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Abstract
In this dissertation I argue that truth-conditional semantics for vague predicates, combined
with a Bayesian account of statistical inference incorporating knowledge of truth-conditions
of utterances, generates false predictions regarding negations and metalinguistic inference.
I thus propose a fundamentally probabilistic semantics for vagueness on which the meaning
of a vague predicate is a likelihood function on the states it encodes, with these likelihoods
being generated via reinforcement learning in a signaling game.
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This dissertation constitutes an extended argument against truth-conditional semantics for
relative gradable adjectives—that is, words like ‘tall’, which uniformly give rise to a group of
phenomena associated with what is known in philosophical circles as vagueness—and in favor
of an alternative, probabilistic conception of a semantics for relative gradable adjectives. The
phenomena around which my arguments are centered are the statistical inferences that we
typically make upon hearing sentences such as ‘Feynman is tall.’ Consider if I say to you,
‘Describe Feynman to me’, and you say, ‘Well, Feynman is tall’: I typically decrease the
probability that assign to him being 5′9′′, increase the probability that I assign to him being
6′1′′, and also increase the probability that I assign to him being 6′6′′, (but not by very
much, since being 6′6′′ is so rare.) It seems obvious that these statistical inferences are a
result at least in part of my beliefs concerning the meaning of ‘tall’, since if I believed ‘tall’
meant what we ordinarily mean by ‘short’, or I did not know that ‘tall’ meant anything
at all, I would have engaged in an entirely different pattern of statistical inference. Thus,
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if we identify the meaning of ‘Feynman is tall’ with its truth-conditions, then my beliefs
concerning the truth-conditions of that sentence must enter into an explanation of how I
engage in these statistical inferences.
It is initially puzzling, however, how to do this: one of the distinguishing features of relative
gradable adjectives, and vague words is general, is that they admit of borderline cases: under
what conditions is it true that Feynman is tall? When he is 5′11′′? Or 6′0′′, or 6′1′′? It seems
clearly true that Feynman is tall if he is, say, 6′6′′, and clearly not true if he is, say, 5′6′′.
But between such clear cases are borderline cases, even after we account for some relevant
comparison class—in this case, perhaps, the class of American adult males. Thus, the most
prominent semantic theories for relative gradable adjectives in the literature today handle
the difficult question of the truth-conditions for such adjectives, and the determination of
the truth or falsity of their borderline cases, by appealing to a context-sensitive threshold : in
the case of ‘tall’, a threshold such that above it, ‘Feynman is tall’ comes out true, and below
it, it comes out false. (In §1.2 of this introduction I present in more detail one particularly
prominent example of such a theory, due to Kennedy (2007).) This has the advantage of
allowing such semantic theories to avoid committing to the claim that, say, one counts as
tall for an American adult male when one is 6′2′′, but no shorter. However, such theories are
still committed to a sharp boundary between the conditions under which ‘Feynman is tall’
is true, and the conditions under which it is false; in contrast, the statistical inferences we
typically engage in when we hear that sentence asserted seem smooth and continuous: my
own sense is that upon hearing Feynman called ‘tall’ I woud smoothly increase from 0 the
probability of his being a given height, starting from about 5′10′′, up to about 6′2′′, and then
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smoothly decrease it for all heights from there on up, with little probability being assigned
to him being, say, 6′6′′. How then we can generate smooth probability distributions from
sharp cutoffs?
In Chapter 2, I examine a recent proposal by Lassiter and Goodman (2017) that attempts to
fill in this gap between a hearer’s knowledge of the truth-conditions of ‘Feynman is tall’, and
their probability distribution for Feynman’s height posterior to hearing that sentence. Their
model is a development of Gricean pragmatics along Bayesian lines, in which a pragmatic
receiver ρ2 assumes that he is listening to a pragmatic speaker σ1 of finite rationality who is,
while choosing between alternative utterances—whether to call him ‘short’, ‘tall’, or saying
nothing at all about his height—attempting to be maximally informative as to the height they
observe Feynman to be, while balancing for the cost of the message. This informativity is
defined relative to ρ2’s conception of a hypothetical literal receiver ρ0 who, given that he hears
‘Feynman is tall’ used with a particular threshold value, assigns 0 probability to all heights
less than that threshold, and proportionally redistributes the missing probability mass over
all heights greater than or equal to that threshold. The truth-conditions of the utterance thus
show up in the literal receiver ρ0, who conditionalizes on the literal truth, relative to the given
threshold, of the utterance: if the threshold was 6′1′′ and I learned only that Feynman was
no shorter than that, I would assign no probability to him being any shorter than that, and
increase the probability of him being 6′1′′, increase but a little less this time the probability
of him being 6′2′′, and so on for greater heights. The pragmatic receiver ρ2 thus has an
utterance production model σ1(‘Feynman is tall’|h, θ) that tells him, for a given height for
Feynman and threshold for tallness, the probability that σ1 will say ‘Feynman is tall’. By
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conditionalizing on a prior distribution for heights and a prior distribution for thresholds, ρ2
infers a posterior probability distribution for Feynman’s height after marginalizing out his
posterior threshold distribution.
The gist of my argument in Chapter 2 is then that that same model, given the same truth-
conditional semantics for ‘tall’, along with the common understanding of the semantics of
negation, makes the wrong predictions about the statistical inferences we make regarding
Feynman’s height, upon hearing an interlocutor’s utterance of ‘Feynman is not tall.’ That is,
upon hearing you say ‘Feynman is not tall’, intuitively, it seems that I decrease the probability
I assign to him being 6′6′′, or even 6′3′′, and correspondingly increase the probability that I
assign to him being 5′9′′, or even 5′6′′. However, the model in question, combined with the
assumption that ‘Feynman is not tall’ is true just in case ‘Feynman is tall’ is false, predicts
that I will engage in a pattern of statistical inference regarding Feynman’s height that is
quite different from the intuitively correct one: it predicts that I will engage in a pattern
of statistical inference concerning Feynman’s height much closer to that which, intuitively,
I engage in when I hear you say ‘Feynman is short.’ In fact, under any plausible parameter
settings, their model predicts that upon hearing ‘Feynman is not tall’, I will engage in a
pattern of statistical inference regarding Feynman’s height that is in fact stronger than that
which I engage in upon hearing ‘Feynman is short’, and this is implausible: it is one thing to
say someone is not tall, it is entirely more to say they are short. Furthermore, their model
predicts that upon hearing ‘Feynman is not tall’ I will engage in a pattern of statistical
inference on which that utterance is interpreted (as far is its implications regarding the
probabilities assigned to various heights is concerned), in a manner opposite from, but far
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stronger than, ‘Feynman is tall.’ Again, this is intuitively incorrect: we want ‘Feynman is not
tall’ to imply something weaker than ‘Feynman is tall’, as far as the probabilities assigned
to Feynman’s height is concerned.
After presenting the details of Lassiter & Goodman’s model, and then presenting the prob-
lems described in the foregoing paragraph, I spend the remainder of Chapter 2 attempting
to resolve these problems: First, I search for solutions within their model, by either varying
its parameters, or examining effects of the conversational context. Second, I attempt to ex-
tend their model in a manner consistent with its initial assumptions, by ascending to higher
levels of the sender-receiver hierarchy: what, for example, a ρ4 receiver would infer from a
σ3 sender thinking about our ρ2 receiver. Third, I attempt to modify their model. After
finding that none of these strategies satisfactorily resolves either of the foregoing problems,
I suggest that we might attempt to fix, external to their model, a plausible distribution for
the threshold above which ‘Feynman is tall’ is true, and below which it is false. I then show
that if we do so, then we can solve, at least at lower levels of the sender-receiver pragmatic
hierarchy, both of the problems with negations of vague predicates.
I then argue that fixing this threshold distribution independently of any model of interpreta-
tion is liable to the objection that there is a simpler model, on which the conditional encoding
probability over heights h and thresholds θ for tallness—that is, σ1(‘Feynman is tall’|h, θ)—is
replaced by a conditional encoding probability over just heights: σ1(‘Feynman is tall’|h).
That is, if I think that the threshold for tallness among American adult males is definitely at
6′1”, I will think that the probability that the speaker will say ‘Feynman is tall’ if Feynman
is less than 6′1′′ is 0, and 1 if he is as tall as or taller than 6′1′′. Similarly, if I think there is
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a uniform probability that the threshold distribution is between 6′0′′ and 6′2′′, I will think
that the probability that the speaker will say ‘Feynman is tall’ if Feynman is less than 6′0′′
is 0, and 1 if he is as tall as or taller than 6′2′′, and will linearly increase between 6′0′′ and
6′2′′.
On this simpler model, with the thresholds absent, the truth-conditions have dropped out
too; listeners consider only the probability that the speaker would say ‘Feynman is tall’ given
that Feynman is a given height. If this model is viable, then we might well wonder how it is
that we come use words in this probabilistic manner, and thus how listeners come to know
these conditional encoding probabilities. In the background is a question as to the source
of our knowledge of the threshold distribution: do we infer a threshold distribution for ‘tall’
from our observations of how the encoding behavior of our co-linguals varies with the heights
of the things they are describing? Or do we infer a threshold distribution on the basis of
what we take to be our pre-existing common knowledge of the truth-conditions of our words,
along with a characterization of the speaker’s relevant psychological features, such as their
degree of rationality, and their subjective cost of talking? As one might anticipate, I will
plump for the former option, but that requires that we be able to give a plausible explanation
for how such probabilistic encoding behavior might arise.
Thus, in Chapter 3, I discuss some recent attempts to provide such an explanation. I start
by introducing the notion of a signaling game from D. Lewis (1969): here, a sender observes
a state, determined by nature and unobservable to a receiver, and must choose a signal to
encode that state. The receiver must decode that signal by taking appropriate actions, and
both players receive a common reward if the sender and receiver appropriately coordinate
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their encoding and decoding strategies. I also introduce the associated notion of a convention,
which is a strict Nash equilibrium satisfying certain other constraints. I then present the
proof from Lipman (2009) that vagueness, understood in the context of a signaling game as
probabilistic encoding over different states of the world, is never a strict Nash equilibrium,
and thus cannot be explained purely in terms of Lewis’ notion of convention. I then consider
the prospects for an alternative explanation, in terms of evolutionary game theory, for how
probabilistic signaling behavior might arise over multiple iterations of play of a signaling
game: First, I consider the replicator dynamics, under which (roughly) the probability at a
given time that a given strategy will be played—in the case of a signaling game where the
states of nature are the heights of an object, the probability of a sender encoding a given
height with a given signal at a given iteration of the game, and the probability of a receiver
decoding a given signal as a given height at a given iteration of the game—is determined by
the success of that strategy in past iterations of the game. I then show that probabilistic
encoding behavior is not predicted to arise under the replicator dynamics. Second, I consider
the best response dynamics, according to which at a given iteration of the game, a player
chooses the best response to other player’s choices in previous iterations of the game. Again,
I show that probabilistic encoding behavior is not predicted to arise under the best response
dynamics of evolutionary game theory.
Then, I turn to two recent attempts to explain probabilistic encoding behavior in signaling
games: First, I discuss work from Franke, Jäger, and Van Rooij (2010), on which probabilistic
encoding (and decoding) behavior is derived from an assumption of limited rationality on
the part of the sender and receiver: the sender and receiver do not deterministically choose
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payoff maximizing encoding and decoding strategies; instead, the probability that they will
choose a given strategy monotonically increases with its payoff. However, I find that this
model fails to provide an adequate explanation of why it is that senders and receivers fail to
choose payoff maximizing strategies, and thus it fails to predict to what degree, and under
what conditions, probabilistic encoding and decoding behavior will emerge.
Next, I present work from O’Connor (2014), which draws on reinforcement learning to explain
how probabilistic encoding behavior arises in signaling games. On this view, as in the
replicator dynamics, the probability of encoding a given height with a given signal at a given
iteration of the game is determined by the success of that strategy in past iterations of the
game. Crucially, however, the success of that strategy in a given iteration of the game also
increases the probability that heights nearby that height will be encoded by that signal in
the next iteration of the game. Similarly, the success of a given decoding strategy in a given
iteration of the game will increase the probability that in the next iteration of the game, the
state that that signal was decoded as, and also nearby states, will be used to decode that
same signal. This approach then yields stable probabilistic encoding behavior over multiple
iterations of game play.
Finally, I extend O’Connor’s work in two ways: First, I argue that an adequate game theoretic
model of the origins of vagueness should allow players to switch roles as sender and receiver
over various iterations of the game. Now, the sender’s probabilities of encoding a given
height are represented in a state-to-signal weight matrix; for any given observed state, the
probability that a sender chooses a given signal to encode that state is the ratio of the
weight for that signal for that height, to the sum of the weights of all signals, for that
8
height. Likewise, the receiver’s probabilities of decoding a given signal as a given state is
represented in a signal-to-state matrix; for any given received signal, the probability that a
receiver chooses a given height to decode that signal is the ratio of the weight for that height
for that signal, to the sum of the weights of all heights, for that signal. But, if we allow a
sender’s state-to-signal weight matrix to be transposed and become a signal-to-state weight
matrix, and vice-versa, then we can have a single representation of both the encoding and
decoding probabilities, and a player’s encoding behavior can be affected by his past encoding
and decoding behavior; similarly for their decoding behavior. Thus, an encoder can become
a decoder, and vice-versa. I show that, as one might hope, vagueness persists under these
conditions.
My second extension of O’Connor’s framework concerns the distribution of the states that the
sender observes: O’Connor only examines signaling games where the heights that the receiver
observes follow a uniform distribution over a bounded range. However, often the features that
we encode using vague predicates follow a Gaussian, and not uniform, distribution; thus, the
heights of American adult males is roughly a Gaussian distribution, with an average of 5′9′′
and a standard deviation of 3′′. I demonstrate that the kind of probabilistic signaling behavior
characteristic of vagueness can emerge when the distribution of heights is not uniform, but
instead Gaussian.
Now, I argued in Chapter 2 that one specific model of how, from knowledge of the truth-
conditions of sentences such as ‘Feynman is tall’, listeners engage in the statistical inference
patterns that we pre-theoretically expect them to engage in upon hearing that sentence as-
sertively uttered, is subject to problems with negation that motivate a move to an alternative,
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simpler theory of statistical inference: one in which the truth-conditions of the utterance no
longer appear, having been replaced by the receiver’s conception of how the probability of
the sender uttering what they did, varies with the height of the object described. In Chapter
3 I then attempted to justify this theory by pointing to a plausible explanation, pre-existing
in the literature, for how such probabilistic encoding behavior might arise independent of
any sender or receiver considering the truth-conditions of their utterances. In Chapter 4, I
argue that the problems with negation discussed in Chapter 2 generalize to a class of models,
all of which attempt to explain, based on our knowledge of the truth-conditions of sentences
containing vague predicates, how we engage in the expected statistical inference patterns
upon hearing such sentences. I also present in Chapter 4 two additional arguments against
such a class of models. First, however, I demonstrate that a number of operations that have
featured prominently in recent semantics and pragmatics are in fact equivalent, and are all
special cases of an equation identical in form if not substance to one seen in Chapter 2,
that generates statistical inference patterns from utterances of sentences containing vague
predicates. I then argue that conformation to this equation is in fact a requirement for
any plausible Bayesian model of how, given utterances containing vague predicates, listeners
draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical inference patterns from beliefs concerning the
truth-conditions of such utterances. This equation then characterizes the general class of
models that I am concerned to reject.
Of course, it must be admitted that just because a model does not belong to this class
of models, does not entail that it does not exist; thus, perhaps there is a non-Bayesian
model for how we can go from knowledge of the truth-conditions of ‘Feynman is tall’ to the
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kinds of statistical inferences we typically make upon hearing that utterance. Nonetheless,
without first producing such a model we seem unable to determine whether one might exist.
Accordingly, my strategy here is not to exhaustively categorize all of the possible models of
how the expected statistical inference patterns can be generated from knowledge of the truth-
conditions of utterances containing vague predicates; instead, I take the initial plausibility
of this class of models as evidence that it is a good starting point, and make what changes
are necessary to the semantics, in order to generate the expected statistical inferences.
I thus present an alternative model of the manner in which utterances of sentences with vague
predicates give rise to the expected statistical inference patterns, of both metalinguistic and
non-metalinguistic kinds. On this model, in non-metalinguistic uses of vague predicates
the truth-conditions of utterances of sentences containing vague predicates have been, at
bottom, replaced by the kind of probabilistic encoding and decoding behavior the origins of
which were discussed in Chapter 3. Bayesian calculations based on anything recognizable
as the truth-conditions of such sentences, are used only to generate metalinguistic inference
patterns, with a probability distribution for thresholds defined by taking the derivative of the
sender’s encoding probabilities. Knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance containing
a vague predicate is only reflected as knowledge of the encoding probabilities, conditional
on first, the subject of the utterance’s degree of deviation, with respect to the property
expressed by that vague predicate, from some measure of central tendency, and second, the
threshold for application of that vague predicate, again expressed as some requisite degree of
deviation, with respect to the property expressed by that vague predicate. The upshot is that
knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance of a sentence containing a vague predicate
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does not play any role in generating the non-metalinguistic statistical inference patterns that
we expect from utterances of sentences with vague predicates. Finally, on the assumption
that it is knowledge of the meaning of vague predicates that allows us to engage in the the
kind of statistical inferences we typically engage in when we hear utterances of sentences
containing vague predicates, I propose a probabilistic semantics for vague predicates, and
demonstrate how we can integrate such a view with an existing degree-theoretic, truth-
conditional semantics.
1.2 Degree-Theoretic Semantics
1.2.1 Motivating Degrees as a Semantic Type
In order to isolate the kinds of words that give rise to vagueness, we can observe that some
words are gradable, and some are not. Furthermore, following Kennedy (2007) and earlier
work in Kennedy and McNally (2005), Rusiecki (1985), and Unger (1975), we can distin-
guish between absolute and relative gradable adjectives, only the latter of which give rise to
the phenomenon of vagueness. As Kennedy points out, gradable adjectives—such as ‘tall’,
‘thick’, ‘pure’, ‘flat’, and ‘opaque’—can be distinguished from non-gradable adjectives—such
as ‘biological’, ‘postal’, and ‘tertiary’—in that the former, but not the latter, can feature in
constructions with various kinds of degree morphology, including comparative morphemes




a. * That book is more biological than this one
b. * This office is very postal
c. * This derivative is too tertiary for the computer
all sound unacceptable. In contrast,
(2) Gradable adjectives
a. This piece of glass is as thick as that one
b. This table is very flat
c. This window is so opaque that I cannot see through it
all sound acceptable. Another difference not yet noted to my knowledge is that many (but
not all) gradable, but not non-gradable, adjectives occur with measure phrases1:
(5) a. * This derivative is 1.8 degrees tertiary
b. This piece of glass is 2 inches thick
1Ben Levinstein points out examples such as:
(3) a. Alice is 5 months pregnant.
b. Bob is 5 years gone.
but these do not seem to indicate the degree of pregnancy or of deadness. Instead I suggest they are elliptical
for:
(4) a. Alice has been pregnant for 5 years.
b. Bob has been dead for 5 years.
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The common feature of degree morphology and measure phrases is that they appear to modify
the degree or gradation to which the modified adjective holds of the object in question; to be
told a piece of glass is thick is one thing, to be told a piece of glass is very thick is another,
and to be told a piece of glass is 2 inches thick is yet another. The difference between the
first and second message appears to be that the latter message tells us that the glass has a
greater degree of thickness than the former message; the difference between the first and third
message appears to be that the latter message tells us exactly what degree of thickness the
glass possesses, while the former message merely conveys a range of possible thicknesses. On
account of their ability to combine with degree morphology and measure phrases, gradable
adjectives have been semantically analyzed as involving functions on degrees, where totally
ordered sets of degrees constitute a scale. Thus, the meaning of the positive form ‘tall’ has
been taken to be, roughly, having a degree greater on the height scale than a contextually
determined degree standard for some relevant comparison class (which is, depending on the
version of the view, either pragmatically or semantically determined). Likewise the meaning
of the comparative form ‘taller than y ’ has been taken to be, roughly, having a degree on
the height scale greater than the maximal degree of the height of y. And the meaning of
the measure phrase form ‘1.8 meters tall’ has been taken to be, roughly, having a degree
on the height scale equal to 1.8 meters. Thus, in addition to entities, truth-values, possible
worlds, and times, such theories of gradable adjectives countenance degrees among the basic
semantic types.
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1.2.2 Relative vs Absolute Gradable Adjectives
Next, I want to explain the distinction between absolute and relative gradable adjectives,
for three reasons: First, in order to more precisely characterize the kinds of adjectives that
give rise to vagueness, and why they do so. Second, in order to show that there is a real
distinction here, so that differences in the structures of the degree scales have real explana-
tory work to do. And third, in order to provide context for how I will later diverge from the
usual characterization of the degree scales for both absolute and relative gradable adjectives.
As for the distinction: Kennedy (2007) points out two ways (among others) of observing
the difference between absolute and relative gradable adjectives. First, if we control for
imprecision, we can see that absolute gradable adjectives allow for natural precisifications,
but relative gradable adjectives do not. An utterance of (5b) can be varyingly imprecise,
depending on the context of use; if we are talking about armored cars, (5b) might be ap-
propriately used to describe a piece of glass 1.95 inches thick, but if we are talking about
satellite telescope lenses, (5b) might be inappropriate to talk about a piece of glass 1.999
inches thick. Similarly, in certain contexts
(6) The building is empty
might be appropriately used to describe a building with a janitor in it late at night; in other
contexts it might require that the building be absolutely unpopulated, such as if we were
about to demolish it. The fact that ‘empty’ has imprecise uses should not obscure the fact
that it has a natural precisification of there being absolutely no persons present inside; it is
thus an absolute adjective, but still, in view of ‘emptier’, ‘as empty as’, and so on, a gradable
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adjective. In contrast, ‘tall’ admits of no natural precisification, even after we account for
a comparison class; to draw the line for ‘tall’ among male collegiate basketball players at
exactly 80.000 inches seems as arbitrary as at exactly 80.001 inches.
Second, relative gradable adjectives lack entailments had by absolute gradable adjectives;
contrast tall with pure. Something completely pure has absolutely no impurities; to say that
something is impure is then to say that it has a degree of impurity greater than the minimum
of having absolutely no impurities. Then the denial that something is impure entails that it
has no impurities, and we predict that
(7) The assay is not impure, but there are some undesired surfactants in it
is contradictory. In contrast, ‘tall’ has no such entailments; consider:
(8) John is not tall, but he is slightly taller than average.
The latter half of (8) requires that John have some degree of height, but John not being tall
of course does not rule that out.
Third, these and other facts suggests that absolute gradable adjectives and relative gradable
adjectives can be distinguished by the presence or absence of absolute minimum or maximum
values on the scale of degrees that these adjectives stand for; this in turn suggests that
degree modifiers that pick out maximal or minimal degrees should be available or unavailable
depending on the presence or absence of the minimum or maximum values. Maximal degree
modifiers are words such as completely, perfectly, and totally ; minimal degree modifiers are
words such as slightly, partly, and a little. And indeed, we find that
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(9) a. ??perfectly/??slightly: tall, deep, expensive, likely
b. ??perfectly/??slightly: short, shallow, inexpensive, unlikely
are all unacceptable, but the maximal and minimal modifiers of antonym pairs that encode
degree scales with absolute maximums are acceptable:
(10) a. perfectly/??slightly: certain, safe, pure, accurate
b. ??perfectly/slightly: uncertain, dangerous, impure, inaccurate
as are the minimal and maximal modifiers of antonym pairs that encode degree scales with
absolute minimums:
(11) a. ??perfectly/slightly: bent, bumpy, dirty, worried
b. perfectly/??slightly: straight, flat, clean, unworried
Finally, we see that some words allow both maximal and minimal degree modifiers:
(12) a. perfectly/slightly: full, open, opaque
b. perfectly/slightly: empty, closed, transparent
Perhaps most importantly for a theory of vagueness, the lack of natural precisifications seems
to give rise to the classic symptoms of vague predicates: susceptibility to Sorites arguments,
the existence of borderline cases, and context-sensitivity. With a natural precisification we
seem able to resist the first step in the Sorites argument: ‘Here, and here alone, is where
the theater is empty, all else is loose talk’; without a natural precisification, we cannot stop
and say ‘Here, here is where the tall are, and no less.’ With a natural precisification, we
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can eliminate borderline cases: ‘Empty means empty, nada, zilch, no one’; without, we must
admit: ‘Is 6’0” tall? Kind of.’ And with a natural precisification we can see that what really
counts as empty is not context sensitive: if I say
(13) Please give me the empty one,
and ask for one of two cups, one of which is emptier than the other but neither of which are
really empty, you will not know which one to give me, as neither is empty. If I ask you
(14) Please give me the tall one,
and ask for one of two cups, one of which is significantly taller than the other, but neither
of which are actually tall, you will know which one to give me.
1.2.3 A Semantics Proper
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that there is some semantic element in common
between the positive, comparative, superlative, and other variants of a gradable adjectives,
both relative and absolute: ‘tall’, ‘taller’, ‘tallest’, and other such variants all share something
in common, and a good semantic analysis of ‘tall’ should show just what that is. ‘taller’,
for example, has been analyzed as a involving both a comparative degree morpheme, (the
[Deg -er ] ending), and an adjectival phrase [AP tall ] that the comparative degree morpheme
takes as input. J [AP tall ] K is thus taken to be a particular measure function; that is, a
function from various entities e to various degrees of height d :
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J [AP tall ] K = λxe.tall(x) (1.1)
‘-er’ is then taken to be a function on measure functions: given any measure function, it
delivers a function which, given an entity (the thing to which the subject is compared),
delivers a function which given another entity (the subject), delivers a truth value:
J [Deg -er ] K = λg〈e,d〉λyeλxe.g(x) > g(y) (1.2)
Thus, since semantic composition is functional application, we have
J [DegP [AP tall ] -er ]K = J [DegP -er] K(J [AP tall ]K)
= [λg〈e,d〉λyeλxe.g(x) > g(y)](λxe.tall(x))
= λyeλxe.tall(x) > tall(y)
(1.3)
Likewise, a common analysis of the unmarked, positive form tall is that it involves the same
adjectival phrase [AP tall ] and an unarticulated, but still present, morpheme [Deg pos- ] that
takes a measure function and delivers a function from entities to truth values. It does so by
deriving from the measure function a degree of possession of the property measured by the
measure function that an entity must have in order for it to satisfy the vague predicate in
question; in short, it derives a standard of application from the measure function. This is
usually taken to involve a function s that takes the measure function as input, and outputs
the degree required for satisfaction of the vague predicate. In this case, we have:
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J [DegP pos-] K = λg〈e,d〉λxe.g(x) ≥ s(g) (1.4)
If we compose [Deg pos- ] and [AP tall ] to get the bare positive form ‘tall’, we have:
J [DegP pos- [AP tall ] ] K = J [DegP pos- ] K(J [AP tall ] K)
= [ λg〈e,d〉λxe.g(x) ≥ s(g) ](λxe.tall(x))
= λxe.tall(x) ≥ s(tall)
(1.5)
Now, one clear problem with an analysis such as in (1.4) is that it fails to account for the
context-sensitivity of ‘tall’: in a context where we are watching Feynman standing down on
the basketball court next to some NBA players, ‘Feynman is tall’ seems false; in a context
where Feynman is standing around with his shorter colleagues, ‘Feynman is tall’ seems
true. And this is of course related to the problem of the comparison class: one way to
account for the apparent context-sensitivity of vague predicates is to posit, in the absence
of a prepositional modifier such as ‘for a physicist’, an implicit comparison class that is
contextually determined. In the first case above, the comparison class is perhaps the set of
basketball players, or the set of people on the court; in the second case, the comparison class
seems to be his shorter colleagues standing around him. But context and ‘for’-phrases do
not seem to be the only ways to introduce a comparison class; another way to do so is to use
a vague predicate to modify a noun phrase: for example, ‘Feynman is a tall physicist.’ If we
think that ‘Feynman is a tall physicist’ and ‘Feynman is tall for a physicist’ and ‘Feynman
is tall’ (when uttered in a context in which the comparison class is physicists) all have the
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same meaning, then we might be tempted to give an analysis such as:
J [DegP pos- ] K = λg〈e,d〉λk〈e,t〉λxe . g(x) ≥ s(k)(g) (1.6)
where our comparison class k is introduced by either a nominal such as ‘physicist’ or the
prepositional phrase ‘for a physicist’, and s computes the standard of comparison from the
restriction of the function g to the set of physicists. There are problems with such an account,
however.
First, we can make good sense of
(15) Feynman is a tall physicist, but he is not tall for a physicist.
If, however, modified nominal constructions and prepositionally modified constructions in-
troduce the same comparison class in the same way, as per (1.6), then (15) should be a
flat-out contradiction. In fact, (15) indicates that in modified nominal constructions such
as ‘Feynman is a tall physicist’, the nominal does not determine the comparison class, in
contrast to prepositionally modified constructions, in which it does.
Second, we have been assuming that s computes either the average, or the median, or some
precise standard of comparison from the measure function. As Graff (2000) has noted, how-
ever, adding the comparison class of physicists to ‘tall’ should then eliminate any vagueness
in ‘tall for a physicist’, when in fact it does not: if there is a group of famous, extremely
tall physicists standing near Feynman, I might know that the mean height for physicists is
6′1′′ and still not think ‘Feynman is tall for a physicist’ is true—and likewise for the median,
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mode, or other statistical measure of the heights of physicists. Thus, even for prepositionally
modified constructions, there must be some further element of context-sensitivity that is not
captured by (1.6).
Thus, (1.6) is at best an analysis of a bare positive construction such as ‘Feynman is tall’,
where context supplies the comparison class, and vagueness results from uncertainty sur-
rounding the identity of the comparison class. Even this, however, seems wrong: once we
make explicit the comparison class via a prepositional modifier such as ‘for a physicist’, we
should eliminate all vagueness, if (1.6) is correct. As we have seen, this is not so.
If (1.6) is insufficient, how can we account for the manner in which comparison classes can
affect the semantics of vague predicates? One option, as in Kennedy (2007), is to claim that
the denotation of a vague predicate is such that s never takes as input a comparison class
variable as it does in (1.6), whether that predicate occurs in constructions such as ‘Feynman
is tall’, ‘Feynman is a tall physicist’, or ‘Feynman is tall for a physicist’. Instead, on this view,
we treat ‘Feynman is a tall physicist’ as equivalent to ‘Feynman is tall and a physicist’, and
account for the apparent manner in which ‘physicist’ affects the degree required to be tall by
claiming that s is a context-sensitive function, and the occurrence of ‘physicist’ is one factor
of context that affects just which degree is required. On Kennedy’s view, s is a function
that chooses a standard of comparison such that ‘Feynman is tall’ or ‘Feynman is tall for
a physicist’ is true of Feynman just in case in the context of utterance the degree to which
Feynman is tall stands out, where ‘stands out’ is to be understood in purely distributional
terms, (and not agent-relative or speaker-relative terms, in order to avoid the objections that
Stanley (2003) raises against Graff (2000) and Bogus lawski (1975)).
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How then, if we keep the denotation of the positive null morpheme [Deg pos- ] as in (1.4),
are we to account for the meaning of prepositionally modified constructions such as ‘tall for
a physicist’? Kennedy notes that vague predicates seem to exhibit a surprising difference
between when they are used to modify nominals, and when they are themselves modified by
prepositional phrases: constructions of the form [x is [DegP pos- [AP A for an NP ] ] ] seem
to presuppose that the referent of x is a member of the class expressed by the noun phrase.
Thus, he claims that sentences such as:
(16) a. Kyle’s car is big for a Buick.
b. Kyle’s car is not big for a Buick.
c. Is Kyle’s car big for a Buick?
all require Kyle’s car to be a Buick. He points to the following pairs of sentences as evidence,
where the apparent dissonance of the first member seems due to presupposition failure.
(17) a. ? Kyle’s BMW is expensive for a Honda.
b. Kyle’s BMW is (really) an expensive Honda.
(18) a. ? Kyle’s BMW is not expensive for a Honda.
b. Kyle’s BMW is (obviously) not an expensive Honda.
(19) a. ? Is Kyle’s BMW expensive for a Honda?
b. Is Kyle’s BMW (actually) an expensive Honda?
He predicts presupposition failure by positing that the adjectival phrase ‘tall’ has a variant
‘tall∗’ such that:
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J [A tall∗ ] K = λk〈e,t〉λxe : k(x).tall(x) (1.7)
which is just the same function as ‘tall’, except with its domain restricted to those things
satisfying λxe.k(x). Jtall∗K thus combines with the denotation of the noun phrase contributed
by a prepositional modifier. Keeping (11) the same, we get
J [AP tall∗ [PP for a physicist ] ] K = λye : physicist(y).tall(y) (1.8)
J [DegP pos- [AP tall∗ [PP for a physicist ] ] ] K =
λxe[λye : physicist(y).tall(y))](x) ≥ S([ λye : physicist(y).tall(y)]) (1.9)
Thus, (1.9) is a function defined only on physicists, and a sentence such as ‘Frege is tall
for a physicist’ will result in a failure to compute a denotation, as expected in cases of
presupposition failure. Rather than act as an input to S, the comparison class is an input
to a type-shifted adjectival phrase.
As far my project in this dissertation is concerned, the important feature of the denotations
for ‘tall’ and ‘tall for a physicist’ in (1.5) and (1.9), respectively, are that s preserves the
context-sensitivity of ‘tall’; we might think of it as a function from a context and a measure
function to a threshold for application of the adjective. Or, we might think there are many
different functions, one for each adjective: stall, sshort, and so on, each a function from a
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context c to a threshold θ. Or, we might relativize the truth-value of ‘Feynman is tall’ to
a context c, and let the threshold for tallness θtall be whichever one was the output of s(c).
Or, since it is the context that determines the thresholds, we might simply let the thresholds
be the context, and have:
JFeynman is tall Kθtall,θshort,... = tall(Feynman) ≥ θtall (1.10)
With the context sensitivity of the truth-conditions front and center, we can now ask, how is
it that from a knowledge of these truth-conditions we can engage in the statistical inference





We saw in Chapter 1 a common semantics from Kennedy (2007) for both absolute and relative
gradable adjectives, the latter of which I will also call vague predicates, as the absolute
gradable adjectives arguably do not give rise to vagueness, or at least do so with much lower
regularity. On this semantics, ‘Feynman is tall’ is true just in case Feynman’s degree of
height is greater than or equal to some contextually determined threshold of application
θtall. For our purposes, this comes to:
JFeynman is tall Kθtall,θshort,... = tall(Feynman) ≥ θtall, (1.10)
where tall is a function from objects to degrees of tallness. This does not address, however,
a important question concerning relative gradable adjectives: how we as listeners are able to
interpret usages of relative gradable adjectives to engage in the statistical inferences that we
all clearly do engage in. Thus, from hearing someone called ‘tall’, I lower the probability that
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they are 5’7”, and increase the probability that they are 6’1”. With no natural precisifications
at which we can place the contextually variant degree standard for tallness, we seem unable
to determine where the threshold might be, and thus how tall someone might be, when they
are called ‘tall’.
Lassiter and Goodman (2017) address this question by claiming that a receiver can engage
in a process of Gricean-inspired Bayesian reasoning to learn about both what Feynman’s
height might be and where the threshold for tallness might be. They posit a receiver who
estimates the probability that a sender would utter ‘Feynman is tall’, given that Feynman is
tall to degree h, and given that the threshold is θ. This receiver also has a prior probability
distribution for Feynman’s degree of tallness—a normal distribution, as seems realistic—and
an uninformative, uniform prior probability distribution for the threshold for tallness. Then,
they engage in a process of Bayesian reasoning to calculate posterior probabilities for both
Feynman’s degree of tallness, which we may for now think of as his height, and the threshold
for tallness. Thus, on their model, receivers do not have to have prior information about
the distribution of thresholds in order to learn how tall Feynman might be upon hearing
‘Feynman is tall’; instead, pragmatic reasoning processes allows them to gain information
about both Feynman’s height and the thresholds for tallness.
After introducing their model of interpretation, I argue that it makes the wrong predictions
about the statistical inferences we engage in when we hear ‘Feynman is not tall’, given
the standard semantics for negation, on which ‘Feynman is not tall’ is true just in case
‘Feynman is tall’ is not true. After examining several different ways of addressing this
problem and finding all of them unsatisfactory, I show that we can predict the intuitively
27
correct patterns of statistical inference from their model, at least at lower levels of the
sender-receiver pragmatic hierarchy, if instead of uninformative, uniform prior threshold
distributions, we think of the receivers as having informative, non-uniform prior threshold
distributions. However, having fixed prior threshold distributions suggests a simpler model of
interpretation on which there there are no thresholds; listeners consider only the probability
that the speaker would say ‘Feynman is tall’ given that Feynman is a given height, and
leverage a prior distribution for Feynman’s height to calculate a posterior distribution for
his height. This then raises the question, what is the source of our knowledge of how
these utterance probabilities vary with Feynman’s height? If we do not infer a threshold
distribution on the basis of what we take to be our pre-existing common knowledge of the
truth-conditions of our words, along with a characterization of the relevant features of the
speaker’s psychology, then how do we know what the threshold distribution is like? I claim
that we infer this from our observations of the encoding behavior of members of our linguistic
community, but this first requires that the encoding behavior characteristic of how we use
vague predicates can arise in the first place. I address this question in Chapter 3.
2.2 Bayes-Grice Models of Vagueness
Lassiter and Goodman (2017) attempt to address this question, (and offer some somewhat
competing explanations of the origins of the features characteristic of vagueness), in terms
of an iterated sender-receiver hierarchy. They posit a pragmatic receiver (or listener) ρ2 who
thinks they are receiving a message from a pragmatic sender σ1 assumed (by ρ2) to know the
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correct answer h to the topic of conversation, or Question Under Discussion (Ginzburg 1995a,
b)—for example, perhaps that topic is Feynman’s height h. Drawing on Fox and Katzir
(2011), they further specify that ρ2 assumes that σ1 chooses from some set of alternative
utterances ALT which represent a subset of possible answers to the QUD; thus, ρ2 thinks of
σ1 as choosing between uttering, say, Feynman is tall, Feynman is short, or nothing at all.
ρ2 also thinks of σ1 as in turn assuming that σ1 is speaking to a literal receiver ρ0. Finally,
at bottom ρ0 updates their probability estimate on Feynman’s height in accordance with the
truth-conditions for gradable adjectives that we see in Equation (1.10).
Let us say that u1 = Feynman is tall, u2 = Feynman is short, and the null utterance = u0.
For the sake of brevity, we will also use θ1 for θtall and θ2 for θshort. The probability density
that ρ0 assigns to Feynman’s height h upon hearing u1 used with some given threshold value
θ1 is derived by assigning 0 to h where h is less than θ1, and where h is greater than or equal
to θ1, assigning to h his prior probability density for h—that is, φ(h)—normalized by the
cumulative probability distribution φ(h) for h ≥ θ1. That is, whatever the literal receiver
thinks the threshold for tall is, upon hearing Feynman is tall, the literal receiver assumes
there is no probability that Feynman is shorter than that threshold, and for every height
equal to or greater than that threshold, assigns a new probability density to that height by
dividing the old probability density by the total old probability mass above the threshold.
In the discrete case, suppose there were 5 possible heights h, and φ(h) was uniform for each
height and thus φ(h) = 1
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for each h. Then, if the literal receiver thought the threshold for
tall was the middle height, then upon hearing Feynman is tall, the literal receiver would








other heights. Thus, we can say:





if h ≥ θ1
0 otherwise
(2.1)
Similarly for u2 = Feynman is short, which is interpreted by ρ0 as the mirror-image of u1:
1




if h ≤ θ2
0 otherwise
(2.2)
The probability density that ρ0 assigns to John’s height h upon hearing no utterance at all
is the same as ρ0’s prior probability density φ(h) for John’s height. Thus θ1 and θ2 drop out
since u0 is interpreted the same way regardless of θ1 or θ2:
ρ0(h|u0) = φ(h) (2.3)
Next, given these definitions of how ρ0 interprets, Lassiter and Goodman (2017) posit that
σ1 probabilistically chooses an utterance as a function of the utility of the utterance; in the
case of tall, assuming that σ1 desires to be as informative to ρ0 about Feynman’s height h
as possible while balancing for the production cost of the message, the utility increases with
increasing informativity about h, and decreases with the production cost of the message.
The informativities INFO of the utterances u0, u1, u2, relative to a given height h, (and
1For reasons given below, the non-finite limits in (2.1) and (2.2) will be replaced by finite limits.
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given threshold θ1 and θ2 in the case of u1 and u2, respectively), are thus defined as the
natural log of the probability density that ρ0 assigns to the height h given the utterance and
the corresponding threshold, if any:
INFO(u0, h) = ln(ρ0(h|u0)) (2.4a)
INFO(u1, h, θ1) = ln(ρ0(h|u1, θ1)) (2.4b)
INFO(u2, h, θ2) = ln(ρ0(h|u2, θ2)) (2.4c)
To see the intuition behind these definitions, consider the informativity of u1 in the case
of a discrete probability distribution over heights: suppose that Feynman’s height is some
particular value h. If ρ0(h|u1, θ1) is close to 1, that means ρ0 has received almost maxi-
mal information about Feynman’s height from hearing Feynman is tall and assuming that
the threshold for tall is θ1: for ρ0, Feynman’s height is almost certain to be h. Then
ln(ρ0(h|u1, θ1)) will be close to 0. Where ρ0(h|u1, θ1) is close to 0, that means ρ0 has received
minimal information about Feynman’s height from hearing Feynman is tall and assuming
that the threshold for tall is θ1: for ρ0, Feynman’s height is almost certain to not be h. Then
ln(ρ0(h|u, θ1)) will be close to −∞. Thus for discrete probability distributions over heights
h, for any given h, INFO(u1, h, θ1) is between −∞ and 0, and INFO(u1, h, θ1) increases as
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ρ0 assigns higher probability to h given that the threshold for tall in Feynman is tall is θ1.
2,3
As for the production cost C(u) of the message, Lassiter and Goodman (2017) assume that
it monotonically increases with the difficulty of articulation, and approximate the difficulty
of articulation as the number of words in the message. They report plausible results with
C(u) set to 2
3
the number of words, and thus fix it to that.
Given these definitions of informativity and cost we can define the utility U to σ1 of message
u1 (u2) used with threshold θ1 (θ2) to encode height h as:
2Similar remarks apply in the case of continuous probability distributions, except that INFO(u0, h),
INFO(u1, h, θ1), INFO(u2, h, θ2), Uσ1(u0, h), Uσ1(u1, h, θ1), and Uσ1(u2, h, θ2) range between −∞ and ∞,
and so 0 ≤ σ∗1(u0|h), σ∗1(u1|h, θ1), σ∗1(u2|h, θ2) ≤ ∞.
3This notion of informativity might seem to confuse the amount of information with the quality of
information; put another way, it might seem to confuse precision for accuracy. Or to put it yet another
way, if Feynman’s height is h then if ρ0(h|u1, θ1) is close to 0, and thus ρ0 upon hearing Feynman is tall
and assuming that the threshold for tall is θ1 thinks that Feynman’s height is almost certain to not be
h, then it might seem like u1 used with threshold θ1 provides not near-minimal information, but instead
lots and lots of information—just bad information. However, consider that if ALT = {u0, u1} then if
ρ0(h|u0) < ρ0(h|u1, θ1) then u1 used with θ1 provides more information about h than u0, in the sense that
ρ0 assigns higher probability to h upon hearing Feynman is tall and assuming that the threshold for tall
is θ1, than upon hearing nothing at all. Thus, it seems that we only assumed u1 used with θ1 provides
bad information, because we assumed that ρ0 already has better background information in the sense that
φ(h) > ρ0(h|u1, θ1); if this is not so, we do not think that u1 used with θ1 is so mis-informative. Similar
comments apply when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}.
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Uσ1(u1, h, θ1) = INFO(u1, h, θ1)− C(u1) (2.5a)
Uσ1(u2, h, θ2) = INFO(u2, h, θ2)− C(u2) (2.5b)
Similarly, for u0 we have
Uσ1(u0, h) = INFO(u0, h)− C(u0) (2.6)
Thus, we see that the utility to σ1 of a given message increases with informativity of the
message, and decreases with the production cost of the message. Now, since σ1 probabilisti-
cally chooses an utterance as a function of the utility of the utterance, with the probability
of usage increasing as the utility increases, we can use a soft-max function
σ∗1(u1, h, θ1) = e
λ×Uσ1 (u1,h,θ1) (2.7a)
σ∗1(u2, h, θ2) = e
λ×Uσ1 (u2,h,θ2) (2.7b)
to define the non-normalized probability σ∗1 of σ1 using u1 (u2) for any given height h and
threshold θ1 (θ2), for 0 ≤ λ ≤ ∞. Here, λ is a Luce choice parameter, the effect of which
is described below; in the meantime, to again see the intuition in the discrete case for u1:
since −∞ ≤ Uσ1(u, h, θ1) ≤ 0, it follows that 0 ≤ eλ×Uσ1(u,h,θ) ≤ 1, since λ is non-negative
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and the utility is non-positive. In particular, assuming λ > 0, as Uσ1(u, h, θ1) decreases to
−∞, eλ×Uσ1(u,h,θ1) decreases to 0; as Uσ1(u,h,θ1) increases to 0, eλ×Uσ1(u,h,θ1) increases to 1. We
similarly use a soft-max function to define the non-normalized probability of σ1 using u0 for
any given height:
σ∗1(u0, h) = e
λ×Uσ1 (u0,h) (2.8)
Then, the normalized probabilities that σ1 will choose to encode state h with message u0,
u1, or u2 given thresholds θ1 for u1 and θ2 for u2 are defined according to:
σ1(u0|h, θ1, θ2) =
σ∗1(u0, h)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗




σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2) =
σ∗1(u1, h, θ1)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗




σ1(u2|h, θ1, θ2) =
σ∗1(u2, h, θ2)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗




Now we can see the effect of the Luce choice parameter λ: if λ = 0, σ∗1 = 1 for any message
u, and hence σ1 has equal chances of selecting any message no matter its utility. As λ goes
to ∞, σ1 has probability 1 of choosing the utility maximizing message, no matter how small
the difference in utility may be.
Next, upon hearing u0, u1, or u2, receiver ρ2 can infer the joint probability density of h, θ1,
and θ2 by using Bayes’ rule, and assuming the independence of h from (θ1, θ2):
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ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u0) =






σ1(u0|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ1, θ2) dhdθ1dθ2
(2.10a)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u1) =






σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ1, θ2) dθ2dhdθ1
(2.10b)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u2) =






σ1(u2|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ1, θ2) dθ1dhdθ2
(2.10c)
Note that the upper and lower limits for the outer integrals in the denominators of (2.10b)
and (2.10c), respectively, are h because when h ≤ θ1, σ∗1(u1, h, θ1) = 0 and when h ≥ θ2,
σ∗1(u2, h, θ2) = 0. Regarding p(θ1, θ2), Lassiter and Goodman think of ρ2 as assuming the
uniformity and independence of θ1 and θ2; but in what follows we will explore diverging from
this assumption. To allow for this we express p(θ1, θ2) as p(θ1|θ2)× p(θ2) or p(θ2|θ1)× p(θ1)
in (2.11) - (2.13). As for the integral limits a, b specified in (2.10), and in (2.11)-(2.13): since
we assume a uniform distribution for θ1 and θ2 we must restrict the ranges of integration for
θ1 and θ2, and hence also for h, to the finite range indicated in figure (2.1). This introduces
no complications when φ(h) is a Beta or uniform distribution since these are defined only
over finite ranges anyway, but when φ(h) is a normal distribution, it must be truncated to
(a, b).
Finally, we can then calculate ρ2’s posterior probability distribution for h (θ1) upon hearing
u1 by marginalizing over θ1 and θ2 (h and θ2):
4
4Note that in (2.11) we leave out the normalization factor from (2.10b) for brevity. Similarly for (2.12)













σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ2|θ1)× p(θ1) dθ2dh (2.11b)
Likewise, we can calculate ρ2’s posterior probability distribution for h (θ2) upon hearing u2












σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ1|θ2)× p(θ2) dθ1dh (2.12b)
Finally, we can calculate ρ2’s posterior probability distribution for h upon hearing u0 by






σ1(u0|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ2|θ1)× p(θ1) dθ2dθ1 (2.13)
With this model in mind we can return to Lassiter and Goodman (2017)’s claim that the
features of relative gradable adjectives tend to arise when listeners (that is, ρ2) have prior
knowledge that the probability distribution of the relevant comparison class over the degree
scale encoded by the adjective (that is, φ(h)) has little to no probability mass on any end-
points— as when φ(h) is a normal distribution with µ, σ = 0, 1, truncated to the range ±4.
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We see in Figure (2.1) the predictions of their model for such a distribution when λ = 4
and C(u1) = C(u2) = 2. Here, and in all other figures in this chapter where φ(h) is a
normal distribution, the x -axis represents the standard deviation, and the y-axis represents
the probability density. Since the lines all represent probability density functions, the areas
under the curves sum to 1. To get a more specific intuition about these scales, consider
that the average height of an adult American male is 5’9”, and the standard deviation is
approximately 3”; thus roughly 95.45% of adult American males lie between −2 and 2 on
the x -axis in Figure (2.1).
If we think of u1 and u2 as Feynman is tall and Feynman is short, respectively, and the
relevant comparison class as adult men, the model seems to make sensible predictions about
actual receivers’ interpretations of relative gradable adjectives: Upon hearing u1, ρ2 does not
have a precise value for Feynman’s height, nor a sharp upper- or lower-bound for its prob-
ability distribution; instead, ρ2’s probability density function for Feynman’s height shows
gradual monotonic increase and decrease to and from some global maximum. Furthermore,
varying the µ and σ of the relevant comparison class will afford ρ2 varying information
about the height of the object; they thus seem to capture the context-sensitivity of relative
gradable adjectives. Finally, the existence of borderline cases seems to be a straightforward
consequence of ρ2’s posterior distribution for θ1: an object whose height lies close to the
maximum of ρ2(θ1|u1) is borderline ‘tall’.
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λ= 4. 0, C(u1), C(u2) = 2. 0, µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= unrelated+ uniform
Figure 2.1: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals Normal Distribution: λ,C(u1) =
4., 2.
2.3 Negation and Relative Gradable Adjectives
However, I think there are two problems with their explanation of the features of relative
gradable adjectives, both of which are related to negation. First, their explanation predicts
that listeners will make certain kinds of inferences involving negation of adjectives and the
antonyms of those same adjectives, when in fact listeners do not make those inferences. That
is, their model fails to predict certain kinds of inference failures. Second, their explanation
wrongly predicts that the negation of a relative gradable adjective will be interpreted equally
strongly as, but opposite to, how the original adjective will be interpreted.
2.3.1 Unexpected Inferences
While Lassiter and Goodman do not discuss how to apply their model to an explanation of
the entailment patterns of relative gradable adjectives, I think we can see how at least some
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of it would have to go. Consider the failure of the inference from ‘Feynman is not tall’ to
‘Feynman is short.’ Capturing this pattern requires that we modify our model to account for
negation; to this end we can extend Lassiter and Goodman’s work by assuming that negation
forces ρ0 to re-normalize the prior probability mass below (above) the threshold. That is,
we propose that ρ0 interprets ‘Feynman is not tall’ and ‘Feynman is not short’, respectively,
as in (2.14) and (2.15):




if h < θ1
0 otherwise
(2.14)





if h > θ2
0 otherwise
(2.15)
The informativities are then defined as:
INFO(¬u1, h, θ1) = ln(ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1)) (2.16a)
INFO(¬u2, h, θ2) = ln(ρ0(h|¬u2, θ2)) (2.16b)
and the cost, utility, and non-normalized sending probability for ¬u1 and ¬u2 are defined
similarly as above:
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σ∗1(¬u1|h, θ1) = eλ×(ln(ρ0(h|¬u1,θ1))−C(¬u1)) (2.17a)
σ∗1(¬u2|h, θ2) = eλ×(ln(ρ0(h|¬u2,θ2))−C(¬u2)) (2.17b)
The normalized sending probabilities σ1(¬u1, h, θ1, θ2) and σ1(¬u2, h, θ1, θ2) are then:
σ1(¬u1|h, θ1, θ2) =
σ∗1(¬u1, h, θ1)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗
1(u1, h, θ1) + σ
∗
1(u2, h, θ2)+
σ∗1(¬u1, h, θ1) + σ∗1(¬u2, h, θ2)
(2.18a)
σ1(¬u2|h, θ1, θ2) =
σ∗1(¬u2, h, θ2)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗
1(u1, h, θ1) + σ
∗
1(u2, h, θ2)+
σ∗1(¬u1, h, θ1) + σ∗1(¬u2, h, θ2)
(2.18b)
The normalized σ1 sending probabilities for u0, u1, and u2 are similarly defined. Then, the
posterior probability density functions ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) and ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) are defined as
in (2.19a) and (2.19b):
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) =






σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ1, θ2) dθ2dhdθ1
(2.19a)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) =






σ1(u2|h, θ1, θ2)× φ(h)× p(θ1, θ2) dθ1dhdθ2
(2.19b)
The posterior probability density functions ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u0), ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u1), and ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u2)
remain defined as in (2.10a), (2.10b), and (2.10c), respectively. Note that the model does
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not require additional thresholds θ3, θ4 for ¬u1,¬u2, so we can continue to normalize and
marginalize over only h, θ1, θ2.
Consider then relative antonym pairs such as short and tall ; let us assume a context in
which Feynman’s height is the QUD and ρ2 assumes that σ1 is choosing between Feynman
is short, Feynman is not short, Feynman is tall, Feynman is not tall, or saying nothing at
all (that is, ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1, u2,¬u2}). When we hear Feynman is not tall we do not
infer that he is as short as when we hear Feynman is short, and similarly for Feynman is
not short and Feynman is tall. However, this does not seem corroborated by the model,
insofar in Figure (2.2), where again λ = 4, ρ2’s posterior probability distributions for ¬u1
and ¬u2 are actually more extreme than for u2 and u1, respectively, regardless of whether
C(u) = 1
3
× length(u) or C(u) = 4
3
× length(u), or whether λ = 4 or λ = 8. Thus, the model
predicts that from not tall, we can infer short, and from not short we can infer tall. In fact,
Figure (2.2) indicates that the model predicts that upon hearing someone called not short,
we would infer that they are taller than we would upon hearing them called tall, and likewise
for not tall and short, (given that the cost of uttering the first is higher than the second).
2.3.2 Equal and Opposite Interpretations
To see the second problem, contrast what we might infer about Feynman’s height from
hearing Feynman is not tall versus Feynman is tall : given my background knowledge of the
height distribution of American males, in particular that the average is about 5’9”, upon
hearing the latter I might infer he is probably around 6’0”, give or take a couple of inches.
Upon hearing the latter, I might infer that he is probably around 5’8”, again give or take a
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C(u) = 1/3 ∗ length(u)
C(u) = 4/3 ∗ length(u)
λ= 4.
λ= 8.
Lassiter and Goodman Three Signals with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= 8. 0, C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ [1. 4. ], C(¬)≈ [0. 331. 33], µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, 2, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.2: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not: λ = 4., 8., Low Cost High
Cost
couple of inches. Notice that the peak probability in the latter case is closer to the average
than in the former case; this is the sense in which tall and not tall are interpreted in opposite
and unequal manners: hearing someone called not tall seems to merely sharply decrease the
proportion of probability mass at the upper end of the distribution, leaving a long tail as
we move down the scale of heights, whereas hearing someone called tall seems to sharply
decrease the proportion of probability mass at the lower and middle parts of the distribution,
effectively moving the distribution up the scale of heights. In terms of the model, this means
that ρ2(h|u1) should peak closer to the average of the prior distribution than ρ2(h|¬u1), with
a long tail towards the bottom of the height scale. Again assume that Feynman’s height is
the QUD and ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}; perhaps you know that I am looking to round out my
intramural basketball team with someone able to rebound and block shots and am would
thus much prefer, all things being equal, a tall player. You might recommend someone who
is tall, but not particularly athletic, or you might recommend someone who is not tall, but
explosively athletic and intensely competitive. Again, ALT does not have to be realistic,
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only realistic for a listener to assume a speaker chooses from; nonetheless, it seems the
simplest way to get such an ALT is for ALT to be realistic, lest we have to posit other
mechanisms to account for why we do not systematically miscommunicate.




σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗












σ1(¬u1, h, θ1)× φ(h)× p(θ1)dhdθ1
(2.21)
(Note that for ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, σ1(u0, h, θ1) and σ1(u1, h, θ1) and their corresponding
posterior probability densities and marginalizations are similarly defined as in (2.20) and
(2.21).)
The problem, as we see in Figure (2.3), is that ρ2(h|¬u1) actually peaks farther from the
center of the prior distribution than the ρ2(h|u1), with no longer of a tail towards the bottom
than ρ2(h|u1) has towards the top: again, this is so regardless of whether C(u) = 13×length(u)
or C(u) = 4
3
× length(u), or whether λ = 4 or λ = 8.
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C(u) = 1/3 ∗ length(u)
C(u) = 4/3 ∗ length(u)
λ= 4.
λ= 8.
Lassiter and Goodman Two Signals with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= 8. 0, C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ [1. 4. ], C(¬)≈ [0. 331. 33], µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.3: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution: λ =
4., 8. Low Cost High Cost
2.4 Solutions Within the Model
2.4.1 Varying the Parameters
I think we can see from Figures (2.2) and (2.3) that the cost roughly determines the location
of ρ2’s maximum posterior probability density for h given an utterance u, analogous to
determining the mean of a normal distribution; furthermore, the faster the cost increases as
a function of the length of the utterance, the faster the negation of an adjective’s antonym
moves towards the extremes of the degree scale, compared to the adjective itself. Thus in
Figure (2.2) we see that regardless of whether λ = 4 or λ = 8, when C(u) = 4
3
× length(u),
¬u2 has a much more extreme meaning than u1; not as much so when C(u) = 13 × length(u).
In fact, with regards to ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, we might note that our definition of
ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1) is equivalent to the definition of ρ0(h|u2, θ2) except for having substituted <
for ≤ (which substitution was necessitated by the intuition that nothing can be both ‘tall’
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and ‘not tall’). Similar remarks apply to ρ0(h|¬u2, θ2) and ρ0(h|u1, θ1). This has the result
that if C(¬u1) = C(u2) and C(u1) = C(¬u2), σ1(¬u1, h, θ1, θ2) for θ1, θ2 = i, j must equal
σ1(u2, h, θ1, θ2) for θ1, θ2 = j, i, so long as h 6= i, j. Since ρ2 assumes θ1 and θ2 are uniformly
distributed over identical ranges, it follows that ρ2(h|¬u1) will be identical to ρ2(h|u2) and
ρ2(h|¬u2) will be identical to ρ2(h|u1). Thus, even if we assume that C(¬u1) = C(u2) and
C(u1) = C(¬u2), the best we could do is to predict that from not tall we infer the same
thing as we infer from short, and likewise for not short and tall. This points up that given
this ALT, even if we assumed a non-linear cost function such that each additional word
in a sentence imposed a decreasing marginal cost, we would still not get the desired effect,
even at the limit where the marginal cost of ‘not ’ is nothing. Predicting that not tall has
a weaker meaning than short, as it actually seems to, requires that the former have a lower
cost than the latter, even though it is longer—in short, it requires that ‘not’ have a negative
cost. Similar remarks apply when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}: even if we assume C(¬u1) = C(u1)
so that the cost of ‘not’ is nothing, we get the results seen in Figure (2.4) where the costs of
u0, u1 are fixed to 0, 1, respectively, and the choice parameter varies as before: ‘not tall’ will
have an equally strong, but opposite interpretation, as ‘tall’, so long as the cost of ‘not’ is
0. It is only by fixing the cost of ‘not’ to −2
3
that we find ‘not tall’ is interpreted in a more
plausible manner.
Nor will it help to alter the choice parameter. In Figure (2.5) we see that as the choice
parameter increases exponentially, ρ2’s maximum posterior densities for all non-null signals
moves increasingly slowly towards the extremes; as the choice parameter decreases to 0, ρ2’s
posterior probability distribution approximates that of the prior probability distribution,
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C(u1) = 1, C(¬) = 0
C(u1) = 1, C(¬) = − 2/3
λ= 4.
λ= 8.
Lassiter and Goodman Two Signals with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= 8. 0, C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ [1. 1. ], C(¬)≈ [− 0. − 0. 67], µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.4: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution: λ =
4., 8. Low Cost Neg Cost















Lassiter and Goodman Two Signals with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= [1. 0, 2. 0, 4. 0, 8. 0, 16. 0], C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ [2. ], C(¬)≈ [0. 67], µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 320, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.5: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution λ =
[1, 2, 4, 8, 16] Low Cost
since when λ = 0, σ1(u) is a constant function for all messages u, for any ALT.
5 No matter
the value of λ, however, so long as one signal is more expensive than another, the first will
be pushed farther to the extreme than the other, whether in the same direction, as is the
problem with ¬u1 versus u2 and ¬u2 versus u1 when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, or in
opposite directions, as is the problem with ¬u1 versus u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}.
5Whether there is a limit as λ approaches inf remains undetermined.
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Another alternative is to allow p(θ1) or p(θ2), or both, to be either non-uniform, or dependent,
or both. (There are uniform dependent distributions, like the heads/non-heads and tails/non-
tails probabilities of a single coin.) But this leads to the question of why there would be
the right kind of non-uniform probabilities, and the natural answer seems like the stimulus
generalization picture.
2.4.2 Alternative Utterances
If varying the parameters will not solve either problem, what else can be done without
modifying the model? Perhaps one option to address our problem with ‘short’ and ‘not tall’
is to differentiate the set of alternative utterances ALT used in comparing ‘short’ and ‘not
tall’: ‘not tall’ is normally only contrasted with ‘tall’. The idea would be that the natural
context to our hearing ‘not tall’ is when the set of alternative utterances available to the
speaker is limited to either ‘tall’ or ‘not tall’. It would, after all, seem odd if after asking
someone to describe John, they replied that ‘John is not tall, bespectacled, and with a touch
of gray in his hair.’ Perhaps the oddness is due to the fact that normally, when a speaker
knows enough about someone’s height to include it in a description of them, they know
enough to call them ‘tall’ or ‘short’; if they say nothing at all, we assume they lack that
information.6 In any case, it seems more natural to hear someone described as ‘not tall’ when
the speaker is first asked ‘Is John tall?’ (There are counterexamples such as ‘not well’, ‘not
6Another possibility is that they know enough to call them ’of roughly average height’, or some such
description. I suspect this will not appreciably change the results of the model, and so leave this unexplored
for now.
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right’, and so on, but these seem to be lexicalized.) Thus, when we ask ourselves whether
if from hearing something called ‘not tall’ we can infer that it is ‘short’, we are comparing
what we would infer about something’s height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘not tall’
when the speaker is choosing from among ‘tall’, ‘not tall’, or saying nothing at all, to what
we would infer about something’s height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘short’ when the
speaker is choosing from among ‘short’, ‘tall’, or saying nothing at all.7
In terms of the model this means that we ought to compare ρ2’s posterior probability density
function for h upon hearing ‘not tall’—that is, ρ2(h|¬u1)—given that ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1},
with ρ2(h|u2) given that ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, as in the original model. As we see in Figures
(2.3) and (2.6), the problem with this option is that when σ1 has to choose among just ‘tall’,
‘not tall’, or nothing at all, ρ2 will actually interpret ‘not tall’ in a stronger manner than
how ρ2 would interpret ‘short’ when σ1’s choices are ‘short’, ‘tall’, or nothing at all, given
the same linear cost function and choice parameter under both ALTs, and assuming the
uniformity of θ1 and θ2; thus, in order to obtain the desired effect, we again have to make
the cost of ‘not’ negative. This seems due to the fact that ¬u1 is longer than u2, as numerical
results when we fix C(¬u1) = C(u2) suggest that ρ2(h|¬u1) when the ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}
is in fact identical to ρ2(h|u2) when the ALT = {u0, u1, u2}.8 In fact, if we think that
when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, there are two thresholds, one for u1 and one for ¬u1, so that we
think of ‘tall’ and ‘not tall’ as partially defined predicates along the lines of Soames et al.
7I discuss below the possibility of eliminating the null signal from the first case.
8We suspect a proof is possible by noting that ρ0(h|¬u2, θ2) in (2.15) is the same as ρ0(h|u1, θ1) in (2.1)
and ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1) in (2.14) is the same as ρ0(h|u2, θ2) in (2.2), except for the appropriate substitutions of θ1
for θ2 and > or < for ≥ or ≤.
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C(u) = 1/3 ∗ length(u)
C(u) = 4/3 ∗ length(u)
λ= 4.
λ= 8.
Lassiter and Goodman Three Signals Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= [4. 0, 8. 0], C(un)≈ [1. 4. ], µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, signal2, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.6: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals Normal Distribution λ = 4., 8. Low
Cost High Cost
(1999), then the threshold for ¬u1 is equivalent to the threshold for u2, and σ1(¬u1, h, θ1, θ2)
and ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} will be identical to σ1(u2, h, θ1, θ2) and
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u2) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, assuming C(¬u1) = C(u2). Note also that Figures
(2.3) and (2.6) indicate that attempting to solve the second problem by comparing ρ2(h|u1)
given that ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, with ρ2(h|¬u1) given that ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, will not
work, as ρ2(h|u1) in Figure (2.6) is weaker (even if only slightly) than ρ2(h|¬u1) in Figure
(2.3).
With regards to the first problem, perhaps when we ask ourselves whether if from hearing
something called ‘not tall’ we can infer that it is ‘short’, we are drawing upon what we
would infer about something’s height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘not tall’ when the
speaker is choosing from among ‘tall’ or ‘not tall’, instead of from among ‘tall’, ‘not tall’
or saying nothing at all, and comparing that with what we would infer about that object’s
height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘short’ when the speaker is choosing from among
‘short’, ‘tall’, or saying nothing at all? Plausibly, the context to hearing ‘not tall’ is when
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one has asked, or been asked, the question ‘Is John tall?’ In this case perhaps the null
signal is not an available choice, since one is expected, after all, to answer the question. In
terms of the model, then, the correct comparison would be between ρ2(h|¬u1) given that
ALT = {u1,¬u1} and ρ2(h|u2) given that ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, instead of between ρ2(h|¬u1)
given that ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} and ρ2(h|u2) given that ALT = {u0, u1, u2}. In this case
where ALT = {u1,¬u1} there is no null signal to push the interpretation of ¬u1 so far
towards the low end of the height scale, so we should get a weaker interpretation of ¬u1 than
when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, under similar model settings. We might even hope that this would
simultaneously solve the problem with ‘not tall’and ‘tall’, by weakening the interpretation
of ‘not tall’.
The problem is that when ALT = {u1,¬u1}, we get implausibly weak readings of ‘tall’ and
‘not tall’, as we see in Figure (2.7). Here we vary the lower and upper bounds of the normal
distribution in order to highlight something that seems even more problematic: when h ≥ θ1
the denominator of σ1(u1, h, θ1) is simply σ
∗
1(u1, h, θ1), since in that case σ
∗
1(¬u1, h, θ1) =
0 and there is no null signal. Mutatis mutandis for σ1(¬u1, h, θ1). Then when h ≥ θ1,
σ1(u1, h, θ1) = 1. and σ1(¬u1, h, θ1) = 0., and vice-versa when h < θ1. Then assuming the

















φ(h)× ((b− a)− h)
(b− a)
, (2.23)
so that λ and C(u) drop out of the system, and the separation of h posteriors is an artifact of
the lower and upper bounds, which were imposed only in order to allow uniform distributions
for θ values.9 Even if we ignore this and hope that by moving a closer to µ and b farther
away, we could achieve the desired shapes for ρ2(h|u1) and ρ2(¬u1) such that the former is
farther from the mean and the latter is closer to the mean, there seem to be no such values
that give plausible interpretations. Consider fixing a ≈ −1 and b ≈ 4, thereby making (b−a)
small enough to attain the required separation of interpretations, while still having u1 mean
something stronger than ¬u1: this requires truncating the low end of the distribution much
too close to the mean; no one thinks the height of persons is limited to one standard deviation
below the mean, and we can’t make thinking so a condition on a plausible interpretation of
an answer to the question ‘Is John tall?’
Similar comments apply to an attempt to solve either of the above problems by appeal to an
ALT = {u0,¬u1}: in order to make such a strategy work, we would have to maintain that
the cost coefficient (or the output of the cost function, if we opt for a non-linear cost function)
is always lower when ALT = {u0,¬u1} than when ALT = {u0, u1} or ALT = {u0, u2} and
so ρ2(h|¬u1) is always weaker than either ρ2(h|u2) (in the same direction) or ρ2(h|u1) (in
9We leave out the normalizing denominator to simplify the presentation.
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a= − 3, b= 3
a= − 8, b= 8
a= − 1, b= 4
Lassiter and Goodman One Signal with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Lower Bound Upper Bound
λ= 1. 0, C(un)≈ 2. 0, C(¬)≈ 0. 67, µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.7: Lassiter and Goodman Model One Signal with Not Normal Distribution λ = 4.
Low Cost Variable Bounds
the opposite direction). We would have to further stipulate that ALT never contains ¬u1
and either u1 or u2. Even if we ignore the apparent artificiality of these stipulations, this
strategy would involve making ρ2(h, θn|un) lexicalized—contrary to the assumption that θn
is contextually determined.
The fundamental problem, it seems, is that there is an asymmetry between a relative gradable
adjective and its negation such that the central tendency of the distribution resulting from
interpretation of the latter is closer than the central tendency of the distribution resulting
from interpretation of the former is, to the central tendency of the prior distribution, (and
similarly for its antonym, but on same, instead of opposite, sides of the central tendency of
the prior distribution); this asymmetry does not seem able to be captured by merely altering
the parameters of the foregoing model, nor by varying the set of alternative utterances that
the receiver thinks the speaker is choosing from, as we have seen. Now, it is important to note
that all of these mechanisms are, I think, part of what has traditionally been considered part
of the pragmatics, and not the semantics. And it is instructive that a common assumption
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driving all of these results is that θ1 and θ2 are uniformly distributed, as befitting the
assumption that these values are pragmatically determined, and not semantically specified
in advance. Nonetheless, it seems like a non-uniform probability distribution for θ values is a
promising avenue for solving our problems, and we might thus attempt to derive non-uniform
distributions for θ values while staying on the right side of the pragmatics-semantics divide.
It is to such approaches that I turn next.
2.5 Extending the Model by Pragmatic Ascent, Part I
2.5.1 Abstract Scale Structures and Non-Uniform Threshold Pri-
ors
As noted above, when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} Lassiter and Goodman (2017) assume that ρ2
has a uniform prior distribution for both θ1 and θ2, in order to reflect that the listener
has ‘no relevant background knowledge about the resolution of free variables’. Lassiter and
Goodman (2017) further justify uniform priors for at least scalar adjectives on the grounds
of the preservation of interpretive flexibility: if θtall were biased towards the heights of adult
American males, then tall skyscraper would end up improperly interpreted, with implausibly
weak meanings. I want to think of the scales as, in some sense, abstractions from actual
measures of physical quantities, so the requisite interpretive flexibility may still be available
even if we have non-uniform prior distributions for θ1 and θ2. Thus, I think that the degree
scale is a scale of degrees of deviation from some measure of central tendency; since the
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central tendency for the heights of skyscrapers is much greater than that for the heights of
adult American males, if the most probable location for the threshold for ‘tall’ is 1 standard
deviation above the central tendency, then for adult American males the threshold is most
likely around 6’0”, while for skyscrapers it will be much higher.
While thinking of degree scales as measures of physical quantities might help ensure that the
denotations of scalar adjectives are tightly connected to the truth conditions of the sentences
in which they occur, I nonetheless think it is a mistake to think of scales as measures of
physical quantities, since words like ‘fast’ are relative, but would have upper-end closed
scales if it stood for actual velocity, even velocity relative to a reference frame, since velocity
in all inertial reference frames is bounded by the speed of light. Similar remarks apply to
words like ‘cold’ and physical quantities like temperature: ‘cold’ acts like a relative gradable
adjective, but temperature has an absolute zero. If anything, these facts seem to reflect
that the concepts behind words like ‘fast’ and ‘cold’ were formed prior to our knowledge of
relativistic physics or modern thermodynamics.
Thus absent at least part of their motivation, how might we imagine a listener as having
pragmatically derived non-uniform prior distributions for θ1 and θ2? One possibility is that
we think of interpretation as happening at the level of ρ4 instead of ρ2. As we see in Figure
(2.1), when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, given u1, ρ2 seems to have a posterior distribution for θ1
of the intuitively correct shape and location: the standard for ‘tall’ is very unlikely to be
at or below the average height of the objects in the relevant comparison class, becoming
monotonically increasingly probable as we reach a little less than 2 standard deviations
above the average height, and then monotonically decreasing from there up. No one, after
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all, thinks that the standard for tallness could be less than the average height; likewise no one
thinks that the standard for tallness could exclude 99.999999% of the population. Similarly
for ρ2’s posterior distribution for θ2 given u2. Thus, if the ρ2 posterior distributions for θ1
and θ2 become the ρ4 prior distributions for θ1 and θ2, we might hope that the resulting ρ4
posterior distributions for h given u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2 have the appropriate distributions to solve
our two problems.
Now, implementing this requires that we define σ3(un|h, θ1, θ2). How to do so? Remember
that ρ2 thinks of σ1 as thinking of ρ0 as a literal receiver who given a non-null utterance
assigns a probability to a height conditional upon a given threshold value; thus we had
INFO(u0, h) = ln(ρ0(h|u0)) (2.4a revisited)
INFO(u1, h, θ1) = ln(ρ0(h|u1, θ1)) (2.4b revisited)
INFO(u2, h, θ2) = ln(ρ0(h|u2, θ2)) (2.4c revisited)
Thus, in order to remain consistent with the original model, we can think of σ3 as marginal-























ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2)dθ1 (2.25e)
This gets us back ρ2(h|u0), just as we had ρ0(h|u0), but for u1, ¬u1 and u2, ¬u2 we need
to think of σ3 as also normalizing by θ2 and θ1, respectively, to get back ρ2(h|u1, θ1),





























Then σ3 can proceed just as σ1 did, once we relativize informativity to a given receiver level.











































Then, we can define σn as before, and ρn for n ≥ 4 becomes:
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|u0) ∝ σn−1(u0|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u0) (2.28a)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|u1) ∝ σn−1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u1)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) (2.28b)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|u2) ∝ σn−1(u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u2)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) (2.28c)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) ∝ σn−1(¬u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|¬u1)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1) (2.28d)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) ∝ σn−1(¬u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|¬u2)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u2) (2.28e)
Now, for n = 2 we can define
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ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u0) ∝ σ1(u0|h, θ1, θ2)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1, θ2|u0) (2.29a)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u1) ∝ σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1, θ2|u1) (2.29b)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|u2) ∝ σ1(u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1, θ2|u2) (2.29c)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) ∝ σ1(¬u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1, θ2|¬u1) (2.29d)
ρ2(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) ∝ σ1(¬u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1, θ2|¬u2) (2.29e)
since ρ0(h|u0) = φ(h) and for n = 0 we can have
ρ0(h, θ1, θ2|u0) = ρ0(h|u0)× p(θ1, θ2) (2.30a)
ρ0(h, θ1, θ2|u1) = ρ0(h|u1, θ1)× p(θ1, θ2) (2.30b)
ρ0(h, θ1, θ2|u2) = ρ0(h|u2, θ2)× p(θ1, θ2) (2.30c)
ρ0(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) = ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1)× p(θ1, θ2) (2.30d)
ρ0(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) = ρ0(h|¬u2, θ2)× p(θ1, θ2) (2.30e)













































p(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2 = 1; mutatis mutandis for ρ0(θ1, θ2|u2),
ρ0(θ1, θ2|¬u1), ρ0(θ1, θ2|¬u2), and ρ0(h|u0). Thus, (2.29) and (2.30) are consistent with
the original definitions of ρ0 and ρ2. Note also that the process of marginalization and
normalization defined in (2.25) and (2.26) applied to the the base case distributions defined
in (2.30) are consistent with the original model given a uniform prior distribution for θ1 and




















































(Here we omit the corresponding proofs for u2, ¬u1, and ¬u2.) Hence, as defined in (2.27),
σ∗n for n = 1 is the same as σ
∗
1 in the original model. Hence our entire extended receiver and
speaker model is a consistent extension of Lassiter and Goodman’s original model.
Note also that we might replace (2.28) and (2.29) with a single slightly different definition of
ρn for n > 0, which uses the null utterance’s h posterior ρn−2(h|u0) as the prior for calculating
the h, θ1, θ2 posterior at level n, for all of the signals:
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|u0) ∝ σn−1(u0|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u0) (2.33a)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|u1) ∝ σn−1(u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) (2.33b)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|u2) ∝ σn−1(u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) (2.33c)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) ∝ σn−1(¬u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1) (2.33d)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) ∝ σn−1(¬u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u2) (2.33e)
This eliminates the need for the separate ρ2 definitions in (2.29), and remains consistent
with the original model. However, it does not help the strategy of ascending the hierarchy
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of senders and receivers to solve our first problem.10
The difficulty is that on neither version of the hierarchy of senders and receivers have we
introduced the required asymmetry, since at every level the posterior (θ1, θ2) distributions
for u1 and u2 will be approximately mirrored by those of ¬u1 and ¬u2, respectively. Thus,
with regards to when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, as we see in Figure(2.8), at any level
of the hierarchy of receivers above level 0, ¬u1 and ¬u2 will still be interpreted to mean
something stronger than u2 and u1, respectively. Even shifting from (2.28) to (2.33) will not
help, since the prior h distribution at any receiver level will be the posterior h distribution
at the previous receiver level, which is symmetric with respect to the mean.
What about when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}? Again, we can define an extended hierarchy of
senders and receivers that is consistent with Lassiter and Goodman’s original model. For
10Note that we might define a variation of (2.33) by using, at every level n > 0, ρ0(h|u0) instead of
ρn−2(h|u0). Note further that we might define another option by using, at every level n > 0, ρ0(θ1, θ2|un)
instead of ρ0(θ1, θ2|un). These remain consistent extensions of the model.
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Again, we can define σn as before, and ρn for n ≥ 4 becomes:
ρn(h, θ1|u0) ∝ σn−1(u0|h, θ1)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1|u0) (2.35a)
ρn(h, θ1|u1) ∝ σn−1(u1|h, θ1)× ρn−2(h|u1)× ρn−2(θ1|u1) (2.35b)
ρn(h, θ1|¬u1) ∝ σn−1(¬u1|h, θ1)× ρn−2(h|¬u1)× ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) (2.35c)
For n = 2 we can define
ρ2(h, θ1|u0) ∝ σ1(u0|h, θ1)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1|u0) (2.36a)
ρ2(h, θ1|u1) ∝ σ1(u1|h, θ1)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1|u1) (2.36b)
ρ2(h, θ1|¬u1) ∝ σ1(¬u1|h, θ1)× ρ0(h|u0)× ρ0(θ1|¬u1) (2.36c)
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since ρ0(h|u0) = φ(h) and for n = 0 we can have
ρ0(h, θ1|u0) = ρ0(h|u0)× p(θ1) (2.37a)
ρ0(h, θ1|u1) = ρ0(h|u1, θ1)× p(θ1) (2.37b)
ρ0(h, θ1|¬u1) = ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1)× p(θ1) (2.37c)
where ρ0(h|u0), ρ0(h|u1, θ1), and ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1) are defined as before.11 Again, as we see in
Figure (2.9), where we define the sender and receiver hierarchy as in (2.27)-(2.30), when
ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, at any level of the hierarchy of receivers above level 0, ¬u1 will be
interpreted to mean something stronger than, but in the opposite direction from, u1, since
at any level the posterior θ1 distribution given u1 will be approximately mirrored by the
posterior θ1 distribution given ¬u1.
Now, we could require that when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, the negation of the antonym
of a relative gradable adjective is always interpreted at a lower level of the sender-receiver
hierarchy than the adjective itself. Since interpretation at higher levels are stronger, that
11The proofs of consistency with the original model, assuming a uniform distribution p(θ1), are similar to
the ones already given, except we do not need to integrate over θ2. We could also replace (2.35) and (2.36)
with a single definition of ρn for n > 0, just as we proposed replacing (2.28) and (2.29) with (2.33). Doing
so does not introduce the required asymmetry, and so does not solve our second problem. Note also that we
could use ρ0(h|u0) instead of ρn−2(h|u0) at every level n > 0, just as we proposed in Footnote (10) for when
ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}. Note again that we might define a further option if we use ρ0(θ1|un) instead
of ρn−2(θ1|un) at every level n > 0. Again, these remain consistent extensions of the original model.
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would allow u1 and u2 to mean something stronger than ¬u2 and ¬u1, respectively, thus solv-
ing our first problem, A similar strategy might be applied when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, but
instead requiring that the negation of a relative gradable adjective be interpreted at a lower
level of the sender-receiver hierarchy than the adjective itself, thus solving our second prob-
lem. In fact we could impose a general requirement that the negations of relative gradable
adjectives be interpreted at lower levels than the adjectives themselves, for any given ALT.
But, absent any independent motivation why the negations of relative gradable adjectives
are always interpreted at a lower level of the sender-receiver hierarchy than the adjective
itself, this seems ad hoc. And in fact, there seems to be some evidence for metalinguistic
negation, and thus we say ‘Shaq isn’t big, he’s HUGE !’, and in the denial that Shaq is big
one does not seem to be saying the same thing as what one is saying in the denial that I am
big; instead, we are perhaps saying that the probability of a speaker calling Shaq ‘big’ is low,
compared the probability of a speaker calling Shaq ‘huge’, since a receiver presuming the
speaker to be choosing between the former and the latter would have a less accurate estimate
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of Shaq’s size upon hearing the former compared to the latter. Or, perhaps we are saying
that a receiver would get a less accurate impression of Shaq’s size from the utterance that
he is ‘big’ than from the utterance that he is ‘huge’. Importantly, however, in the former
case the speaker seems to be talking about the encoding probabilities of a lower level sender,
and in the latter case the speaker seems to be talking about the decoding probabilities of a
lower level receiver. Thus in either case, appeal to metalinguistic negation should lead us to
expect the negations of relative gradable adjectives to be interpreted at a higher level, not a
lower level, than the corresponding un-negated forms.
Nor will ascending the hierarchy in combination with the earlier strategy of varying the set
of alternative utterances solve our first problem, given that we are comparing ρn(h|u2) when
ALT = {u0, u1, u2} with ρn(h|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, since the lower cost of u2 will
ensure that it receives a weaker interpretation than ¬u1 given the same parameter settings.
(When ALT = {u0, u1, u2} the hierarchy is defined as in (2.27)-(2.30), or (2.27), (2.33), and
(2.30), but with the sender and receiver definitions for ¬u1 and ¬u2 deleted.) Again, at any
given level n, making ¬u1 have a weaker reading than u2 requires that ¬ have a negative
cost. And, requiring that interpretation of ρn(h|u2) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} happens at a
level higher than interpretation of ρn−k(h|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} seems ad hoc.
2.5.2 Privileging Non-negated Posteriors
In order for ascension of the sender-receiver hierarchy to solve either of our problems, it
might seem helpful to privilege the posterior (θ1, θ2) distributions of u1 and u2 when ALT =
{u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, and the posterior θ1 distributions of u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}. Af-
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ter all, ρ2(θ1|¬u1) is the mirror image of ρ2(θ1|u1) about the median of φ(h) when C(¬u1) =
C(u1), and even further to the left when C(¬u1) > C(u1). If ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2},
then, using the posterior ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) instead of ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1) as the prior for calcu-
lating ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) might seem to pull ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) to the right; in the same way,
using the posterior ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) instead of ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u2) as the prior for calculating
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) might seem to pull ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) to the left.
Thus we might propose that in the definition of ρn for n ≥ 4, (2.28d) and (2.28e) should be
replaced by:
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) ∝ σn−1(¬u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|¬u1)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) (2.38a)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) ∝ σn−1(¬u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|¬u2)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) (2.38b)
and ρ2 and ρ0 should be as in (2.29) and (2.30), respectively.
A second option when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} is to think of ρn for n ≥ 4 as gain-
ing from u1 information about θ1 but not θ2, and only gaining information about θ1 from
u1, and likewise for u2 and θ2, and then assuming the independence of θ1 and θ2. Thus
we might propose that in (2.28) we replace ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u0), ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1), ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2),
ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1), and ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u2) with
ρn−2(θ1|u1)× ρn−2(θ2|u2) (2.39)
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We see the results from (2.38) and (2.39) in (2.10) and (2.11) and compare them to the
results from the original model shown in (2.12). On either option, the negation of the
antonym of a relative gradable adjective is still interpreted more strongly than the adjective
itself; we only discuss (2.38) but similar comments apply to (2.39). Counterintuitively, for
n > 2 using the posterior from ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) to calculate ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) actually results
in ρn(h|¬u1) being even more extreme than in the default hierarchy; similarly for using the
posterior from ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) to calculate ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) for n > 2. A further problem
is that both of these strategies seem poorly pragmatically motivated: it seems, intuitively,
that from hearing something called ‘not tall’ one can in fact gain information about how tall
something has to be to count as tall: something has to be at least taller than the thing that
was called ‘not tall’. Thus, there seems to be no independent reason to use ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1)
instead of ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1) when calculating ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1).12
12Note also that we might apply either (2.38) or (2.39) to the definition of ρn for n > 0 in (2.33). If we
choose the former, (2.33d) and (2.33e) should be replaced by:
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u1) ∝ σn−1(¬u1|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) (2.40a)
ρn(h, θ1, θ2|¬u2) ∝ σn−1(¬u2|h, θ1, θ2)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) (2.40b)
and ρ0 should be as in (2.30). Since ρ2(θ1, θ2|u1) = p(θ1, θ2) = ρ2(θ1, θ2|¬u1), and similarly for u2 and ¬u2,
this will still be consistent with the original model. If we choose the latter, then we replace ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u0),
ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1), ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2), ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1), and ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u2) in (2.33) with (2.39) and again ρ0
should be as in (2.30). Since ρ2(θ1|u1) = ρ2(θ2|u1) = 1a−b , this is also consistent with the original model.
The results for (2.40) do not significantly differ from those for (2.38). The results for the latter option for
the same parameter settings as in Figure (2.39) solve our first problem only for n = 6; at levels higher than
that the interpretations for ‘not tall’ become too close to ‘tall’, and at levels below that the interpretations
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Will using ρn−2(θ1|u1) instead of ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) to calculate ρn(h, θ1|¬u1) when ALT =
{u0, u1,¬u1} solve our second problem? Here we would be proposing to replace (2.35c)
with:
ρn(h, θ1|¬u1) ∝ σn−1(¬u1|h, θ1)× ρn−2(h|¬u1)× ρn−2(θ1|u1) (2.41)
Another option when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, analogous to the approach in (2.39) when
ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, is to think of ρn as only gaining information about θ1 from
u1; thus we would replace ρn−2(θ1|u0), ρn−2(θ1|u1), and ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) in (2.35) with
ρn−2(θ1|u1) (2.42)
for ‘not tall’ are too close to ‘short’. Again, this solution seems ad hoc. Both of these options also share the
problem of privileging u1 and u2 over ¬u1 and ¬u2.
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Figure 2.13: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
1 Receiver Hierarchy
The results for (2.41) and (2.42) are shown in Figures (2.13) and (2.14), respectively; as
we see, neither of these approaches solves our second problem. As we see in Figure (2.13),
even if we use ρn−2(θ1|u1) instead of ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) to calculate ρn(h, θ1|¬u1), ρn(h|¬u1) is
still stronger but in the opposite direction from ρn(h|u1). And again, it seems that we can
gain information about just how tall someone has to be to count as tall, from an utterance
of ‘not tall’; so there seems to be independent reason to treat ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) on a par with
ρn−2(θ1|u1).13
Now, one way to treat ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) on a par with ρn−2(θ1|u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} is
to use the average of the two as the prior when calculating the posterior probabilities for h
and θ1. Thus, in (2.35) we might replace ρn−2(θ1|u0), ρn−2(θ1|u1), and ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) with
13Note that we could also apply either (2.41) or (2.42) to the hierarchy outlined in Footnote (11) and
remain consistent with the original model. We don’t show the results here, but our second problem is not
solved on the first option. On the second option, just as when we applied (2.39) to (2.33), the second problem
is solved for n = 4, 6, but this too seems ad hoc, and the interpretation of u0 at those levels is implausibly
asymmetric, an artifact of the model.
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Figure 2.14: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution




A similar strategy when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} would be to claim that we gain infor-
mation about θ1 but not θ2 from u1 and ¬u1 and information about θ2 but not θ1 from u2 and
¬u2. We then assume that θ1 and θ2 are independently distributed. Thus in (2.28) we might




× ρn−2(θ2|u2) + ρn−2(θ2|¬u2)
2
(2.44)
or, if we find it acceptable to gain information about θ1 from u2 and ¬u2 and information
about θ2 from u1 and ¬u2:
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ρn−2(θ1|u1) + ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) + ρn−2(θ1|u2) + ρn−2(θ1|¬u2)
4
×
ρn−2(θ1|u1) + ρn−2(θ1|¬u1) + ρn−2(θ2|u2) + ρn−2(θ2|¬u2)
4
(2.45)
Note that we could also define versions of (2.43), (2.44), and (2.45) that incorporate infor-
mation about θ1 and θ2 from u0.
14 We see the results for (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45) in Figures
(2.15), (2.16), and (2.17); as we see, the negation of a relative gradable adjective is still
interpreted more strongly than the relative gradable adjective itself, and the negation of a
relative gradable adjective is still interpreted more strongly than the antonym of the relative
gradable adjective. Thus, neither of our two problems are solved.
What about appealing to alternative utterances while privileging the θ1 posterior distribu-
tions from u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, perhaps in combination with applying (2.39) to
(2.28a), (2.28b), and (2.28c) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}? As noted in Footnote (13), this
solves the second problem for certain parameter settings at certain levels if we use (2.42)
applied to the hierarchy defined in Footnote (11), and in combination with the appeal to
alternative utterances, will solve our first problem, since the interpretation of ¬u1 will be
weaker than the interpretation of u2. Again, however, this is too ad hoc, the interpretation
of u0 has an implausible asymmetry that seems to be an artifact of the model, and the entire
14And again, when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} we could apply (2.43) to the modified hierarchy outlined in
Footnote (11), and when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} we could apply (2.44) or (2.45) to the modified
hierarchy defined in (2.33). Neither of the latter two models solves our first problem, and the former model
does not solve our second problem.
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Figure 2.15: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Not 1 Receiver Hierarchy
prospect of privileging the θ1 posterior distribution from u1 and ignoring that of ¬u1 seems
poorly pragmatically motivated.
2.6 Modifying the Model: Assuming θ1 > θ2
What might we gather from the failure of ascending the sender-receiver hierarchy to solve
either of our problems? We have been trying to induce a desired asymmetry between the
interpretation of relative gradable adjectives and their negations; that is, we have been
trying to make ρn(h|¬u1) sufficiently weaker than ρn(h|u2) in the same direction, and suf-
ficiently weaker than ρn(h|u2) in the opposite direction, in keeping with the intuition that
upon hearing something called ‘not tall’ we would shift our probability distribution for their
height downward, but not as far downward as we would shift it downward if we heard that
thing called ‘short’, and not as far downward as we would shift it upward if we heard that
thing called ‘tall’. Mutatis mutandis for ρn(h|¬u2) and ‘not short’. We have been try-
ing to create this asymmetry by using non-uniform, asymmetric distributions for θ1 and
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Figure 2.16: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Not 1, Signal 2, Not 2 Receiver
Hierarchy
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Figure 2.17: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, 2, Not 1, Not 2, Signal 1, 2, Not 1,
Not 2 Receiver Hierarchy
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θ2 derived at higher levels of the sender-receiver hierarchy. However, even if we ignored
ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u1) and ρn−2(θ1, θ2|¬u2) and instead used ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u1) and ρn−2(θ1, θ2|u2) to
calculate ρn(h|¬u1) and ρn(h|¬u2), respectively, for n ≥ 4 in order to introduce the de-
sired asymmetry between relative gradable adjectives and their negations, ρn(h|¬u1) and
ρn(h|¬u2) were still not sufficiently weaker than ρn(h|u1) and ρn(h|u2)— in fact, they were
stronger. Thus we might infer that we need to introduce asymmetric, non-uniform distri-
butions for θ1 and θ1 at even lower levels: that is, we should depart from Lassiter and
Goodman’s original model at the level of ρ2 and let ρ2 draw on non-uniform prior θ1 and θ2
distributions. That, of course, would require that ρ0 have a non-uniform distributions for θ1
and θ2.
How might we think of ρ0 as having pragmatically driven non-uniform distributions for θ1
and θ2? We might think of the listener as assuming that θ1 > θ2 —lest he think that anything
can be both short and tall. This cannot be solely a matter of the meaning of ‘short’ and ‘tall’
on the Kennedy semantics, since nothing in that semantics requires that the threshold for
‘tall’ be greater than the threshold for ‘short’. However, if we grant that the receiver knows
that each threshold is chosen so as to ensure that the object ‘stands out’ in the context of
utterance, perhaps then the receiver would infer that relative to the statistical distribution
of heights of the comparison class, the height required to stand out as having greater height
than some preponderance of the comparison class must be greater than the height required
to stand out as having lesser height than some preponderance of the comparison class, so
the threshold for ‘tall’ must be greater than the threshold for ‘short’. More explicitly, if
the threshold for ‘tall’ were chosen so as to ensure the object stands out relative to the
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comparison class, that threshold would have to be significantly above most of the heights
the comparison class; then if the threshold for ‘short’ were at or above the threshold for ‘tall’,
then most of the heights of the comparison class would fall below the threshold for ‘short’,
and there would be no guarantee that anything called ‘short’ would stand out relative to the
comparison class: even things of slightly more than average height would be ‘short’.
What is the distribution for θ1 and θ2 if we assume θ2 < θ1? We might imagine two urns,
one with balls for each possible θ1 value, and the other with balls for each possible θ2 value.
A machine spins the urns around and stops randomly, if it is the θ1 urn we draw a ball to
get a θ1 value, and then every ball in the θ2 urn with a value greater than our θ1 value drops
out of that urn, and we then pick a θ2 ball from the θ2 urn; likewise if it is the θ2 urn that
appears in front of us, but with the θ1 balls less than our θ2 value dropping out of the θ1
urn. Where φθ1(θ1) and φ
θ2(θ2) are the distributions of balls, respectively, in the θ1 and θ2
urns, we can define the probabilities Prθ1(θ1, θ2), Pr
θ2(θ1, θ2) of (θ1, θ2) when picking first
from the θ1, θ2 urns, respectively, as:
















× φθ2(θ2) if θ2 < θ1
0 otherwise
(2.46b)





if θ2 < θ1
0 otherwise
(2.47)
We can then think of ρ0 as deriving p(θ1, θ2) and then using it in (2.30). Of course, what
p(θ1, θ2) turns out to be depends on just what φ
θ1 and φθ2 are. We should note that initial
normal distributions in the urns allows for using the full normal state distribution for φ(h),
instead of a truncated normal state distribution, since truncated normal distributions were
only required since uniform distributions are defined only over finite range. If we think
of φθ1 and φθ2 as uniform, however, we seem to hew closer to Lassiter and Goodman’s
original model, even if that model’s limitation to uniform θ distributions was a semantically
unmotivated technical necessity.
Overall, for ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, we find that when assuming that the listener
assumes θ2 < θ1, we come closer to solving our first problem when we define the sender-
receiver hierarchy as in (2.28) and (2.29), or some such previously defined variant thereof,
as opposed to (2.33) or some such previously defined variant thereof. More specifically, the
most plausible h posteriors occur not for (2.28) itself but for its variants defined in (2.38),
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Figure 2.18: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal 2,
Signal 1, Signal 2 Theta Distr Rel = True Theta Distr Normal Receiver Hierarchy
(2.39), (2.44), and (2.45), which are shown in Figures (2.18), (2.19), (2.20), and (2.21),
respectively. Note that for (2.28) and (2.38), at each level n in the receiver hierarchy, for
any signal contributing a posterior to be a prior at level n+ 2, we marginalize out h and θ1
to define φθ2n and marginalize out h and θ1 to to define φ
θ1
n , and then calculate (2.47) as the
prior contributed by that signal to be used at level n + 2. For (2.39), (2.44) and (2.45), at
each level n, we calculate the average for θ1 and θ2, and then instead of multiplying them as
in (2.44) and (2.45), we use those as φθ1n and φ
θ2
n and calculate (2.47) as the prior to be used
by all signals at level n+ 2. Furthermore, we find that starting with φθ10 and φ
θ2
0 as normally
distributed, as opposed to uniformly distributed, tends to yield h posteriors that come closer
to solving our first problem, and θ1, θ2 posterior distributions that are more plausible. Under
these conditions, the best results tend to occur at level 4; at higher levels the interpretations
are overly narrow.
Although having the listener assume that θ2 < θ1 seems to solve our first problem, there
are two problems: First, among (2.38), (2.39), (2.44), or (2.45), the most plausible θ1 and
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Figure 2.19: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Signal 2 Theta Distr Rel = True
Theta Distr Normal Receiver Hierarchy
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Figure 2.20: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Not 1, Signal 2, Not 2 Theta Distr
Rel = True Theta Distr Normal Receiver Hierarchy
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Figure 2.21: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, 2, Not 1, Not 2, Signal 1, 2, Not 1,
Not 2 Theta Distr Rel = True Theta Distr Normal Receiver Hierarchy
θ2 priors (used to calculate (h, θ1, θ2) posteriors) occur with (2.38) or (2.39); see Figures
(2.22)-(2.24). In Figure (2.22), we do see plausible priors resulting from Equation (2.47) at
level 2 and 4, from the model defined in Equation (2.39). (We omit the figures for the model
defined in Equation (2.38) for brevity, since each signal has a unique (θ1, θ2) distribution;
however, the distributions are similar to those for the model defined in Equation (2.39).) In
Figure 2.22, the green and blue lines in Sub-figure (2.22a) result from projecting the surface
in Sub-figure (2.22b) onto the right and left walls, respectively, thus the green line represents
the marginalization out of θ1 from the result of Equation (2.47) at level 2, and the blue line
represents the marginalization out of θ2 from the result of Equation (2.47) at level 2. Similar
remarks apply to Figures (2.23) and (2.24). In contrast, we see in Figures (2.23) and (2.24)
the priors resulting from Equation (2.47) from the models defined in Equations (2.44) and
(2.45), respectively. The projections show an implausible ‘two-hump’ shape. We thus seem
forced back to model (2.38) or (2.39); however, these face the earlier objection that they
privilege the information about the threshold from the un-negated form over the negated
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form, contra our intuitions that we can learn about the threshold from negated forms just
as well as from un-negated forms. Thus, not privileging the un-negated forms forces us to
define the model in ways that depend on less plausible θ1 and θ2 priors.
Second, assuming the listener assumes that θ2 < θ1 does nothing at all to solve our second
problem, when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, since in that case there is no θ2 to be less than θ1.
Now, we might appeal to alternative utterances and claim that we are comparing ρn(h|¬u1)
given that ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} with ρn(h|u1) given that ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, and assuming
the receiver assumes θ2 < θ1 in the latter case. However, under the same parameter settings,
at any level, ρn(h|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} remains roughly as strong as, but in
the opposite direction from, ρn(h|u1) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} and we assume the receiver
is assuming θ2 < θ1, as we can see if we compare Figures (2.9), (2.13), (2.14), or (2.15)
to Figures (2.25) or (2.26) or (2.27). Here, Figure (2.25) is the result of (2.28), (2.29),
and (2.30), applied to ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, Figure (2.26) is the result of (2.39) applied to
ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, and Figure (2.27) is the result of (2.45), appropriately modified to
account for the absence of negated forms in calculating the average θ1 and θ2 distributions,
applied to ALT = {u0, u1, u2}. In all three cases the receiver assumes θ2 < θ1. Note that
since the forms are only un-negated when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}, (2.38) does not analogize.15
This inability to extend the technique of having the receiver assume that θ2 < θ1 to solve
our second problem should be especially worrisome, and make the technique seem especially
15We let φθ10 and φ
θ2
0 be uniform over the ranges indicated in Figures (2.25) or (2.26) or (2.27) in order to
allow direct comparison with Figures (2.9), (2.13), (2.14), and (2.15), in which we assumed that p(θ1) was
uniform over the same indicated ranges. If we assume normal distributions for the comparison, the results
are no different.
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(b) Level 2 Theta Surface































(d) Level 4 Theta Surface
Figure 2.22: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Signal 2 Theta Distr Rel = True
Theta Distr Normal Receiver Level 2, 4 Theta Distribution
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(b) Level 2 Theta Surface






























(d) Level 4 Theta Surface
Figure 2.23: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Not 1, Signal 2, Not 2 Theta Distr
Rel = True Theta Distr Normal Receiver Level 2, 4 Theta Distribution
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(b) Level 2 Theta Surface






























(d) Level 4 Theta Surface
Figure 2.24: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, 2, Not 1, Not 2, Signal 1, 2, Not 1,
Not 2 Theta Distr Rel = True Theta Distr Normal Receiver Level 2, 4 Theta Distribution
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ad hoc, given that the first and second problems seem fundamentally related: both grow
out of the fact that a relative gradable adjective and its negation are such that the central
tendency of the distribution resulting from interpretation of the latter is closer than the
central tendency of the distribution resulting from interpretation of the former is, to the
central tendency of the prior distribution. Since their central tendencies are on opposite
sides of the central tendency of the prior distribution, and the interpretation of the antonym
of a relative gradable adjective is the mirror-image of the interpretation of the adjective
itself, it follows that the antonym of a relative gradable adjective and its negation are such
that the central tendency of the distribution resulting from interpretation of the latter is
also closer than the central tendency of the distribution resulting from interpretation of the
former is, to the central tendency of the prior distribution, but on the same side as, instead
of opposite sides of, the central tendency of the prior distribution. Perhaps put more simply,
the second problem grows out of an asymmetry between the interpretation of a relative
gradable adjective and its negation such that the latter is interpreted more weakly than the
former; the first problem then arises simply since the interpretation of the antonym of a
relative gradable adjective is the mirror image of the interpretation of the adjective itself, so
the interpretation of the negation of a relative gradable adjective is also weaker than that of
the adjective’s antonym.
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Figure 2.25: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals Normal Distribution Lambda 4
Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal 2, Theta Distr
Rel = True Theta Distr Uniform Receiver Hierarchy



















Lassiter and Goodman Three Signals Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= 4. 0, C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ 1. 0, µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta distribution relation= True, theta posterior source= signal1, signal2, pragmatic sender type= hsensitive
Figure 2.26: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals Normal Distribution Lambda 4
Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Signal 2 Theta Distr Rel = True Theta Distr
Uniform Receiver Hierarchy
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Figure 2.27: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals Normal Distribution Lambda 4
Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, 2, Signal 1, 2 Theta Distr Rel = True Theta
Distr Uniform Receiver Hierarchy
2.7 Extending the Model by Pragmatic Ascent, Part
II
There is an alternative definition of the sender-receiver hierarchy that is at levels ≤ 2 at
least numerically equivalent to Lassiter and Goodman’s original model. Here we define the
initial receiver level ρ0 as before in (2.30). We think of the sender, for every signal other
than the null signal, as trying to convey information about both h and the threshold of
application of that signal. For the null signal, we think of the sender as before: trying to
convey information only about h. Thus for ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} we can define an







































To see that for n = 1, (2.48) is equivalent to (2.27) if we assume p(θ1, θ2) is uniform over
































so assuming p(θ1, θ2) is uniform over [a, b] (2.27b) for n = 1 is
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and likewise for (2.27c)-(2.27e)





















and (2.48b) for n = 1 is
















and likewise for (2.48c) - (2.48e). But since σ1(h, θ1, θ2, u1) is:
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σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2) =
σ∗1(u1, h, θ1)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗
1(u1, h, θ1) + σ
∗
1(u2, h, θ2)+
σ∗1(¬u1, h, θ1) + σ∗1(¬u2, h, θ2)
=
σ∗1(u1, h, θ1)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
∗
1(u1, h, θ1) + σ
∗
1(u2, h, θ2)+





then when (2.51) is in the denominator of (2.53) it becomes equivalent to (2.27a) for n = 1
under the assumption that p(θ1, θ2) is uniform over [a, b]. Likewise when (2.52) is in the
numerator and denominator of (2.53) it becomes (2.50), which is itself equivalent to (2.27b)
for n = 1 under the assumption that p(θ1, θ2) is uniform over [a, b]; and similarly for all
of the other terms in the denominator of (2.53). Similar remarks apply to σ1(u0, h, θ1, θ2),
σ1(u2, h, θ1, θ2), σ1(¬u1, h, θ1, θ2), and σ1(¬u2, h, θ1, θ2). Since the definition of the receiver
remains unchanged, for n = 2 the interpretation is no different from the original model.
We see the results from our h, θ-sensitive sender-receiver hierarchy when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,
¬u1,¬u2} in Figure (2.28), and when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} in Figure (2.29). (When ALT =
{u0, u1,¬u1} the sender model consists of the appropriately modified versions of (2.48a),
(2.48b), and (2.48d).) For similar reasons as with the original sender model, varying the
parameters of the overall model —that is, the cost coefficient or the choice parameter—will
not help to solve either of our problems, and neither will appeal to a non-linear cost function
that monotonically increases with length. With regards to cost, only by assuming that
negation has a negative cost can we solve either problem.
On the other hand, appealing to alternative utterances—comparing ρn(h|u2) when ALT =
{u0, u1, u2} with ρn(h|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}—appears at least close to solving our
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Figure 2.28: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
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Figure 2.29: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0,
Signal 1, Signal Not 1 Receiver Hierarchy
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Figure 2.30: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals Normal Distribution Lambda 4
Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
2 Receiver Hierarchy
first problem. (When ALT = {u0, u1, u2} the sender model consists of the appropriately
modified versions of (2.48a), (2.48b), and (2.48c). We show the results of our h, θ-sensitive
sender-receiver hierarchy when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} in Figure (2.30).) And similarly, com-
paring ρn(h|u1) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} with ρn(h|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, or
when ALT = {u0,¬u1} appears to close to solving our second problem. However, as we see






(and thus ¬u1 has the desired weaker interpretation than u2), the interpretation of ¬u1 is
too strong: there is almost no probability that h is greater than the median. However,
intuitively there seems to be no contradiction at all in saying ‘Feynman is not tall, but he’s
taller than average.’ We could try lowering the cost, but as we see in Figure (2.31), at these
parameter settings ρn(h|u1) is much too weak, especially at the higher levels where ρn(h|¬u1)
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is appropriately weak. If you think I’m choosing between ‘tall’, ‘not tall’, or nothing at all,
(perhaps I know it’s quite appealing to you to date someone tall, and someone short is
utterly unacceptable, so that ALT is ‘tall’, ‘not tall’, or nothing at all), you still do not
interpret ‘tall’ to mean ‘not short’, as in Figure (2.31). In this regard it seems important to
remember that according to the proposed solution, when we ask ourselves whether if from
hearing something called ‘not tall’ we can infer that it is ‘short’, we are comparing what
we would infer about something’s height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘not tall’ when
we assume the speaker is choosing from among ‘tall’, ‘not tall’, or saying nothing at all, to
what we would infer about something’s height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘short’ when
we assume the speaker is choosing from among ‘short’, ‘tall’, or saying nothing at all. But
getting the right results from our h, θ-sensitive sender model also then requires that what we
would infer about something’s height from a speaker choosing to call it ‘tall’ when we assume
the speaker is choosing from among ‘tall’, ‘not tall’, or nothing at all, is entirely too weak.
Furthermore, at these parameter settings, at levels n such that ρn(h|¬u1) is appropriately
weak, ρn(θ1|u1) is simply implausible: upon hearing someone called ‘tall’, we do not think
that the speaker’s threshold for tallness is most likely below the median height for persons;
this problem persists even at higher cost settings.
Now, we might try to think of these comparisons between ‘not tall’, ‘tall’, and ‘short’ as
resulting from a process of lexicalization such that ρn(h, θ1|¬u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}
becomes lexically fixed and ρn(h, θ1|u1) and ρn(h, θ2|u2) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} become
lexically fixed. We might then keep Lassiter and Goodman’s pragmatic hierarchy, in one of
the versions defined above, and use the new lexicalized items at ρ0, and thus not end up with
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Figure 2.31: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0,
Signal 1, Signal Not 1 Receiver Hierarchy H and Theta Distribution
an overly weak interpretation of u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}. However, we then seem to
have given up on the Kennedy-style threshold semantics altogether. Furthermore, it seems
ad hoc to think that lexicalization does not happen for u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} but
only when ALT = {u0, u1, u2}.
What about the various ways of privileging the θ1 and θ2 posterior distributions, in combi-
nation with our h, θ-sensitive sender? That is, we could use (2.39) or (2.38) in combination
with (2.48) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, or (2.41) or (2.42) in combination with ap-
propriately modified versions of (2.48a), (2.48b), and (2.48d) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}.
However, there is a certain incoherence about the idea, since the posterior θ distributions are
generated by appealing to the unnegated signals, but for each negated signal the sender at-
tempts to convey information about θ for that signal. Consider ¬u1: in a sense, the receiver
at n ignores what he at (n− 2) thought he could infer about θ1 given that the (n− 3) sender
used ¬u1 and instead draws on what he at (n−2) thought he could infer about θ1 given that
the (n− 3) sender used u1, even as he assumes at n that the sender used ¬u1. Even worse,
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he continues to think that the (n− 3) sender (and the (n− 1) sender) was trying to convey
information about θ1 using ¬u1: at n the receiver thinks ‘Here is the probability that the
sender at (n− 1) would use ¬u1 given (h, θ1, θ2), trying as he is to convey information about
h and θ1, and here is the probability of θ1 at (n− 2) given that the sender at (n− 3) did not
use ¬u1 but instead used u1.’
Now, one might think that since the level n receiver thinks of the (n− 1) sender as thinking
of the (n − 2) receiver as gaining information from the (n − 3) sender’s utterance of ¬u1
conditional on the (n − 4) receiver’s posterior u1 probabilities for θ1, so also he ought to
gain information from the (n − 1) sender’s utterance of ¬u1 conditional on the (n − 2)
receiver’s posterior u1 probabilities for θ1. However, of course, this inductive step has to
bottom out at a justification for why we should think of the level 2 receiver as gaining
information from the level 1 sender’s utterance of ¬u1 conditional on the level 0 receiver’s
posterior u1 probabilities for θ1, instead of his posterior ¬u1 probabilities for θ1. And there
seems no good reason for doing so, since by stipulation at level 0 all signals carry the same
information about all thresholds. (And of course, all this is not to mention the earlier noted
problem that privileging ρn(θ1|u1) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} (and additionally ρn(θ2|u2)
when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}) seems poorly pragmatically motivated.) Finally, the
resulting posterior distributions solve neither our first nor our second problem:
We should note that the rest of our options do not produce solutions: neither our al-
ternative hierarchy using ρn(h|u0) for n ≥ 2 along the lines of (2.33), when ALT =
{u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} or ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, nor the other ways of not privileging θ
sources as in (2.44) or (2.45) when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} or (2.43) when ALT =
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Figure 2.32: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Signal 2 Receiver
Hierarchy
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Figure 2.33: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0,
Signal 1, Signal 2, Signal 1, Signal 2 Receiver Hierarchy
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Figure 2.34: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0,
Signal 1, Signal 1 Receiver Hierarchy
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Lassiter and Goodman Two Signals with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= [4. 0], C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ [1. ], C(¬)≈ [0. 33], µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta posterior source= signal1, pragmatic sender type= handthetasensitive
Figure 2.35: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1 Receiver Hierar-
chy
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Figure 2.36: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Signal 2 Theta
Distr Normal Receiver Hierarchy
{u0, u1,¬u1}, produce acceptable results in our h, θ-sensitive sender-receiver hierarchy. We
do observe results closer to the intuitively correct interpretation when we use truncated nor-
mal distributions for θ at level n = 0, especially when we use (2.39) or (2.44); see Figures
(2.36) and (2.37). However, even here at the lower levels ¬u1 and u2 are interpreted too
similarly, and at higher levels where ¬u1 and u2 have sufficiently distinct interpretations,
¬u1 has too strong an interpretation and too narrow an interpretation. Mutatis mutandis
for ¬u2 and u1. We also notice some seeming artifacts in the interpretations of u2 and u1
at n = 8, 10. We might search for model parameters that eliminate these problems; or we
might try having the receiver assume that θ1 > θ2. But this seems like the only addition
of so many epicycles in order to save the model, and should instead motivate us to find an
alternative model.
What about privileging the θ1 posterior distributions of u1 given that ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1},
in combination with the strategy of appealing to alternative utterances, and ascending the
sender-receiver hierarchy using our h, θ-sensitive sender? As we see in Figure (2.34) and
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Figure 2.37: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Sensitive Theta Posterior Source = Signal 1, Not 1, Signal 2,
Not 2 Theta Distr Normal Receiver Hierarchy
(2.35), the resulting interpretations of ¬u1 under either privileging method are too strong
for this strategy to succeed.
2.8 An Alternative Bayes-Grice Model
2.8.1 Motivation: Unrealistic Sender Behavior
If our h, θ-sensitive sender model does not solve our two problems, perhaps there are other
sender models that we might pursue? In this regard we note one particular problem with the
original sender model, and see how we might modify the sender model in light this problem.
Consider when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}. If θ1 ≤ h then ρ0(h|¬u1, θ1) = 0, per (2.14). Then per
(2.17), σ∗1(¬u1, h, θ1) = 0. Since INFO(u0, h) = ln(ρ0(h|u0)) = ln(φ(h)), if we let C(u0) = 0
(since the production cost of saying nothing is nothing) then Uσ1(u0, h) = ln(φ(h)). Then
we have:
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σ1(u1|h, θ1) =
σ∗1(u1, h, θ1)
σ∗1(u0, h) + σ
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Else, if θ1 > h, then ρ0(h|u1, θ1) = 0 and eλ(ln(ρ0(h|u1,θ1))−C(u1)) = 0 so σ1(u1|h, θ1) = 0. Notice,
however, that for a fixed θ1, σ1(u1|h, θ1) is constant for all h ≥ θ1, since φ(h) drops out. It
follows that, as can be seen in Figure (2.38), for a fixed θ1, no matter how much greater h
is than θ, σ1 has the same probability of sending u1.
16 This seems counterintuitive; if the
16Likewise, for a fixed θ we cannot make σ1 certain for every h ≥ θ to send u1—that is, for every h ≥ θ
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question under discussion is whether John is tall or not, for a given threshold for ‘tall’, we
would expect that the taller John is, the more likely John is to be called ‘tall’. Since σ1 is
an abstraction in the mind of ρ2 this is not directly an objection to the model, but it does
highlight the extent to which the model, if it accurately predicts listener’s interpretation
of gradable adjectives, depends on the listener having assumptions about the speaker that
do not match up to what intuitively seems like actual speaker behavior: it seems intuitive
that actual speakers do not use gradable adjectives with determinate thresholds below which
the adjective is certain never to apply and above which the adjective is always equally (but
perhaps not certainly) likely to apply.17 Again, even if speakers actually don’t behave as σ1
senders, so long as receivers behave as ρ2 receivers, the model has done its job; we should
then look for the effects of systematic error between actual receiver assumptions and actual
speaker behavior. Another option is to think of actual receivers as ρ4 receivers, and see if
we cannot make σ1(u1|h, θ1, θ2) close to 1—unless λ is sufficiently high and C(u) sufficiently low.
17I do not think it will be enough to merely point out that the threshold may shift from context to context
depending on factors in addition to the comparison class; if that defense of thresholds is not to capitulate
and become a probabilistic model it must maintain that those factors are a part of the truth conditions of
the utterance, since the point of thresholds is to provide contextually sensitive truth conditions. Even more
problematic for such a view will be the trade-off of vagueness for massive ambiguity, since different uses of
‘tall’ will require different thresholds from context to context; this problem remains even if we find a way to
keep these other factors out of the truth conditions of ‘tall’. A probabilistic model has in a sense built in such
factors by assuming that they affect sending probabilities to a greater or lesser degree as the height moves
away from a tipping point. Perhaps it is odd that I talk about truth conditions, since I am giving a semantic
theory not in terms of truth conditions; but the point remains even if we don’t have truth conditions in our
semantic theory: as long as we require precise sending thresholds we will require lexical ambiguity instead
of vagueness.
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the model predicts probabilistic σ3 senders even for a fixed threshold.
18
It is important to distinguish the foregoing feature from the fact that for a fixed h, if h
is relatively high but θ1 is relatively low, there is a low probability of σ1 using u1. (This
can also be seen in Figure (2.38).) This may also seem counterintuitive, but if ‘tall’ meant,
roughly, ‘not extremely short’, then even if someone was very tall, we would seem unlikely
to call them ‘tall’, as the cost of saying so would outweigh the minimal information gained
about h. It is one thing for any given threshold to be such that the probability of calling
someone ‘tall’ monotonically increases above that threshold (even if to some bound much
less than 1); it is another thing for any given threshold to be such that the probability of
calling someone ‘tall’ approaches 1 sufficiently far above the threshold. The former seems
desirable, the latter does not; the model thus far lacks both features.













σ1(¬u1|h, θ1)× ρ0(θ1|¬u1) dθ1 (2.56c)
Note that we must also marginalize over θ2 when ALT includes u2 or ¬u2.
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2.8.2 A Distance-Weighted Informativity Model
In light of the foregoing problem with the sender model, we present here a modified version
of Lassiter and Goodman (2017). The level 0 receiver ρ0 decodes as before, as in equations
(2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). The intuition behind our modified model is that in deciding which
signal to encode a given state as, a sender might care not just about the probability that the
receiver decodes that signal as the observed state, but about the probability that the receiver
will decode that signal as a state nearby the observed state; the nearer a given decoding state
is to the observed state, the more valuable it is to the sender that that signal is decoded
as that state. Put another way, the informativity of a signal relative to an observed state
and a given threshold for that signal is not to be measured as the probability that the
receiver will, using that threshold for that signal, decode that signal as that state, but as
the distance-weighted probability that the receiver will, using that threshold for that signal,
decode that signal as a state nearby the observed state. We assume here that the weight
is a Gaussian function of the distance from the observed state, with the rate of weighting







We can then replace the definitions of informativity in (2.4a)-(2.4c) and (2.16a)- (2.16b)
with:
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INFO(u1, h, θ1) = ln(
∫ ∞
−∞
fh(x)× ρ0(x|u1, θ1)dx) (2.58b)
INFO(u2, h, θ2) = ln(
∫ ∞
−∞
fh(x)× ρ0(x|u2, θ2)dx) (2.58c)
INFO(¬u1, h, θ1) = ln(
∫ ∞
−∞
fh(x)× ρ0(x|¬u1, θ1)dx) (2.58d)
INFO(¬u2, h, θ2) = ln(
∫ ∞
−∞
fh(x)× ρ0(x|¬u2, θ2)dx) (2.58e)
and then make the corresponding generalization to levels n in order to allow for ascent of
our sender-receiver hierarchy. To see the effect of distance-weighting, consider Figure (2.39);
the area under the red dashed line is greater than the area under the red dotted line, so for
h0 = −1.5, u0 is more informative than u1. In contrast, for h1 = 1.5, the area under the blue
dotted line is greater than the area under the blue dashed line, so u1 is more informative
than u0.
19
If we assume the rest of the model is the same as in Figure (2.38), (that is, we follow (2.34)-
(2.30)), the σ1 results are as in Figure (2.40). As we see there, for a fixed θ1 value, the prob-
19Note that we could also define a modified h, θ-sensitive definition of informativity, assuming the sender
desires to convey information about both the height and threshold using ‘tall’. We could do so by defining








and then define informativity as a combination of the two:
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fh0(x) ∗ ρ0(h|u1, θ)
fh1(x)
fh1(x) ∗ ρ0(h|u0)
fh1(x) ∗ ρ0(h|u1, θ)
Figure 2.39: Lassiter and Goodman Modified Model
θ, h0, h1, σw = 0.,−1.5, 1.5, 1.0
ability that σ1 will use ‘tall’ monotonically increases as h increases, as desired. The receiver
hierarchy is shown in Figure (2.41); as we see there, our second problem remains even as we
ascend the sender-receiver hierarchy: ‘not tall’ means something stronger, but in the opposite
direction from, ‘tall’. We see in Figure (2.42) the results when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2};
there too ascending the sender-receiver hierarchy leaves our first problem unresolved, as ‘not
tall‘ continues to be interpreted more strongly that ‘short’. For the same reasons as before,













fθ1(x)× ρ0(x|u1, h)dx) (2.60b)






fθ2(x)× ρ0(x|u2, h)dx) (2.60c)
INFO(¬u1, h, θ1) = ln(
∫ ∞
−∞
fh(x)× ρ0(x|¬u1, θ1)dx) +
∫ ∞
−∞
fθ1(x)× ρ0(x|¬u1, h)dx (2.60d)






fθ2(x)× ρ0(x|¬u2, h)dx) (2.60e)
We leave this possibility unexplored in the interest of space.
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Figure 2.40: Lassiter and Goodman Modified Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribu-
tion Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
Not 1 Sender 1
neither changing the choice parameter λ nor altering the cost function (unless ‘not’ is as-
signed a negative cost) will solve either problem. As we see comparing Figure (2.41) with
Figure (2.43), neither will appealing to alternative utterances—that is, comparing u1 when
ALT = {u0, u1, u2} to ¬u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} to solve our first problem, and com-
paring u2 when ALT = {u0, u1, u2} to ¬u1 when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} to solve our second
problem—solve either problem.
Where do we go from here? We could of course pursue our various options above: First,
we might try to define the receiver hierarchy in a unified manner for n > 0 as in (2.33)
when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} or as in Footnote (11) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1},
instead of giving separate definitions for n = 2 and n > 2 as in (2.28) and (2.29) when
ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} or as in (2.35) and (2.36) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}. Second,
we might try our various ways of privileging the θ-posteriors of the various signals as in
(2.38)-(2.45). Third, we might might try having the receiver assume that θ1 > θ2 as in
§2.6. Along with that, we might attempt to use a normal as opposed to a uniform prior
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Figure 2.41: Lassiter and Goodman Modified Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribu-
tion Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
Not 1 Receiver Hierarchy
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Lassiter and Goodman Three Signals with Not Iterated Arbitrary Variable Cost Variable Choice Parameter
λ= 4. 0, C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ 1. 0, C(¬)≈ 0. 33, µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta distribution relation=False, theta posterior source= signalspecific, pragmatic sender type=modifiedhsensitive
Figure 2.42: Lassiter and Goodman Modified Model Three Signals with Not Normal Dis-
tribution Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1,
Signal 2, Signal Not 1, Signal Not 2 Receiver Hierarchy
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λ= 4. 0, C(u0)≈ 0. 0, C(un)≈ 1. 0, µ= 0. 0, σ= 1. 0, num states= 160, theta distribution type= uniform, theta distribution relation=False, theta posterior source= signalspecific, pragmatic sender type=modifiedhsensitive
Figure 2.43: Lassiter and Goodman Modified Model Three Signals Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal 2
Receiver Hierarchy
θ-distributions at n = 0. Fourth, we might attempt to define an h, θ-sensitive version of
our distance-weighted sender model. We might hope that by some permutation of these
various approaches we will solve both of our problems; furthermore, we could try to appeal
to alternative utterances along with some permutation of these various approaches. However,
these start to seem like only so many epicycles lacking independent motivation except to our
problems, and it seems fair to look in other directions.
2.9 Non-Uniform ρ0 θ Priors
As noted at the beginning of §2.5, there seems to be good reason to think of degree scales
for gradable adjectives as abstractions from actual measures of physical properties: cases
like the speed of light, or absolute zero, seem to be cases in which the physical property
ostensibly being talked about has an upper or lower limit that would seem to entail that the
corresponding degree scale is upper or lower closed, contra the fact that ‘perfectly fast’ and
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‘perfectly cold’ are unavailable. We might then instead think of degree scales as degrees of
deviation from some measure of central tendency, and the prior distribution of the property
being talked about as distributions over degrees of deviation from the central tendency, at
least for relative gradable adjectives. This has the effect of transforming the distribution of
the property being talked about into a version of the standard normal distribution, as the
degrees of deviation are standardized. We might also distinguish, as suggested by Kennedy
(2007), between whether the degree scale is bounded or unbounded, and whether it is open
or closed: the normal distribution is unbounded, but we can also define a truncated normal













where φ(x) and Φ(x) are the probability density and cumulative distribution functions,
respectively, for the standard normal distribution, and −∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞. We can let
b = ∞ so that Φ( b−µ
σ
) = Φ(∞) = 1, and let a = 0. If the degree scale is defined only for
0 < h then even if φ∗(0) > 0, Φ∗(∞) = 1, so we still have a proper probability distribution.
We would then have a lower bounded, but open degree scale, in accordance with Kennedy
(2007)’s observation that relative gradable adjectives have degree scales that are both lower
and upper open. We might then claim that the unavailability of ‘perfectly tall’ is due to
the openness of the scale on both ends, there being no endpoints to move probability mass
onto or off of. On the other hand, we might let the degree scale be defined for 0 ≤ h;
again, even if φ∗(0) > 0, Φ∗(∞) = 1, so we again have a proper probability distribution. We
would in this case have a lower bounded, but closed degree scale. This would allow us to
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offer different explanations for the unavailability of ‘perfectly cold’ and ‘perfectly tall’: The
former has a degree scale which is lower unbounded, there being intuitively at least (contra
the deliverances of modern thermodynamics) no limit on the number of standardized degrees
of deviation below the central tendency that an object’s temperature might be. In contrast,
the latter has a degree scale which is lower bounded, since whatever the central tendency
of the heights of objects in the comparison class, there is a lower limit to the number of
standardized degrees of deviation below that central tendency that an object’s height might
be: the central tendency will be at a finite height, and no object (or at least no object
that is the kind of object that might have height) can have a height less than or equal to
0. Nevertheless, the degree scale is also lower open, since (again) no object (or at least no
object that is the kind of object that might have height) can have a height less than or equal
to 0.20
20In the case of ‘completely tall’ we might distinguish between a lower bounded scale that has 0 probability
density at the lower bound, and a lower bounded scale that has undefined probability density at the lower
bound; if we think of the intuition that no object that is the kind of object that can have height has 0 height
as driving the topology of the scale, then it seems we will want to model the degree scale as the former
kind of scale. On the other hand, if we think of the intuition that no object that is the kind of object that
can have height has 0 height as deriving from the topology of the scale, we might want to model the degree
scale as the latter kind of scale. Either way, however, if we think of the effect of ‘perfectly’ as forcing the
receiver to place all of the probability mass on the endpoint of the degree scale, the calculation of meaning
will go wrong: in the former case, the probability mass will be 0, in the latter case, the probability mass will
be undefined. Note that this understanding of ‘completely ’ requires appealing to generalized functions, as
we will be attempting to define a probability density function that sums to 1, but is everywhere except the
endpoint equal to 0, and infinitely dense at the endpoint.
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Figure 2.44: Lassiter and Goodman Model Three Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal 2,
Signal Not 1, Signal Not 2 Theta Distr Offset Normal Receiver Hierarchy
Now, the original motivation from Lassiter and Goodman (2017) for uniform prior distribu-
tions for threshold values was the preservation of interpretive flexibility; if θtall were biased
towards human heights, then tall skyscraper would end up improperly interpreted. If, how-
ever, for relative gradable adjectives we can think of degree scales as degrees of deviation
from some measure of central tendency, and the prior distribution of the property being
talked about as distributions over degrees of deviation from the central tendency, then it
seems we can have non-uniform prior distributions for threshold values without losing inter-
pretive flexibility: 1.5 standard deviations above the average height of men, will be much
less than 1.5 standard deviations above the average height of skyscrapers.
We show in Figure (2.44) the resulting receiver hierarchy when the hierarchy is defined
as in (2.27)-(2.30) and ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}, and p(θ1) = N (1.5, 1.) and p(θ2) =
N (−1.5, 1.). As we see there, our first problem seems better addressed than on any of
the previous approaches, insofar as at all levels n, ρn(h|u1) is stronger than ρn(h|¬u2), and
ρn(h|u2) is stronger than ρn(h|¬u1).
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Figure 2.45: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
Not 1 Theta Distr Offset Normal Receiver Hierarchy
Our second problem is more difficult to resolve. We see in Figure (2.45) the resulting receiver
hierarchy when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1} and the hierarchy is defined as in (2.34)-(2.37), and
p(θ1) = N (1.5, 1.). When n = 0 ρn(h|¬u1) is appropriately weak and ρn(h|u1) is appropri-
ately strong. However, at higher levels ρn(h|¬u1) is nearly as strong as ρn(h|¬u1). For that
matter, we might also quibble with the interpretation when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}.
Looking again at Figure (2.44) at higher levels ρn(h|¬u1) and ρn(h|¬u2) seems too strong,
and there seems an odd shift in ρn(h|u1) and ρn(h|u1) as we ascend the hierarchy, becoming
weaker at n = 2 and then stronger then on. Now, we could specify that interpreters never
ascend that high in the sender-receiver hierarchy, or we could hope that some permutation of
the foregoing approaches along with our now appropriately specified prior ρ0 distributions for
θ1 and θ2 would give us the interpretations we want. To review, those approaches included:
1. Varying the parameters in a appropriate manner.
2. Appealing to alternative utterances
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3. Defining the receiver hierarchy in a unified manner for n > 0 as in (2.33) when ALT =
{u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} or as in Footnote (11) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}, instead of
giving separate definitions for n = 2 and n > 2 as in (2.28) and (2.29) when ALT =
{u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2} or as in (2.35) and (2.36) when ALT = {u0, u1,¬u1}.
4. Privileging the θ-posteriors of the various signals as in (2.38)-(2.45).
5. Having the receiver assume that θ1 > θ2 as in §2.6. Along with that, we might attempt
to use a normal as opposed to a uniform prior θ-distributions at n = 0.
6. Using an h, θ-sensitive version of our sender-receiver hierarchy.
7. Using an h-sensitive or h- and θ-sensitive version of our distance-weighted sender model.
However, I think the most important objection to attempting to resolve either of our problems
by appropriately specified prior ρ0 distributions for θ1 and θ2 is that doing so seems to
anticipate a simpler model that entirely lacks θ values at all. To see this, consider again the
Bayesian reasoning that a hypothetical receiver engages in, when he assumes that ALT =
{u0, u1,¬u1}. Let us write Pρn for ρn’s probability function, in order to distinguish the
Bayesian component of our interpretive model from the recursive sender-receiver heirarchy






Now, according to our recursive sender-receiver hierarchy21:
21Note that this raises the possibility of defining a different hierarchy, one that takes the n− 2 utterance
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1. Pρn(h) is taken to be ρn−2(h|u0).
2. Pρn(u0|h) is taken to be the probability that ρn assigns to σn−1 uttering u0 given that
the height is h—that is, σn−1(u0|h). σn−1(u0|h) is then taken to be the sum, for every
θ1, of the product of the probability of σn−1 uttering u0 given that the height is h and
the threshold is θ1, (that is, σn−1(u0, h, θ1)), and the probability that ρn assigns to
the threshold being θ1 (which is in our recursive sender-receiver hierarchy defined as




3. Pρn(u0) is taken to be the probability that ρn assigns to σn−1 uttering u0—that is,
σn−1(u0). The probability that ρn assigns to σn−1 uttering u0 at all is then taken
to be the sum, for every h and θ1, of product of σn−1(u0, h, θ1), ρn−2(θ1|u0), and the
probability that ρn assigns to the height being h, which in our recursive sender-receiver







Since in the recursive sender-receiver hierarchy Pρn(h|u0) is taken to be ρn(h|u0), we thus
have that:
probabilities into account. That is, in items 2 and 3, instead of using ρn−2(θ1|u0), use ρn−2(θ1), which is∑
u∈ALT ρn−2(θ1|u)×ρn−2(u), where ρn−2(u) is defined as σn−3(u), similarly to σn−1(u) in item 3. Likewise
in items 1 and 3 instead of using ρn−2(h|u0), use ρn−2(h), which is
∑
u∈ALT ρn−2(h|u) × ρn−2(u), where
again ρn−2(u) is defined as σn−3(u), similarly to σn−1(u) in item 3. The latter change will not, I think, for
n=2 be equivalent to the original hierarchy assuming ρ0 has uniform prior probabilities for each utterance
and p(θ1) is uniform. We could, however, just use φ(h) all the way up the hierarchy and be consistent with









σn−1(u0|h, θ1)× ρn−2(θ1|u0)× ρn−2(h|u0)dθ1dh
(2.63)
Of course, we can move ρn−2(h|u0) within the integral, and this is equivalent to (2.35a), only
adding the marginalization over θ1 and the normalization over θ1 and h:
ρn(h, θ1|u0) ∝ σn−1(u0|h, θ1)× ρn−2(h|u0)× ρn−2(θ1|u0) (2.35a, revisited)
Similar remarks apply to u1 and ¬u1, and mutatis mutandis when ALT = {u0, u1, u2,¬u1,¬u2}.













Now, consider again u0: when n = 2, ρn−2(h|u0) = φ(h), reflecting ρ2’s prior knowledge of
the height distribution of objects in the comparison class. This will remain fixed invariant
of the model parameters or even of the various options regarding ALT, or how to calculate
the θ-posteriors for higher levels of n, or any of the other options in the foregoing list. We
might then wonder what σn−1(u0|h)
σn−1(u0)
looks like, or perhaps what it must look like in order to
have plausible interpretations of u0 when n = 2. But note here that σn−1(u0) is simply a
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normalizing factor to ensure that
∫ b
a
ρn(h|u0)dh = 1, which we can ignore insofar as we focus
on the relative probabilities that ρ2 assigns to various values of h given that ρ2 thinks that
σ1 utters u0. So we can focus instead simply on σn−1(u0|h)—that is, simply on how the
probability that ρ2 assigns to σn−1 using u0 varies, as h varies. Mutatis mutandum for u1
and ¬u1.
Let us set ρn(h|ui) to ρ0(h|u0) so that we can consistently see the effect of σn−1(ui|h) on
ρn(h|ui) for various levels n. Thus, our hierarchy is defined as in (2.34)-(2.37), except that
ρn−2(h|u0), ρn−2(h|u1), and ρn−2(h|¬u1) in (2.35) are replaced by ρ0(h|u0), which is just
φ(h). We again set p(θ1) = N (1.5, 1.). We see the resulting receiver hierarchy in Figure
(2.46), and the resulting sender hierarchy in Figure (2.47). As one might expect, as the
probability mass of σn−1(ui|h) shifts away from the central tendency of φ(h), ρn(h|ui) shifts
in the same direction away from the central tendency of φ(h). This makes sense: the less
likely a speaker is to call someone ‘not tall’ unless that person is well and truly short,
the more likely we should be to consider someone they call ‘not tall’ to be well and truly
short. Thus, σ1(¬u1|h) has significant probability mass to the right of the inflection point
around −.75σ, and ρ2(h|¬u1) is plausibly weak. (See Figure (2.48) for an enlarged view of
σ1(¬u1|h).) However, as we ascend the sender hierarchy the probability mass of σn−1(ui|h)
shifts away from the central tendency of φ(h). Thus σ9(¬u1|h) has proportionally less of
its probability mass to the right of the main inflection point, which itself has moved to
around −.9σ, and ρ10(h|¬u1) is implausibly strong. Similar remarks apply to σn−1(u1|h)
and ρn(h|u1): as we ascend the sender-receiver hierarchy, the probability mass of σn−1(u1|h)
moves towards the central tendency of φ(h), and ρn(h|u1) becomes weaker. We thus see that
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Figure 2.46: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
Not 1 Theta Distr Offset Normal Mod 2 Receiver Hierarchy
generating plausible interpretations for relative gradable adjectives under the Bayes-Grice
framework seems to require that the receiver assume roughly sigmoid encoding behavior on
the part of the sender, whether or not there is a threshold in the underlying semantics. We
might then wonder if there is a way to generate such encoding behavior independently of
thresholds at all, and it is to such attempts that I turn next. This may seem to reverse
the order of things: we have been assuming a semantics and trying to generate plausible
interpretations. Instead we are now assuming we know what a plausible interpretation looks
like, and working backwards to a semantics, going by way of a model of sending behavior.
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Figure 2.47: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
Not 1 Theta Distr Offset Normal Mod 2 Sender Hierarchy
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Figure 2.48: Lassiter and Goodman Model Two Signals with Not Normal Distribution
Lambda 4 Low Cost Theta Posterior Source = Signal Specific Signal 0, Signal 1, Signal
Not 1 Theta Distr Offset Normal Mod 2 Sender Hierarchy Enlarged
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Chapter 3
Game Theory and Probabilistic
Signaling
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 I argued that at least one prominent model due to Lassiter and Goodman
(2017) of how we engage in the statistical inferences that we typically do engage in upon
hearing a sentence containing a vague predicate such as ‘Feynman is tall’, when married to
a common kind of truth-conditional semantics for that sentence such as is found in Kennedy
(2007), generates the wrong predictions about the negations of such sentences. That is, such
a model predicts that upon hearing ‘Feynman is not tall’, listeners will infer that Feynman is
likely to be shorter than if he had been called ‘short’. This seems to be much too strong an
interpretation, and I argue in Chapter 2 that getting the model to generate the intuitively
correct results, requires that listeners have a fixed distribution for the threshold for tallness,
at or above which ‘Feynman is tall’ is true, and below which it is false. This in turn suggested
a simpler model of interpretation, on which listeners simply consider the probability that
the speaker would have said ‘Feynman is tall’ given that Feynman is a given height, and
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the prior probability of Feynman being that height, to generate a posterior probability for
Feynman being that height. Of course, it is implausible that listeners do this unless speakers
actually do increase the probability that Feynman will be called ‘tall’as Feynman’s height
increases.
However, on the most plausible understanding of what language is, according to which it is
a convention in the game-theoretic sense, just as driving on the left-hand side of the road is
a convention, such encoding behavior is at least initially unexpected, since as Lipman (2009)
proves, probabilistic encoding behavior is never a strict Nash equilibrium. Thus, in this
chapter I explore some attempts to explain in terms of game theory how such probabilistic
encoding behavior might arise, and I extend in two ways the explanation that I find most
successful.
3.2 The Puzzle of Game Theory and Vagueness
In D. Lewis (1969), the author introduced the notion of a signaling game: we imagine a
sender who observes states of nature and chooses a signal to send to a receiver. Given a
signal, the receiver chooses an action to perform. The sender can observe and send a signal,
but cannot act. The receiver can receive a signal and perform an action, but cannot observe.
If the action performed is appropriate to the observed state, the sender and receiver receive
a reward. If not, they receive nothing. Obviously, the challenge for sender and receiver is
to coordinate their choices of signals and actions so as to maximize their rewards. Suppose
there are two possible states of nature, two signals, and two actions. We can represent the
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a1 a2 R a1 a2
1 0 0 1
Figure 3.1: 2-state, 2-signal, 2-action signaling game
game in extensive form as in Figure 3.1, where N is nature, n1 and n2 are the possible states
of nature, S is the sender, m1 and m2 are the messages she can send, R is the receiver, and a1
and a2 are the actions he can take. The 1’s and 0’s at the end of the paths represent rewards
given the preceding choices. Thus, n1 −→ m1 −→ a1, n2 −→ m2 −→ a2 is one arrangement that
leads to maximal payoffs; but not the only one: n1 −→ m2 −→ a1, n2 −→ m1 −→ a2 will do just
as well. This is a coordination game, where each player prefers that the other players play a
corresponding strategy to the one he plays, no matter which one he chooses.1 For the former
arrangement, that one-one correspondence maps n1 −→ m1 to m1 −→ a1 and n2 −→ m2 to m2
−→ a2; for the latter arrangement, it maps n1 −→ m2 to m2 −→ a1 and n2 −→ m1 to m1 −→ a2.
Lewis went on to analyse conventions of language use as conventions of games of pure coor-
dination. To see what this means, consider a coordination game we’ll call Left-Right, where
player 1 and 2 always receive equal payoffs (x 1, y2). We present the game in tabular form in
Figure 3.2. We might think of this game as analogous to choosing which side of the road to
drive on: neither I nor the driver of the oncoming car care which particular side we drive on,
just that he choose right if I choose right, and he choose left if I choose left, for otherwise
1In a pure coordination game, for any action, each player receives the same payoff, (although different









Now, a pure strategy is one where players always only choose one strategy or another; a
mixed strategy is one where a player probabilistically chooses between strategies—in the
game above, sometimes choosing A and other times choosing B. A Nash equilibrium is an
assignment of pure or mixed strategies to each player in the game such that no player is
better off by unilaterally deviating from the strategy assigned to him. The game above then
has two pure strategy Nash equilibria. Each of these is also a strict Nash equilibria, which
is an assignment of pure or mixed strategies to each player in the game such that any player
is actually worse off by unilaterally deviating from the strategy assigned to him. There is
one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game: s = (.5A + .5B).
With these preliminaries in mind we can say that for Lewis, a strict Nash equilibrium of a
game of pure coordination is a convention just in case each player adheres to that equilibrium
because (i) the rules and payoff structure of game, (ii) the strategic rationality of each player,
and (iii) the intention of each player to adhere to that equilibrium, are all items of common
knowledge, in the sense that every player knows these items, knows that every other player
knows these items, knows that every other player knows that every other player knows them,
and so on. The value of such a notion of convention is clear, for we can now explain in formal
terms why we drive on the right (or left) side of the road: this is also a convention in a pure
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coordination game.
Lewis’ analysis of conventions of language as conventions of a pure coordination game has
been highly influential, and a number of linguists and philosophers have atttempted to extend
the game-theoretic approach to account for puzzles of language such as scalar implicatures
and free choice permissions, and more general features of language such as compositionality
and context-sensitivity. It would seem reasonable to think that such an approach could also
shed light on vagueness. However, Lipman (2009) proves that vagueness is in one sense
puzzling on a game-theoretic approach: it is never part of the strict Nash equilibrium of
a signaling game of pure coordination, and thus can never be explained as arising from a
convention.
What is vagueness in a signaling game? Intuitively, the taller something is relative to a
comparison class, the more likely it is to be called tall. Thus, in a signaling game vagueness
is not leaving some states unexpressed, nor is it having some states be expressed by more than
1 message; it is having some states be probabilistically expressed by at least one message.
Given this notion of vagueness in a signaling game, the proof that it is never part of a strict
Nash equilibrium of a signaling game of pure coordination is as follows: let (m, a*) be a
pair of (perhaps mixed, perhaps pure) strategies such that
US,R(m
∗, a∗) = U∗ (3.1)
where U is the supremum of U S,R, the utility function for the sender and receiver. Then
(m*, a*) is a Nash equilibrium, since any deviation from m* cannot raise the payoff for
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S (nor for R, since they have the same utility function), and similarly for a*. Now m* is
something of the form:
(p1m1 + p2m2 + ...+ pkmk) (3.2)
for 0 ≤ p1, p2, ..., pk ≤ 1 and m1, m2, ..., mk ∈M, where all pi are probabilities. Similarly for
a*. If U S,R(m i , a*) > U S,R(m*, a*) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k then there must be some 1 ≤ j ≤ k
such that U S,R(m j , a*) < U S,R(m*, a*). (An analogy: you want a B in the class. If you get
a C on the first quiz, you need an A on something down the line.) But then (m*, a*) is not a
Nash equilibrium, since S could just play (m j , a*) and get a higher payoff. So U S,R(m i , a*)
= U S,R(m*, a*) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 0. Similarly for every a i . Hence for every (m i , a j ) in (m*,
a*), U S,R(m i , a j ) = U *, and is thus a Nash equilibrium. Hence, probabilistically mixing
messages is never better than sending precise messages. If we are to hew to the project of
giving game-theoretic explanations of linguistic phenomena, we had better find some other
account why vagueness arises than the claim that is a strict Nash equilibrium, because it’s
not that.
3.3 Evolutionary Game Theory to the Rescue?
3.3.1 Replicator Dynamics
Now, one response to this problem is to draw on the resources of evolutionary game theory
and attempt to explain vagueness in signaling games as a result of the manner in which the
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strategies of such games evolve. Even if vagueness is never part of the strict Nash equilibrium
of a signaling game, perhaps evolutionary game theory can tell us how players starting from
non-optimal strategies might come to engage in vague signaling. There are at least two flavors
of evolutionary game theory of interest to us: the replicator dynamics interpretation, and the
best response dynamics interpretation. As for the replicator dynamics interpretation, let us
return to the Left-Right game above. Suppose we initially have a population of individuals,
each of whom is either an A-player or a B -player. The game is played over multiple rounds,
and after each round a player can produce an offspring of only the same player type—A-
players can only create A-players, and B -players can only create B -players. Assume that
the average number of offspring of any player of any type after any round is equal to the
expected utility of a player of that type when playing against a random player, and that
any new player has one and only one parent. If a and b are the number of A-players and
B -players, respectively, then since 1 × a/(a+b) + 0 × b/(a+b) = a/(a+b), the average
number of offspring of an A-player is equal to the proportion of A-players, and likewise for
B -players: 0 × a/(a+b) + 1 × b/(a+b) = b/(a+b). (That is, the number of offspring is
calculated just as expected utility would be.)
If we start with 50 A-players and 50 B -players at round 0, then after round 1 we will have 75
A-players and 75 B -players, after round 2, 112.5 A-players and 112.5 B -players, and so on.
Evolutionary game theory typically assumes that populations are infinitely large and that
random variation is non-existent. Thus, we can say that if the initial distribution is 50:50, it
will indefinitely remain so. If we start with 100 A-players and 0 B -players at round 0, then
after round 1 we will have 150 A-players and 0 B -players, after round 2, 225 A-players and 0
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B -players, and so on; thus, we see that if the initial distribution is 100:0, it will indefinitely
remain so. Likewise if the initial distribution is 0:100.
In general, suppose a>b. Then since
EU(A) = 1× a/(a+ b) + 0× b/(a+ b) > EU(B) = 0× a/(a+ b) + 1× b/(a+ b) (3.3)
and the average number of offspring is equal to the expected utility EU, it follows that after
each round the percent increase of the A-player population will be greater than that of the
B -player A- or B -players is a geometric function of the number of rounds, the population
will eventually converge at the limit to 100% A-players. Likewise if b>a.
There are thus only three steady states of the population distribution A% to B%: 100%:0%,
50%:50%, and 0%:100%. Imagine, however, an invasion of a population in the second distri-
bution by an arbitrarily small group of A-players: as now a¿b, the population will eventually
converge to only A-players. The second distribution is not an evolutionarily stable state,
defined in John Maynard Smith (1982) as a population state such that the initial distribution
is restored by natural selection after a limited disturbance. The first distribution is such a
state, however: so long as the number of B -player invaders is strictly less than the total of
an A-player only population, the population will eventually converge again to an A-player
only population. Likewise for the third distribution.
Under the replicator dynamics interpretation of evolutionary game theory, the notion of an
evolutionary stable state gives rise to the notion of an evolutionary stable strategy, for which
there are two distinct definitions: First, following J Maynard Smith and Price (1973) we can
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say that a strategy s is evolutionarily stable if and only if for every player p:
∀t 6= s : (Up(s, s) > Up(t, s) ∨ (Up(s, s) = u(t, s) ∧ Up(s, t) > Up(t, t))) (3.4)
In words: s is such that it is always either better to stay with s if the other player stays too
or both the same to switch if he stays and better to stay if he switches. Second, following
Thomas (1985), we can say that a strategy s is evolutionarily stable if and only if:
∀t 6= s : (Up(s, s) ≥ Up(t, s) ∧ Up(s, t) ≥ Up(t, t)) (3.5)
In words: s is such that it is never better to switch if the other player stays and always
better to stay if he switches. There is a third definition in John Maynard Smith (1982) that
is equivalent to the first definition: we can say that a strategy s is evolutionarily stable if
and only if:
∀t 6= s : (Up(s, s) ≥ Up(s, t) ∧ Up(s, s) = Up(t, s)→ Up(s, t) > Up(t, t)) (3.6)
In words, s is such that it is never better to switch if the other player stays and if ever the
same to switch if he stays then better to stay if he switches.2
The first and the third definitions are not equivalent to the second definition; both pure
strategy Nash equilibria in the game above are evolutionarily stable strategies under the
first and third definitions, but not under the second definitions, since for neither A nor B is
2The equivalence follows from propositional logic and the fact that a = b and a > b are never both true.
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it better to stay if the other player switches. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the
game above is not an evolutionarily stable strategy under any of the definitions: let s = (.5A
+ .5B) and t = (.7A + .3B); then since U p(s,s) = .50, U p(t,s) = .50, U p(t,t) = .58, and
U p(s,t) = .50, it follows that U p(s,s) = U p(t,s) and hence U p(s,s) > U p(t,s)), but (U p(s,t)
> U p(t,t)). The last fact by itself entails that s is not an evolutionarily stable strategy under
the second definition, and the three facts together entail that s is not an evolutionarily stable
strategy under the first definition, (and hence the third one too). Since each of the three
definitions entails that an evolutionary stable strategy under any of the three definitions is
a Nash equilibrium, this overall demonstrates that the evolutionarily stable strategies under
any of the three definitions are a proper subset of the Nash equilibria.
Finally, a strict Nash equilibrium is automatically an evolutionarily stable strategy under
the first definition by its first disjunct, and hence is an evolutionarily stable strategy under
the third definition too. Not so for the second definition, since either strategy in the game
above is a strict Nash equilibrium, but not an evolutionary stable strategy under the third
definition. In the game illustrated in Figure 3.3, we see that B is a evolutionarily stable
strategy under the first definition, but also a non-strict Nash equilibrium. Hence the strict
Nash equilibria are a proper subset of the evolutionarily stable strategies, under the first
and third definitions. (Of course, there is a clear correspondence between the evolutionarily
stable states and the evolutionarily stable strategies: we can turn any evolutionarily stable
state into a (perhaps mixed) evolutionarily stable strategy by interpreting the population
distribution as the mixing proportions, and vice-versa.)







Figure 3.3: B is a non-strict evolutionarily stable strategy
theoretic terms is that even if vagueness in signaling games is not part of the strict Nash
equilibrium (and thus we cannot explain its existence as a feature of language in terms
of its utility-maximization), perhaps there is a a way to explain how it arises under the
replicator dynamics. However, Selten (1978) proves that for asymmetric games, a strategy is
evolutionarily stable under the replicator dynamics (for the first and third definition above)
if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. Since the strategy sets of the sender and
receiver are distinct (that is, they choose between different sets of moves), signaling games
are asymmetric games.3 Thus, if vagueness is not part of the strict Nash equilibrium, it is
not predicted to arise either on the replicator dynamics!
3.3.2 Best Response Dynamics
We derived these notions of evolutionarily stable states and evolutionarily stable strategies by
appeal to an interpretation of evolutionary game theory that made no mention of any player’s
knowledge of the reward structure of the game or capacity to engage in rational deliberation
and then arrive at the correct decision-theoretic outcome. Game theory has traditionally,
however, been couched in precisely these terms, albeit with the rather unrealistic assumptions
that each player has logical omniscience and the ability to reason to infinite strategic depth,






Rock 1 0 2
Paper 2 1 0
Scissors 0 2 1
Figure 3.4: Rochambeau
and the further assumption that that is common knowledge.
Enter best-response dynamics, which takes a middle ground between the replicator dynamics
and traditional game theory. To illustrate the difference, consider the game of Rochambeau
in Figure 3.4:
The single Nash equilibrium of this game is the mixed strategy
s = 1/3×Rock + 1/3× Paper + 1/3× Scissors (3.7)
However, s is not evolutionarily stable under the replictor dynamics: suppose we introduce a
small a population of rock players in a population in the equilibrium state. The next round
of the game will see an increased reproduction rate for paper players and a decreased rate
for scissors players; this will continue until the excess of paper players leads to an increased
reproduction rate for scissors players, eventually leading to an excess of rock players, and so
on. This will lead to a cycle of paper, then scissors, then rock dominating the population,
with the dominance in one round always greater than that in the previous one.
In fact we can see that s is not an evolutionarily stable strategy under either definition. In
Figure 3.5 we let s = 1/3 × Rock + 1/3 × Paper + 1/3 × Scissors and t = 1/2 × Rock +
1/4 × Paper + 1/4 × Scissors.
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(s,s) 1/3 1/3 1/3 Rock Paper Scissors
1/3 1/9 1/9 1/9 Rock 1 0 2
1/3 1/9 1/9 1/9 × Paper 2 1 0 = 1
1/3 1/9 1/9 1/9 Scissors 0 1 2
(t,s) 1/3 1/3 1/3 Rock Paper Scissors
1/2 1/6 1/6 1/6 Rock 1 0 2
1/4 1/12 1/12 1/12 × Paper 2 1 0 = 1
1/4 1/12 1/12 1/12 Scissors 0 1 2
(t,t) 1/2 1/4 1/4 Rock Paper Scissors
1/2 1/4 1/8 1/8 Rock 1 0 2
1/4 1/8 1/16 1/16 × Paper 2 1 0 = 1
1/4 1/8 1/16 1/16 Scissors 0 1 2
(s,t) 1/2 1/4 1/4 Rock Paper Scissors
1/3 1/6 1/12 1/12 Rock 1 0 2
1/3 1/6 1/12 1/12 × Paper 2 1 0 = 1
1/3 1/6 1/12 1/12 Scissors 0 1 2
Figure 3.5: u(s,s) = u(t,s) = u(t,t) = u(s,t) = 1
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We see that even though u(t,s) = u(s,s), it’s false that u(s,t) > u(t,t).
On the other hand, we can imagine engaging in the following line of reasoning: suppose I
notice my opponent is playing rock half the time and paper and scissors each one quarter of
the time. I reason that I ought to play paper half the time (and scissors and rock a quarter
each.) I do so. But then if my opponent performs similar reasoning in the next round, then
he will play scissors half the time and rock and paper a quarter each. In the round after
that, I will play rock half the time and paper and scissors a quarter each. Thus, we will cycle
endlessly. There seems to be some kind of stability here, where each player is successively
playing best responses to the other’s last move. Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) thus give the
following definition for 2-player games where both strategy sets are the same: a strategy s
is evolutionarily stable under the best response dynamics iff for all t 6= s:
1. u(s,s) > u(t,s), or
2. u(s,s) = u(t,s) and there is some t ’ 6=s such that u(t ’,s) = u(s,s) and u(t ’,t) > u(t,t)
All this talk of best respose dynamics might lead us to think we can explain vagueness in
terms of its being a best response to some other strategy. However, Jäger (2007a) proves that
for asymmetric games, a strategy is evolutionarily stable under the best response dynamics
if and only if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. Thus again, if vagueness is not part of the strict
Nash equilibrium, it is not predicted to arise on the best response dynamic!
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3.3.3 Two Solutions
In this section I present two attempts to explain the origin of vagueness; importantly, both
rely on an assumption of what is called bounded rationality : in contrast to the assumptions
of classical game thoery, players are not assumed to perfectly know the structure of the game
and its payoffs and be able to reason to infinite strategic depth.
3.3.3.1 The Shakes
A second attempt to explain the emergence of vagueness in signaling games is due to Franke
et al. (2010). They also assume a similarity relation imposed on the states observed by the
sender and compute the payoff as a function of the similarity between encoded and decoding
states; instead of defining similarity as the absolute difference between the encoded and
decoding states and then specifying a payoff function, they specify a Gaussian similarity
relation, and then identify the payoff with the similarity:
US,R(t, t






where t and t ’ are the encoded and decoding states, respectively. (They call these sim-max
games.) Furthermore, they assume that sender and receiver do not deterministically choose























′,m)× US,R(t, t′). (3.12)
As for λ, it is a rational choice constant: as λ approaches 0, PS(t, t* ) approaches uniform
random choice of strategy; as λ approaches ∞, PS(t, t* ) approaches deterministic choice of
expected payoff-maximal strategy. It is important to note the adoption of a probabilistic
choice rule is Franke, et al ’s departure from classical game theory; this in turn allows them
to offer an explanation of vagueness in signaling games. That is, this is their adoption of
a version of bounded rationality. If we assume sender and receiver use the same λ and are
correct in their assessment of the others’ encoding and decoding probabilities, (an assumption
reflected in fact that EU S depends on PR, and EU R depends on PS ) then there will always













Franke, et al simulate a 100 state, 3 signal sim-max game with σ = .2, λ = 20 and demon-
strate that it has a quantal response equilibria on which PS(t,m1) is near 1 for almost all of
the lower third of states and smoothly transitions to 0 for the rest of the states, PS(t,m2) is
near 1 for almost all of the middle third of states and smoothly transitions down to 0 over
the rest of the states, and PS(t,m3) is near 1 for almost all of the upper third of states and
smoothly transitions down to 0 for the rest of the states. PR(m1, t), PR(m2, t), and PR(m3, t)
are a roughly Gaussian distributions centered at the middle of the lower, middle, and upper
third of states, respectively.
However, I find this model of the origins of vagueness unsatisfying, as it offers no explanation
as to exactly why senders and receivers fail to deterministically choose payoff maximizing
strategies. The equations describe probabilistic encoding and decoding behavior, and given
sufficient data we might be able to specify values for λ that accurately describe observed
behavior; however, that is different than explaining just why λ takes the values that it does.
Now, the authors do say that just as a single person at different times may make different
choices under conditions that are indistinguishable relative to a given behavioral model, due
to factors that fail to be captured by that model, so also such factors may sum over different
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strategies such that even though one strategy is payoff maximizing according to the model
and another is not payoff maximizing according to the model, the player at times treats
the latter is if it were one of the former. This may be due in part to a player’s imperfect
understanding of what is payoff maximizing, and it may be due in part to the model failing
to adequately capture the player’s preferences. As large sums of small error factors are less
likely than small sums of small error factors, we may even assume that the farther a strategy
is from being payoff maximizing according to the model, the less likely a player is to mistake
it from one that is payoff maximizing according to the model; this is the effect of λ in their
model. However, to say this is again not to say what those error factors are, and it makes
no predictions of when vagueness can be expected to arise.
3.3.3.2 Generalized Reinforcement
Another attempt to explain the origin of vagueness is due to O’Connor (2014). She presents a
modified signaling game in which there is a similarity relation imposed on the states observed
by the sender. The rationale for doing so is that vague predicates often apply to varying
degrees to an object: a 50 kg bear is not as big as a 500 kg bear. Furthermore, in view of the
similarity relation over states, the payoffs obtained by the sender and receiver are allowed
to vary with the distance between the state encoded by the sender in the chosen message
and the state that message is decoded as by the receiver. (To simplify matters, we assume
in the remainder of this paper that the receiver’s actions are all to choose among the states
observed by the sender, unless otherwise noted.) Again, this makes sense: the bigger the
bear, the faster we ought to run from it. Thus, in a 20-state game with 2 messages, if the
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sender observes state 5 and encodes it via message 0, the sender and receiver would obtain
(the same) maximal payoff if message 0 is decoded as state 5, a smaller payoff if decoded
as state 4 or 6, a yet smaller payoff if decoded as state 3 or 7, and so on. She calls this a
contiguous signaling (CS) game.
To see the effect this has on the equilibria in signaling games, let us return to the game in
Figure (3.1). In such a signaling game what Lewis called a signaling system is possible: a
strategy profile such that there is a one-one sender function from states to signals and a one-
one receiver function from signals to states which is also the inverse of the sender function;
signaling systems thus effect perfect coordination. With more than 2 states, senders can
also engage in partial pooling, where a signal can encode more than one state. When states
and signals are equi-numerous, partial pooling is payoff dominated by signaling systems; but
where states outnumber signals, players can do no better than partial pooling to achieve
partial coordination. As Jäger (2007b) proves, the effect of imposing a similarity metric
on states and then varying the payoffs with the distance between the encoded state and
the decoding state is to reduce the number of partial pooling Nash equilibria. To see why,
consider Figure 3.6a-3.6d.
Here Figure 3.6a is a pure strategy partial pooling equilibria of a 7-state, 2-signal CS game;
Figures 3.6b-3.6d are pure strategy profiles that are partial pooling equilibria of the cor-
responding non-CS game (where payoffs do not vary with distance of the decoding state
from the encoded state.), but which are not pure strategy partial pooling equilibria of the
corresponding CS game. In Figure 3.6b the receiver decodes signal 2 as a state too far
from the median of the states encoded by signal 2. In Figure 3.6c the sender would achieve
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higher payoffs by encoding state 7 as signal 2, since state 6 is closer to state 7 than state
2. In Figure 3.6d the sender would achieve higher payoffs by encoding state 3 as signal 1,
since state 2 is closer to state 3 than state 6. Thus for CS games, the pure strategy partial
pooling equilibria require that the receiver decodes each signal as a state among the median
states of that signals’ encoded states, and that the sender encodes states in convex-shaped,
equal-sized groups.
However, this is still not sufficient to explain vagueness as a strict Nash partial pooling
equilibrium of a CS game: the results of Lipman (2009) still apply, since the average dis-
tance between encoded states and decoding states is minimized by playing pure strategies:
suppose the sender probabilistically encoded states 3, 4, and 5 as signals 1 and 2 at the
rates of .75/.25, .5/.5, and .25/.75, respectively. Consider the 25% of the time that state 5
is encoded as signal 1: since state 2 is farther from state 5 than state 6, this results in a
lower overal payoff. Similarly for the 25% of the time that state 3 is encoded as signal 2.4
Instead, O’Connor explains vagueness in signaling games as the result of a modified version
of Herrnstein reinforcement learning, inspired by the phenomenon of stimulus generalization;
she calls this generalized reinforcement learning. This learning method permits players to
develop signaling arrangements that can maximize payoffs when states are numerous, signals
are few, and the players must quickly develop such arrangements; however, it also results in
persistently (and essentially) vague signaling.5
Under (non-generalized) Herrnstein reinforcement learning, due to Roth and Erev (1995),
4What if only state 4 was probabilistically encoded? Even here the mixed strategy does no better than
3.6a since the decoding state (2 or 4) is still always 2 states away. In general, games where the states cannot
be evenly divided among the signals allow edge states to be split between two signals without loss—or
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players reinforce choice of strategy in proportion to that strategy’s past payoff. To see how
this work for a 7-state, 2-signal game, we imagine the sender with 7 urns, one for each
state, in front of him. Each sender urn starts with one signal 0 ball, and one signal 1 ball.
We imagine the receiver with two urns, one for each signal, in front of him. Each receiver
urn starts with one state 0 ball, one state 1 ball, and so on up to state 6. (See Round 0
in Figure 3.7.) In each round of play of the game, the sender and receiver pick encoding
signals and decoding states, respectively, by pulling balls from their urns. For example, if
the sender observes state 2 in round 1, he picks a ball from urn 2; perhaps it is a signal
1 ball. The sender thus sends signal 1, and the receiver, having received signal 1, reaches
into his signal 1 urn and picks a ball; perhaps it is a state 5 ball. Since states 2 and 5 are
a medium distance apart, the players earn a moderate payoff; having earned this moderate
payoff, the sender places additional signal 1 balls in his state 2 urn, and the receiver places
additional state 5 balls in his signal 1 urn. (In fact, we can imagine the payoff as just being
the balls themselves.) How many balls do they add? For this we require a payoff function
that specifies the payoff as a function of the distance of the decoding state from the encoding
state. In our own simulations we have found that the choice of function does not much alter
the kind of resulting signaling arrangements that result, so long as the payoffs monotonically
decrease with increasing distance. If we suppose that this payoff function specifies a payoff
of 4 balls for a 3 state difference, then the sender and receiver urns will be as illustrated in
Figure 3.7, Round 1. Then, in Round 2, if the sender observes state 2 again she will be likely
gain—of payoff.
5Note that we decline to call these arrangements signaling systems, since they are not, except in the
limiting case, representable as one-one sender state-to-signal functions and inverse receiver sender-to-state
functions.
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to pick signal 1, and the receiver will be more likely to pick state 5 upon receiving signal 1;













where WS and WR are the sender and receiver weight matrices (or arrays of urns), respec-
tively. Note that the sender only adds signal 1 balls only to the state 2 urn, and the receiver
only adds state 5 balls to the message 1 urn. Since the sender ball type will always match the
receiver urn type, we can describe this as the sender and receiver reinforcing on the encoded
state 2 and the decoding state 5, respectively.
What about generalized reinforcement learning? Here we imagine that the sender and re-
ceiver reinforce not just on the encoded state and decoding state, respectively, but also on
nearby states. The rationale here is that a given situation tends to evince a given reaction
in proportion to the past success of that reaction under similar situations: if running very
quickly from a 500 kg bear was successful in the past, one will tend to run—albeit not as
quickly—from a 250 kg bear too, and even less so from a 50 kg bear. For our games, this
means the level of sender reinforcement monotonically decreases across states with distance
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from the encoded state; the level of receiver reinforcement monotonically decreases across
states with distance from the decoding state. Thus, in addition to a payoff function that
specifies the payoff for the encoded state and decoding state, we also require a generalization
function that specifies how quickly the payoff drops off across states; if we suppose that this
generalization function specifies a 1-1 state-ball drop off, then after Rounds 0 and 1 our urns
would be as in Figure 3.8, (assuming the payoff function remains unchanged from Figure
3.7). As before, the sender encoding and receiver decoding probabilities are calculated by
normalizing the weights across signals and states, respectively.
The more widely we generalize our reinforcement across states, the more vague the resulting
signaling arrangement will tend to be, for a fixed number of rounds of play, where vagueness
is measured as the average, across states, of the probability difference between the first and
second most probable signal encoding that state. (In fact, O’Connor reports that in the
absence of generalization, reinforcement learning dynamics in signaling games approaches
non-vague signaling arrangements as the number of rounds of play approaches infinity.)
We can define a measure of success by summing over all rounds of play the expected payoff of
the sender and receiver strategies resulting from that round of play, and divide that total by
the expected payoff of playing a payoff dominant strategy for all rounds of play—which for
our games will be pure strategies in which the sender encodes states as equal-sized, convex
regions, and in which the receiver maps signals to the median state of the states encoded by
that signal. For a 200 state, 40 signal game, O’Connor reports that in shorter simulations
of 100,000 rounds, generalizing more widely results in higher levels of success. However, at
simulations run to 1,000,000 rounds, generalizing more widely results in almost no change
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in success; at 10,000,000 rounds generalizing more widely results in lower success. This is
because wider generalization allows players to more quickly reach signaling arrangements, but
the resulting arrangements will have progressively lower expected payoffs the more widely the
players generalize. In shorter simulations this is an advantage; in longer ones, a disadvantage.
This effect is reduced as we shrink the number of states but maintain the state/signal ratio; in
a 50 state, 10 signal game, wider generalization almost monotonically leads to lower success
no matter the length of simulation. In contrast, this effect is increased as the number of
signals decreases; for a 200 state, 10 signal game run to 1,000,000 rounds, wider generalization
leads to progressively higher levels of success.
It is important to note that this explanation of vagueness as a result of a learning process
that achieves higher shorter-term payoffs depends on a kind of bounded rationality and thus
a departure from classical game theory: players are not assumed to adopt a strategy that
achieves the maximal payoff or even one that maximizes expected payoff; instead, they play
a strategy necessitated by the need to learn quickly the tendencies of the other player. Given
infinite time, they would be better off by playing deterministic, non-vague strategies.
3.4 Symmetrization and Normal Distributions
Here we extend O’Connor’s model in two ways: first, we allow players to arbitrarily take on
the role of either sender or receiver; second, we investigate the behavior that emerges when
the states of nature are roughly normally distributed, as opposed to uniformly distributed.
The former change more completely reflects the conditions under which language evolves;
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the latter change reflects the intuition that vague predicates like ‘tall’ are often used with
comparison classes that are normally distributed with respect to the feature in question: for
example, we say of people that they are ‘tall’ or ‘short.
Thus, it will be helpful to review the results of our own implementation of that model.
Consider, for example, a 20 state, 2 signal, 20 action game, with a Gaussian payoff function
U∗S,R(t, t






where t and t′ are the encoded and decoding states, respectively, and where α = 5 and
σ ≈ 2.548. Since this is the payoff function, U∗S,R is the amount of reinforcement (number of
balls) that the sender and receiver place on the encoded and decoding states, respectively.
If t = t′ then U∗S,R = 5; as t − t′ increases, U∗S,R decreases. With σ ≈ 2.548, the full width
at half maximum of our payoff function is 6; that is, U∗S,R = 2.5 for t− t′ = 3.6 But sender
and receiver also reinforce on states nearby the encoded and decoding states, respectively,
according to the generalization function. Suppose we assume a Gaussian generalization
function
US(t
















6For a Gaussian function, full width at half maximum = 2
√
2 ln 2 σ
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with again full width at half maximum = 6; again t and t′ are the encoded and decod-
ing states, so that states farther from the former and latter get progressively less and less
reinforcement from the sender and receiver, respectively.7
The sender and receiver’s state-to-signal and signal-to-state probabilities for a typical sample
of 10,000 rounds of play is as in Figure 3.9, where the blue line represents one signal and the
green line represents the other. Note that the sender’s state to signal probabilities for each
state must sum to 1 across all signals, and the receiver’s signal to state probabilities for each
signal must sum to 1 across all states. To get an idea of the distribution of outcomes, we
see the sender and receiver’s state-to-signal and signal-to-state probabilities for 30 samples
of 10,000 rounds of play in Figure 3.10. Note that although across samples the signals tend
to group into those that encode the lower states and those that encode the upper states,
they are different signals from sample to sample; whether it is signal 0 or signal 1 in a given
sample that comes to encode and be decoded as the lower (or higher) states is determined
by the events that transpire as the game progresses. For comparison, we see the results from




α|t− t′|+ β if |t− t′| ≤ 5
0 else
(3.20)
where α = −5/6 and β = 5 (so that U∗S,R = 2.5 for t− t′ = 3) and a Gaussian generalization
function with full width at half height = 6 in Figure 3.11.
7This is of course two functions, and leaves unexplored the possibility of specifying different σ values for
the sender and receiver.
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3.4.1 Symmetrization
We begin to depart from the existing model by noticing an intuitive shortcoming of the
generalized reinforcement dynamics of signaling games studied thus far: in real life, the
receiver often becomes the sender and vice versa. Language evolution is not a one-way street
from senders to receivers. Furthermore, the assumption that the actions are identical to
the states in fact makes possible an exchange of roles: the sender’s state-many by signal-
many weight matrix can be transposed into a signal-many by state-many weight matrix that
a receiver would use, and the receiver’s signal-many by state-many weight matrix can be
transposed into state-many by signal-many weight matrix that a sender would use. So, we
can simulate the evolution of games where players take on the sender or receiver role at
random by having a single state-many by signal-many weight matrix for each player. If in a
certain round a player is picked as the sender, their weight matrix is normalized across signals
as before to derive their encoding probabilities; if they are picked as the receiver, their weight
matrix is transposed and normalized across states to derive their decoding probabilities. This
is the first modification we make to the generalized reinforcement model.
Note that it is not merely a matter of mathematical expediency that permits us to allow
players to sometimes be the sender and other times the receiver, making use of the same
(sometimes transposed) table of weights no matter which role they take on: if we have to
keep separate matrices of state-to-signal and signal-to-state weights for each player, they
will in essence be playing two separate games, with no more than random probability that
they will have similar encoding and decoding probabilities for a given signal. That would
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be as if our model attempted to explain how words evolve between you and I, but ended up
predicting that it is only a matter of chance that you use ‘tall’ they way I use ‘tall’. Similar
to how ‘hole’ in English means what’ ho:l’ means in Yucatec Mayan, the players would be
speaking in two separate languages, like a parent who speaks to a child in a mother tongue
and a child who speaks back in an adopted second language.
For a 20 state, 2 signal, 20 action, 2 player game with our symmetric generalized reinforce-
ment learning, still assuming a Gaussian payoff function of height 5 and full width at half
maximum = 6, and a Gaussian generalization function with full width at half maximum = 6,
the players’ encoding and decoding probabilities after 10,000 rounds of play are as in Figure
3.12, with sample size = 30. After 100,000 rounds of play we have Figure 3.13.
Note also that we can take the sender and receiver’s state-to-signal and signal-to-state
weights, respectively, resulting from non-symmetrized generalized reinforcement learning and
tranpose them to see how such a sender would receive, and how such a receiver would send.
We see the results in Figure 3.14.
The main difference we observe here is that the sender resulting from a one-way game,
if asked to act as a receiver, would on average have a ‘flatter’ signal to state decoding
probability distribution than the receiver resulting from the same one-way game; and the
receiver resulting from a one-way game, if asked to act as a sender, would on average have
a ‘steeper’ state to signal probability function than the sender resulting from the same one-
way game. If we designate one signal in our two-signal game as the ‘low-state’ signal and
the other as the ‘high-state’ signal based on the average of the players’ peak state to signal









then for a given sample we can calculate the difference between the encoding behaviors of
the receiver and sender resulting from that sample, and the difference between the decoding
behaviors of the sender and receiver resulting from that signal. If we do so for the same
30 samples that we saw in Figure 3.10 then we have Figure 3.15a. If we do the same for
the 30 samples of the symmetrized game we saw in Figure 3.12 then we have Figure 3.15b,
and likewise for Figure 3.13 in Figure 3.15c. In each sub-figure the ‘low-state’ signal is in
red, and the ‘high-state’ signal is indicated in blue; the steeper receiver-cum-sender curves
from non-symmetrized games are apparent as the red and blue bulges above and below 0 in
the middle of the top graph of Figure 3.15a, and the flatter sender-cum-receiver curves from
non-symmetrized games are apparent as the red and blue curves above and below 0 in the
bottom graph of Figure 3.15a. We also see in Figures 3.15b and 3.15c that in symmetrized
games as the number of rounds increases, the player’s encoding and decoding probabilities
tend to converge.
Allowing players to take on the sender or receiver role at random also allows the us to have
more than 2 players in the game; the motivation here is that language evolves groups with
more than 2 members. If we continue to assume that any iteration of the game involves
only a single sender and a single receiver, the convergence of state-to-signal and signal-to-
state probabilities across samples takes more iterations than in a 2 player game; this is
unsurprising: with fewer turns for any given player, it takes more time to the probabilities
to converge.
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We might also allow for one-to-many sender-receiver relations, or many-to-one sender-receiver
relations, or many-to-many sender-receiver relations. The first seems best motivated of the
three modifications, since it seems common that one speaker is heard by many listeners;
hence it is the only one of the three that we have simulated. To do so we calculate the rein-
forcement level by using a function, perhaps Gaussian, linear, or otherwise, on the standard
deviation from the state of nature. The sender still reinforces on the state of nature, and
the receivers each reinforce on their individual decoding states. The intuition at work here
is that sender and receivers would reinforce more strongly in cases where all receivers have
a similar decoding state that is close to the state of nature than in either cases where the
receivers’ decoding states are on average close to the state of nature but still widely dis-
persed, or cases where the receivers’ decoding states are closely clustered together but still
far from the state of nature. We want both closeness and concentration. (The function from
standard deviation to reinforcement level takes the place of the reinforcement function from
the one-to-one sender-receiver model.) We also require a function to specify the distribution
of the number of receivers. We use a gamma distribution, with the user supplying a shape
parameter and a scale parameter. Our findings are as expected, with the time (measured
in iterations of the game) required for convergence greater than for 2-player symmetrized
games, but less than for multi-player symmetrized games where only one-one sender-receiver
relations are allowed.
For the second, we propose to calculate the signal by assigning signals to upper-open intervals
(that is, signal 0 is [0,1), signal 1 is [1, 2), and so on. Given many signals, we reinforce on
the signal into which the average of the signals falls. We then account for the distribution
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of signals adjusting the level of reinforcement by using a function, perhaps Gaussian, linear,
or otherwise, on the standard deviation of the signals from the average signal. For example,
if the average signal is .3333333333 then we reinforce on signal 0, adjusting the level of
reinforcement downwards if the standard deviation is large. The intuition at work is that if
a bunch of people tell you ‘blorp’ and you pick state 5 and it matches the state of nature,
you would reinforce more than if among the same number of people some tell you ‘blorp’,
others tell you ‘blorn’, and still others tell you ‘blurp’. We want concentration, but there
is no closeness at stake. Admittedly, our procedure seems to assume there will always be
some metric of similarity between blorp, blorn, and blurp, which is conveniently provided
here by the number of different letters among the signals. (I do not currently have a better
solution.) We also require a function to specify the distribution of the number of senders.
For the third, we propose to simply combine the first and the second. This necessitates the
specification of three more functions than a simple one-to-one sender-receiver model: two to
determine the distribution of the numbers of senders and receivers, and one to adjust the level
of reinforcement depending on the Euclidean distance or standard deviation of the signals
from the average signal. Again, however, we leave these second and third modifications
unexplored, and point them out only as justification for allowing players to take on the
sender or receiver role at random (and for doing so by allowing the state-many by signal-
many weight matrix to be transposed depending on the role a player takes in a given iteration
of the game.)
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3.4.2 Normal State Distributions
The second modification we make is to allow non-uniform distributions of states. The in-
tuition here is that the property of members of a comparison class of interest that a vague
predicate gives information about is often not uniformly distributed: adult human heights
are not uniformly distributed, neither are the masses of stars or the lengths of ships. For
a 20 state/20 action game we approximate a normal distribution with a truncated normal
distribution centered at 10 and generate random variates of that distribution; a variate v is
assigned to one of our discrete states t just in case t < v < t+ 1.
For a 20 state, 2 signal, 20 action game, 2 player game with a truncated normal state dis-
tribution with σ = 3 and σ = 6 for 10,000 rounds of symmetrized generalized reinforcement
learning we see the results of 30 samples in figures 3.16a and 3.16b, respectively. We see that
as σ decreases it is increasingly difficult to generate the kind of signaling arrangements that
intuitively reflect vagueness: instead, the sender tends to use one signal to the exclusion of
the other, and the receiver interprets both signals very similarly. Increasing the number of
rounds in figure 3.16c does mitigate this effect.
One solution is to increase the payoffs for extreme states of nature; we might justify this
choice on the grounds that ‘getting it right’ in the extreme cases can be very important.
The difference between something 100dB and 110db is less significant than the difference
between 110dB and 120dB, just as the difference between hitting another car at 25 versus 35
mph is less significant than the difference between hitting another car at 35 mph versus 45
mph. Of course, both of these examples involve essentially exponential scales: decibels are
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logarithmic scale, and kinetic energy is a squared function of velocity. Here we increase the
payoff of a round by the ratio of the probability of the most common state to the probability
of the state of nature: if the state of nature in a given round is 20 times less probable than
the most common state, the payoff for that round is increased by a factor of 20. (Thus there
is no increased payoff for the central states.) For the same game settings as in figure 3.16a
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Figure 3.8: 7-state, 2-signal game after Rounds 0 and 1
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma.
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = y, 0, y, [1] 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, number of samples = 30, sample number = 15 
Fi ur 3.9: 10000 Rounds Non-symmetrized 1 Sample
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = y, 0, y, [1] 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
Figure 3.10: 10000 Non-symmetrized 30 Samples
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State distribution type, sigma & Extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = y, 0, y, [1] 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Linear, n/a, n/a, 5.0, 6.0 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
Figure 3.11: 10000 Rounds Non-symmetrized 30 Samples Linear Payoff
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = 0.5, 1 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
Figure 3.12: 10000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples
154







Level 0 State to Signal Probabilities










Level 0 Signal to State Probabilities
stimulus generalization in signaling games 5.5













State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = 0.5, 1 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [100000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [100000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
Fi ur 3.13: 100000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples
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State distribution type, sigma & Extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = y, 1, y, [0] 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
Figure 3.14: 10000 Ro ds Non-symmetrized 30 Samples Roles Reversed
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State distribution type, sigma & Extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = y, 0, y, [1] 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
(a) 10000 Rounds Non-symmetrize 30 Samples Roles Reversed Comparison
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State distribution type, sigma & Extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
(b) 10000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples Roles Reversed Comparison
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State distribution type, sigma & Extremal compensation = Uniform, n/a, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = n/a, n/a 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [100000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [100000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
(c) 100000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples Roles Reversed Comparison
Figure 3.15
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Normal, 3, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = 0.5, 1 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
(a) 10000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples
Normal Distribution σ = 3
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Normal, 6, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = 0.5, 1 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
(b) 10000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples
Normal Distribution σ = 6
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Normal, 6, n 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = 0.5, 1 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [100000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [100000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
(c) 100000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples
Normal Distribution σ = 6
Figure 3.16
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State distribution type, sigma & extremal compensation = Normal, 3, y 
Null signal, player observation, & observation decoding = n, n/a, n/a 
Null signal decoding distribution type & usage probability = n/a, n/a 
Sigma for null signal decoding normal distribution is identical to state distribution sigma. 
Null signal decoding uniform probability distribution is 1/num_states. 
Fixed sender, sender number, fixed receivers, receiver number list = n, n/a, n, n/a 
Receivers gamma distribution shape, scale parameters = 0.5, 1 
Reinforcement function type, height, width, y-intercept, cut-off = Gaussian, 5, 6, n/a, n/a 
Generalization function type, width, cut-off = Gaussian, 6, n/a 
Pragmatic sending threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic receiving threshold list, level list = [10000], [0] 
Pragmatic sending choice parameter = 0, num_samples = 30 
Figure 3.17: 10000 Rounds Symmetrized 30 Samples Normal Distribution σ = 3 Extremal Compensation
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Chapter 4
A Dynamic Probabilistic View
4.1 Introduction
I begin this chapter by showing in §4.2 the equivalence of a number of operations that have
featured prominently in recent semantics and pragmatics; I then argue that these operations
have a natural generalization to an equation, identical in form if not substance to one seen in
Chapter 2, that generates statistical inference patterns from utterances of sentences contain-
ing vague predicates. I then argue that conformation to this equation is a requirement for
any plausible Bayesian model of how, given utterances containing vague predicates, listeners
draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical inference patterns from beliefs concerning the
truth-conditions of such utterances. Then, in §4.3 I present three arguments against any
such model: the first argument claims that under normal conditions, (where what Barker
(2002) has termed ‘metalinguistic modes of use’ are not in play), utterances of sentences con-
taining vague predicates have interpretations under which the thresholds, relative to which
the truth-conditions of utterances of such sentences must be defined, turn out to be otiose to
the model. The second argument is disjunctive; it claims that any plausible Bayesian model
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of truth-condition driven inference must fall into one of two categories, both of which suffer
fatal defects. Finally, the third argument claims that any such model, if it gives rise to plau-
sible inferences from sentences such as ‘Feynman is tall’, must also give rise to implausible
inferences from sentences such as ‘Feynman is not tall’.
I then present in §4.4 an alternative model of the manner in which utterances of sentences
with vague predicates give rise to the expected probabilistic listener inference patterns, of
both the metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic kind. On this model, in non-metalinguistic
uses of vague predicates the truth-conditions of utterances of sentences containing vague
predicates have been, at bottom, replaced by probabilistic encoding and decoding behav-
ior. Bayesian calculations based on anything recognizable as the truth-conditions of such
sentences, are used only to generate metalinguistic inference patterns, with a probability
distribution for thresholds defined by taking the derivative of the sender’s encoding proba-
bilities. Knowledge of the truth-conditions of an utterance containing a vague predicate is
only reflected as knowledge of the encoding probabilities, conditional on first, the subject
of the utterance’s degree of deviation, with respect to the property expressed by that vague
predicate, from some measure of central tendency, and second, the threshold for application
of that vague predicate, again expressed as some requisite degree of deviation, with respect
to the property expressed by that vague predicate. The upshot is that knowledge of the
truth-conditions of an utterance of a sentence containing a vague predicate does not play
any role in generating the non-metalinguistic statistical inference patterns that we expect
from utterances of sentences with vague predicates. Finally, on the assumption that it is
knowledge of the meaning of vague predicates that allows us to engage in the the kind of
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statistical inferences we typically engage in when we hear utterances of sentences containing
vague predicates, I propose a probabilistic semantics for vague predicates, and demonstrate
how we can integrate such a view with an existing degree-theoretic, truth-conditional se-
mantics.
4.2 Showing Equivalence
4.2.1 From Barker to Stalnaker/Kaplan
One important body of semantic theory that has developed in the past thirty-odd years
is that of dynamic semantics, on which the meaning of a given sentence is determined by
its potential to change the conversational context in which it is uttered; one component of
this is its potential to eliminate from consideration possible worlds that have not, prior to
the utterance of said sentence, been ruled out by the common knowledge of the discourse
participants. We say that P is commonly known among the discourse participants just in
case for every discourse participant x, x knows that P, knows, for any discourse participant
y, that y knows that P, knows, for any discourse participant y, that y knows, for any
discourse participant z, that z knows that P, and so on. The collection of all P that are
commonly known among the discourse participants is the common knowledge of the discourse
participants; if we represent each such P as a set of possible worlds, we can represent the
common knowledge as the intersection of all such P, and this set of possible worlds is called
the common ground of the discourse participants.
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To see how a sentence token can change the conversational context in which it is uttered by
eliminating from consideration possible worlds that have not, prior to the utterance of said
sentence, been ruled out of the common ground of the discourse participants, consider that
perhaps it is common knowledge among parties to the going conversation that Feynman is
taller than 6′0′′ tall, but just exactly how tall he is, is not common knowledge. When I say to
the discourse participants, ‘Feynman is 6′3′′ tall’, I am eliminating from the common ground
of the discourse participants, all worlds in which Feynman is less than or greater than 6′3′′
tall. Notice that in this example, it seems that the the only information that has in some
rough sense been directly added to the common ground is information about Feynman’s
height, in the sense of ‘direct’ such that if the common ground prior to my utterance were to
contain only worlds where the threshold for tallness was greater than 6′3′′, then even though
the discourse participants would learn something about ‘tall’ by my utterance—they would
learn that ‘tall’ does not apply to Feynman—this is only learned indirectly: if the common
ground prior to my utterance contained both worlds where the threshold for tallness is above
6′3′′ and also worlds where the threshold for tallness is below 6′3′′, then the common ground
after my utterance will contain both worlds where ‘tall’ applies to Feynman, and worlds
where ‘tall’ does not apply to Feynman.
On the other hand, there do seem to be cases where the information added to the common
ground by an utterance of a sentence is directly about the words in the language of the
sentence, even the words that are used, and not merely mentioned, in the sentence. For ex-
ample, perhaps you and I are looking through the glass at the unique person whom ‘Batman’
is used to refer to, in the interrogation room with Harvey Dent. You and I both know that
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that person in the black cape is the unique person whom ‘Batman’ is used to refer to, that
the other knows that that person in the black cape is the unique person whom ‘Batman’ is
used to refer to, that the other knows that the other knows. . . and so on. Thus, all worlds in
the common ground are worlds in which that person in the black cape is the unique person
whom ‘Batman’ is used to refer to. If you don’t know that ‘Bruce Wayne’ is used to refer to
the same person as ‘Batman’ is used to refer to, however, the common ground includes worlds
in which ‘Bruce Wayne’ is used to refer to someone other than the person in the black cape
behind the glass, and worlds in which ‘Bruce Wayne’ is in fact used to refer to the person
in the black cape behind the glass. I might say ‘That is Bruce Wayne,’ and thus eliminate
from consideration all possible worlds in the common ground in which ‘Bruce Wayne’ is not
used to refer to the same person as ‘Batman’ is used to refer to.1 Having uttered this, I have
changed the context of future utterances in our discourse into one in which such possible
worlds have been eliminated from the common ground.
How can we extend this dynamic analysis from sentences to vague predicates? A key insight
from Barker (2002) is that a usage of a given vague predicate can serve not merely to add
information to the conversational common ground about the degree to which an object has
the property measured by that predicate, but also to give information about the degree
1If I didn’t know that you knew that that person in the black cape is the unique person whom ‘Batman’
is used to refer to, I couldn’t utter ‘That is Bruce Wayne,’ and successfully inform you that ‘Bruce Wayne’
is used to refer to the same person as ‘Batman’ is used to refer to. Furthermore, if I didn’t know that you
knew that that person in the black cape is the unique person whom ‘Batman’is used to refer to, I might in
fact feel the need to tell you ‘That is Batman,’ which I in fact do not do. Thus, the common ground helps
account for both what is said, and what is not said.
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of possession of that property that is required, in the context of utterance, to warrant
usage of that vague predicate. He calls the former and latter kinds of usage descriptive and
metalinguistic usages, respectively. To use his example: I might utter ‘Feynman is tall’, and
thereby add to the common ground information about Feynman’s actual height. If it is part
of the conversational common ground that the degree of height required for application of
‘tall’, in the context of our conversation, is 180 cm, then I will have added to the common
ground the information (all other things being equal—no protestations to the contrary from
you, for example) that Feynman’s height is greater than 180 cm. This would be an example
of a purely descriptive usage. On the other hand, it might be part of the common ground that
Feynman’s height is 180 cm, and thus it might be perfectly well known to all participants in
the conversation that that is his height. You might wonder, however, just how tall someone
has to be around these parts to count as tall—and thus I might utter, ‘Well, certainly,
Feynman is tall’, and thus add to the common ground the information that the degree of
height required for tallness in our conversational context is certainly less than or equal to
180 cm. This would be an example of a purely metalinguistic usage of a predicate.2
Of course, it seems obvious that in most situations the common ground does not precisely
specify the degree of height required for the application of a vague predicate (if there even
is a precise degree of height so required), and also in most situations the common ground
does not precisely specify the height of all entities in the domain of discourse (if there even
is a precise degree of height—just how tall am I, given that my height varies from morning
to evening?) Thus, Barker claims we can expect that in most contexts, usage of a vague
2See also Barker (2013) for an extension of this framework to what Lasersohn (2005) calls predicates of
personal taste; note also the similarity of this semantics to the process described in D. Lewis (1979).
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predicate will not be either purely descriptive or purely metalinguistic; instead, such usages
will add both descriptive and metalinguistic information to the common ground.
How can we implement this in a formal semantics? In general, formal semantics analyzes
semantic composition as functional application: composing two expressions together to form
new meaningful expressions is analyzed as applying the meaning of one of the expressions, a
function, to the meaning of the other expression, an argument, to yield the meaning of the
compound expression. In dynamic semantics, where we typically take sentences to denote
functions from sets of worlds to sets of worlds, it seems we ought to take a unary predicate
(which semantically composes with a noun phrase to form a sentence) to denote a function
from entities (which are taken to be the meanings of noun phrases) to a function from sets
of worlds to sets of worlds. Thus, just as a unary predicate composed with a noun phrase
yields a sentence, so also the denotation of a unary predicate, (a function from entities to
a function from sets of worlds to sets of worlds), when applied to the denotation of a noun
phrase (an entity), yields the denotation of a sentence (a function from sets of worlds to sets
of worlds).
Now, as a feature of the context of utterance we might relativize the denotations of tokens
of vague unary predicate types like ‘tall’ and ‘long’ to the degree of height or length required
to count as tall or long in a given context, analogous to how we relativize the denotations
of tokens of deictic pronoun types like ‘I’ and ‘you’ to the parameters of a given context.
As R. Stalnaker (1998) argues, if we think of an assertion of a sentence in a particular
discourse as changing the context, and also think of an assertion of a sentence as interpreted
only relative to such features of context as the degrees of height, heat, etc., required for
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application of vague predicates, and we further think that such features of context can
be changed by prior utterances in a discourse, then we see that a given context is both
changed by the assertion of prior sentences, and goes on to determine the interpretation of
subsequent sentences. In discourses where information is exchanged, the change in context
effected by the assertion of prior sentences can be represented by changes in sets of possible
worlds, as the primary effect of assertions of sentences in such discourses is to change the
information presupposed to be common knowledge among participants to the discourse.
Since this continually updated information is then the source for such features of context
as the degrees of height, heat, etc., required for application of vague predicates, which are
necessary for subsequent interpretation of sentences, we can think of this information as
the context relative to which interpretation occurs, and represent it too as a set of possible
worlds.
Some further preliminaries: First, we define a function d: given a world and a predicate
denotation, d tells you to what degree one must possess the property measured by that
predicate in order to qualify for the application of that predicate in that world: it tells you,
for example, just how tall you have to be to count as tall in any given world. Second, let
tall be a function that, given a degree and an entity, delivers the set of worlds in which that
entity possesses at least that degree of tallness. The dynamic semantics that Barker (2002)
gives for ‘tall’ is then:
JtallK = λxe.λW〈s,t〉.{w ∈ W |w ∈ tall(d(w)(JtallK), x)} (4.1)
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For example, assuming the copula is semantically vacuous and that JFeynmanK is indeed
Richard Feynman, we see that
JFeynman is tallK = λW〈s,t〉.{w ∈ W |w ∈ tall(d(w)(JtallK),Feynman)} (4.2)
Here, we have applied the function defined in (4.1) to the meaning of the term ‘Feyn-
man’—that is, Richard Feynman, and derived our new function: a function that takes us
from a context—a set of worlds—to a subset of that context set in which Feynman possesses
the degree of tallness that is required for the application of ‘tall’ in the original context.
The presence of JtallK on both sides of the equation in (4.1) may seem illicit; how can (4.1)
tell us what function JtallK is if we must use JtallK as input before we can define JtallK?
They key is to consider (4.1) as imposing a certain defining constraint on JtallK. Consider
the following scenario: suppose we have in our context one world w1 containing one object
x1. Then the denotation of JtallK is either {〈x1, 〈{w1}, {w1}〉〉} or {〈x1, 〈{w1},∅〉〉}. If x1’s
height is greater than or equal to d(w1)(JtallK), then JtallK will be the former. If it is not,
then it will be the latter. Likewise, if JtallK is the former, then d(w1, JtallK) must be less
than or equal to x1’s height; if JtallK is the latter, then d(w1, JtallK) must be greater than
x1’s height. Thus (4.1) does not really define a denotation; it instead defines a constraint
on JtallK, and just what the denotation of JtallK is, will depend on d—which will in turn, as
the latter pair of conditionals shows, depend on JtallK.
To see how an utterance of (4.2), given (4.1), can give rise to only descriptive information,
only metalinguistic information, or some mixture of both, consider an utterance of ‘Feynman
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w d(w)(JtallK) ι(max(λd.tall(d, w ∈ tall(d(w)(JtallK),
Feynman))) Feynman)
w1 179 178 F
w2 179 180 T
w3 179 182 T
w4 181 178 F
w5 181 180 F
w6 181 182 T
Figure 4.1
is tall’ in the contexts shown in Figure 4.1; here, ι(max(λd.tall(d,Feynman))) is the greatest
degree d such that wn is in tall(d,Feynman)—that is, the maximal degree of height of
Feynman in wn.
If it is part of the common ground that the standard for tallness is 179 cm, but it is un-
known exactly how tall Feynman is, then we start with W = {w1, w2, w3} and end with
W ′ = {w2, w3}. If it is part of the common ground that Feynman is exactly 180 cm tall, but
unknown just what counts for tall around here, then W = {w2, w5} and W ′ = {w2}. But if
we know only that his height is between 178 and 182 cm, and that the standard of tallness
is between 179 and 181 cm, then W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6} and W ′ = {w2, w3, w6}. In
the first case, we gain only descriptive information, since we gain no information about what
counts as tall around here, but only information about the language-independent part of the
world—in particular, Feynman’s height. In the second case we gain only metalinguistic infor-
mation, since we gain no information about how tall Feynman is. In the third case, however,
we gain some information of both kinds—or rather, we enough about how Feynman’s height
and the requisite standard of tallness are related so as to eliminate certain combinations of
the two.3
3Note that if we thought that the standard for tallness around here was either 177, 178, or 179 cm,
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w1 w2 w3
w1 T T T
w2 T T T
w3 F F F
Figure 4.2
Prior to Barker (2002), R. C. Stalnaker (1978) introduced the ‘† ’ operator (although see
D. K. Lewis (1973), p. 63 for an earlier version of the †. Lewis himself cites Kamp (1971)
and Vlach (1973) for temporal analogues of †and †, respectively. See also Kaplan (1979),
Kaplan (1978), and Kaplan (1989).) To see the point of the † operator, consider if I utter
‘That is either Zsa Zsa Gabor or Elizabeth Anscombe’ about someone talking in the next
room. Assume w1 is a world in which that person is Zsa Zsa Gabor, w2 is a world in
which that person is Elizabeth Anscombe, and w3 is a world in which that person is Tricia
Nixon. Assume further that for a given context of utterance, a token of proper names and
demonstrative pronouns denotes the same individual in every possible world. Then if we
are in w1, the proposition I express is the same as I would have expressed (again in w1) by
uttering ‘Zsa Zsa Gabor is either Zsa Zsa Gabor or Elizabeth Anscombe’. Mutatis mutandis
for w2 and w3. We could display the propositions variably expressed as in Figure (4.2), where
along the vertical axis we list the worlds as they determine the content of my utterance—the
proposition I express—and along the horizontal axis we list the worlds as they determine
the truth or falsity of the proposition I express. Thus the proposition I express in w3—that
Tricia Nixon is either Zsa Zsa Gabor or Elizabeth Anscombe—is false in w1, w2, and w3.
Stalnaker calls a matrix such as in Figure (4.2) a propositional concept.
and Feynman’s height was either 176, 177, or 178 cm, then we would gain some information about how tall
Feynman is, and about what the standard for tallness is around here.
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Now, Stalnaker lists three constraints on assertion:
1. A proposition asserted is always true in some but not all of the worlds in the context
set.
2. Any assertive utterance should express a proposition, relative to each possible world in
the context set, and that proposition should have a truth value in each possible world.
3. The same proposition is expressed relative to each possible world in the context set.
The motivation for the third constraint is that otherwise, the receiver does not know which
worlds to eliminate: in our example, if he is in w1 he is to eliminates no worlds from the
context set, and if he is in w3 he is to eliminate all worlds from the context set; but without
knowing which world in the context set he is in, he does not know which worlds to eliminate
from the context set. The motivation for the second constraint is that otherwise, if at any
world in the context set the proposition expressed is neither true nor false, due either to the
utterance not expressing a function from worlds to truth-values at all, or expressing only a
partial such function, then it will be unclear whether to eliminate or retain that world. The
motivation for the first constraint is that since the point of assertion is to eliminate certain
worlds from the context set, to assert something true in every world is to attempt something
that’s already been done, and to assert something false in every world in the context set
leaves the receiver with no information at all: ex falso, quodlibet.4
In our case at hand, we can attempt to rectify the violation of the third constraint by
4Stalnaker says that ‘To assert something incompatible with what is presupposed is self-defeating; one
wants to reduce the context set, but not to eliminate it altogether.’ I think the problem he sees with
eliminating the context set altogether is that then no information is available to the receiver.
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shrinking the context set to exclude w3, but this ends up violating the first constraint: any
proposition I would have been expressing with my utterance would have been true in every
world in the context set. Instead, the proposition I intuitively seem to be expressing is the one
which is true in every world in which it is either Zsa Zsa Gabor or Elizabeth Anscombe next
door, and false in every other world. Among the worlds in the context set, that proposition
is the one that is true at w1 and w2, and false at w3. More generally, in this case we want
the proposition that is evaluated for truth or falsity at a world wi relative to the denotation
of ‘that’ at wi. If we index worlds in their dual roles as both determiners of the proposition
expressed, and the places at which the propositions thus expressed are either true or false,
like we have above, then this proposition will be the main diagonal of the resulting matrix.
The dagger operator † takes the main diagonal of matrix and projects it into the horizontal
axis, thus bringing the resulting matrix into conformity with the third constraint.5
Now, we might notice that we can get the same effects as Barker’s semantics—both de-
scriptive and metalinguistic—by taking the diagonal as we see in Figure (4.3): Again, if
the common ground (the context set) starts with the threshold for ‘tall’ being 179cm, but
Feynman’s height is not part of the common ground, then we start with W = {w1, w2, w3}
and end with W ′ = {w2, w3}, thus we have pure descriptive entailment. If it is part of the
5Note that in this case the end result—removing w3 from the context set—is the same whether we shrink
the context set to bring the utterance into conformity with the third constraint, or apply the † operator and
then remove w3 upon accepting the speaker’s assertion. But the mechanism is different: the former involves
the receiver thinking that the context was defective, the latter does not. More generally, the shrinking or
expanding of the context set is not guaranteed to have the same effect as applying the dagger operator and
then shrinking the context set.
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wi: θ, h w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6
w1: 179, 178 F T T F T T
w2: 179, 180 F T T F T T
w3: 179, 182 F T T F T T
w4: 181, 178 F F T F F T
w5: 181, 180 F F T F F T
w6: 181, 182 F F T F F T
Figure 4.3
context set that Feynman is exactly 180 cm tall, but the context set does not determine just
what counts as ‘tall’, we start with W = {w2, w5} and end with W ′ = {w2}. And if we know
only that the standard for tallness is between 179 cm and 181 cm, and Feynman’s height
is between 178 cm and 182 cm, then we start with W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6} and end
with W ′ = {w2, w3, w6}. We thus see that the dynamic semantics for vagueness that Barker
proposes is equivalent to applying the † operator.
4.2.2 From Stalnaker to Montague
We might also note we can also define the †-operator in the system of intensional logic found
in Montague (1973), as the ∧∨-operator. Consider if our sentence ‘Feynman is tall’ expresses
different propositions in different possible worlds, perhaps depending on the threshold for
tallness in those worlds. For the sake of brevity, we let w1, w2, w3, w4 in Equation (4.3)
be worlds w1, w2, w4, w5 in Figure (4.3), and let ‘Feynman is tall’ = P . Then following
Montague we define Type as the smallest set X such that:
1. e, t ∈ X
2. if a, b ∈ X then 〈a, b〉 ∈ X
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3. if a ∈ X then 〈s, a〉 ∈ X
where e, t, s are distinct, fixed objects and not ordered pairs or triples. Where A is a domain
of entities and W a set of possible worlds, we then recursively define Da,A,W , the set of
possible denotations of type a, as follows:
1. De,A,W = A
2. Dt,A,W = {0, 1}
3. D〈a,b〉,A,W = Db,A,W
Da,A,W
4. D〈s,a〉,A,W = Da,A,W
W
We can then define a model A = 〈A,W,F 〉, where F is a function that assigns to every
α ∈ Cona, where Cona is the set of constants of type a, for every a ∈ Type, a member
of DWa,A,W . Finally, we can define the intension of P relative to a model A and assignment
function g, JP KA,g , as that function f with domain W such that for w ∈ W , f(w) = JP KA,w,g.6
Then, suppose:
6Montague actually included a set of times T and a simple ordering ≤ over T in his models A =
〈A,W, T,≤, F 〉, by relativizing interpretations in Da,A,W,T (instead of Da,A,W ) to models, worlds, times,
and assignment functions, and defined the range of F as a Da,A,W,T
W×T . Note that we also depart from


































Montague specifies that if α ∈ D〈s,a〉 then J∨αKA,w,g = JαKA,w,g(w). And, if α ∈ Da, then we
can say that J∧αKA,w,g is that function f from the set of worlds W such that for all w′ ∈ W ,
f(w′) = JαKA,w′,g.7 Then for any w ∈ W , J∧∨P KA,w,g(w1) is f(w1) which is J∨P KA,w1,g which is
7Montague originally claimed that J∧αKA,w,t,g = JαKA,g, where JαKA,g is only defined for α ∈ Cona, to
be such that JαKA,g = F (α). As Montague and Thomason (1974) pointed out, Montague’s intention here is
clear, but the definition is not quite correct, since then JαKA,g is undefined when α is not a constant, which α
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JP KA,w1,g(w1) which is 0. Similarly, J∧∨P KA,w,g(w2) is JP KA,w2,g(w2) which is 1, and similarly









Note that we see that J∧∨P KA,w,g is not the same as any of the propositions P expresses in
any given world. And, we can see that we are again tracing the diagonal as we determine
J∧∨P KA,w,g.
4.2.3 From Stalnaker/Kaplan to Bayes-Grice
To see how we can get from Stalnaker’s diagonal proposition and †-operator to the kind
of Bayesian development of Gricean pragmatics seen in Chapter 2, consider that we can
transform the propositional concept matrix into a θ, h matrix by taking the θ-equivalence
class of worlds, ordering the classes by θ, ordering the worlds in a class by h, and then the
truth-value at θm, hn is the truth-value of the hn world in the θm-class. Or equivalently, as
we have the matrix displayed above, take the first row of the θ, h matrix to be the first row
of the sub-matrix of the propositional concept matrix such that that sub-matrix contains all
may not be. Thomason thus defines when α ∈ Cona, JαKA,w,t,g = F (α)(〈w, t〉), and then defines J∧αKA,w,t,g
as we have above (modulo the relativization to world-time pairs, instead of simply worlds.) This seems to
have become standard, see Dowty, Wall, and Peters (1981).
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178 180 182
179 F T T
181 F F T
Figure 4.4
and only world-world pairs where both worlds have the first lowest θ value—in Figure (4.3)
this sub-matrix will be the top left quadrant; take the second row of the θ, h matrix to be the
second row of the sub-matrix of the propositional concept matrix such that that sub-matrix
contains all world and only world-world pairs where both worlds have the second lowest θ
value—in Figure (4.3) this will be the bottom right quadrant, and so on for propositional
concepts containing more world-world pairs. (It does not matter if either procedure is done
before or after applying †.) And of course we can reverse the operation to go from a θ, h
matrix back to the propositional concept; to do so, we replicate sub-matrices horizontally to
get back to the propositional concept prior to application of †, and replicate sub-matrices
vertically to get back to the propositional concept after application of †.) The resulting θ, h
matrix is shown in Figure (4.4).
Now, we might note that diagonalization works just as well on worlds outside the context
set as worlds inside the context set; thus, if we expanded Figure (4.3) to show more worlds,
and then applied the same procedure as we used to make Figure (4.4), the result would
be Figure (4.5). Notice, however, that diagonalization by itself does not give us Stalnaker
or Barker’s picture. Diagonalization does not account for the existing (one might even say
prior) context set: Barker thinks of the listener as having certain prior conceptions of what
the range of heights is, and what the range of thresholds could be. Thus we might think of
the listener as thinking of the range of heights as being between 178 cm and 182 cm, and the
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175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184
175 T T T T T T T T T T
176 F T T T T T T T T T
177 F F T T T T T T T T
178 F F F T T T T T T T
179 F F F F T T T T T T
180 F F F F F T T T T T
181 F F F F F F T T T T
182 F F F F F F F T T T
183 F F F F F F F F T T
184 F F F F F F F F F T
Figure 4.5
175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184
175 F F F F F F F F F F
176 F F F F F F F F F F
177 F F F F F F F F F F
178 F F F F F F F F F F
179 F F F T T T T T F F
180 F F F T T T T T F F
181 F F F T T T T T F F
182 F F F F F F F F F F
183 F F F F F F F F F F
184 F F F F F F F F F F
Figure 4.6
range of thresholds as being between 179 cm and 181 cm. Then we would have Figure (4.6),
where the relevant ranges of height and threshold values are highlighted in blue; applying
conjunction to the corresponding cells in Figures (4.5) and (4.6) would yield the matrix in
Figure (4.7).
Now, if in Figure (4.6) we replace true and false with 0 and 1, then we might think of the
rows between 179 and 181 inclusive as having the value 1, and all other rows as having the
value 0; similarly we might think of the columns between 178 and 182 inclusive as having
the value 1, and all other columns as having the value 0. Then the values in the cells in
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175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184
175 F F F F F F F F F F
176 F F F F F F F F F F
177 F F F F F F F F F F
178 F F F F F F F F F F
179 F F F F T T T T F F
180 F F F F F T T T F F
181 F F F F F F T T F F
182 F F F F F F F F F F
183 F F F F F F F F F F
184 F F F F F F F F F F
Figure 4.7
Figure (4.6) will be the product of the two. And again if in Figure (4.5) we replace true and
false with 0 and 1, then we can see the denotation of a sentence such has ‘Feynman is tall’
on the Barker/Stalnaker picture as involving a product of three terms:
1. the value of the diagonal given that h and θ combination,
2. the prior value of θ, and
3. the prior value of h.
This should look roughly like the kind of Bayesian development of Gricean pragmatics that
was discussed in Chapter 2, except that where the Bayesian has probabilities, this picture
has true and false (or 1 and 0): on either the Barker or Stalnaker picture, each world
represents a combination of h and θ values, and we are in fact multiplying, for any given h
and θ combination, the truth-value assigned to that combination along the diagonal, by the
prior truth-value assigned to h, and the prior truth-value assigned to θ, in order to assign
an updated truth-value to any h, θ combination: every h, θ combination that makes the
utterance false, is assigned the value false. Consider then the kind of Bayes-Grice model
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from Chapter 2, reprinted here in Equation (4.5). Here, instead of prior truth-values, we
have prior probabilities, assigned by φ(h) to each height h and by p(θ) to each threshold θ.
Instead of the diagonal, we have σn−1(u|h, θ), which tells us the probability that the sender
utters u, given that Feynman is h tall, and the threshold for tallness is θ. And, just as we
can consider the result of updating according to the Barker/Stalnaker model as the product
of its three terms, so also we defined updating according to the Bayes-Grice picture, as the
product of its three terms. Thus, mathematically, the Barker/Stalnaker model can be seen
as a special case of:8
ρn(h, θ|u) =
σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ p(θ) ∗ φ(h)
σn−1(u)
(4.5)
Now, we could think of the values above the diagonal line in the θ, h matrix in Figure (4.5) as
answering the question: would the sender have uttered what they uttered given this h and θ
value? Or, we could think of the values above the diagonal line as just, would the utterance
have been true if h and θ were as they are in this world? These result in the same matrix in
the Barker/Stalnaker picture, but perhaps different matrices in the Bayes-Grice picture: The
former question becomes: what is the probability that the sender uttered what they uttered,
conditional on this h and θ value? The latter question becomes: what is the probability that
the utterance is true, conditional on this h and θ value? The latter will result in σn−1(u|h, θ)
being 1 for every h, θ combination such that h ≥ θ, and 0 otherwise, (thus capturing the
8This is clearest in the case when ALT = {Feynman is tall,Feynman is not tall,∅} and thus we have
Equation (22) from Chapter 2, but we can see the same point if we marginalize out θ2 from the right side of
the equation in Equation (11) before conditionalization on h and θ1 in Equation (11) from Chapter 2.
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truth-conditions of the utterance). The former question may take on non-trivial probabilities
depending on the model of speaker behavior, as we see in Chapter 2. Either way, however,
the Barker/Stalnaker model can be seen as a special case of a Bayes-Grice model.9,10
4.2.4 Requirements on a Model of Interpretation
4.2.4.1 What we mean by interpretation
Now, I think that conformity with Equation (4.5) is a necessary condition on any Bayesian
model of how, given utterances with vague predicates, listeners draw the pre-theoretically
expected statistical inference patterns from beliefs concerning the truth-conditions of such
utterances. To be clear, these inference patterns are also, roughly, ones that a speaker
expects a listener to make on the basis of the speaker’s utterance: when I tell you ‘John is
tall,’ and you nod and act as you do when you believe what I say, I expect you to increase
9In Lassiter and Goodman (2017) the authors relate Stalnakerian update to the literal ρ0 listener defined
in Chapter 2; they claim that update is equivalent to set intersection on the worlds in the common ground and
worlds in which the utterance is true; conditionalization is then set intersection followed by renormalization
by the measure of the resulting set. That is, they observe the parallel between update of the common ground
by the proposition expressed in the horizontal lines in Stalnaker’s picture, and how the literal listener in
their picture updates their probabilities. In fact there is also a parallel between diagonalization and the
Bayes-Grice models such as the one that Lassiter and Goodman (2017) propose, as we see above. See also
Cumming (2007) for the relation between Bayes-Grice models and the diagonal.
10I will for now continue to think of φ(h) and p(θ) as the probability of h and θ. Another possibility, given
that the question is, would the sender have uttered what they uttered?, is to think of φ(h) and p(θ) as the
probability that the sender thinks the height is h and the threshold is θ, respectively. I postpone discussion
of this possibility to future work.
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the probability you would assign to John being 6′0′′, relative to what I think you would have
assigned to John being 6′0′′ before I told you ‘John is tall’. And of course, you expect me to
expect that you do this, as that is the point of your acting as you do when you believe me.
It is clear that we are here approaching a probabilistic analogue of the notion of common
knowledge discussed in D. Lewis (1969), and defining this analogue requires a probabilistic
analogue of the iterated belief hierarchy. I will thus offer below a few remarks concerning
how a probabilistic analogue of the iterated belief hierarchy might be defined, where such a
notion might be useful, and how such a notion might be approximated, in order to at least
justify the assumption here that we can take φ(h) to be (roughly) what, for the purposes
of the discourse, the speaker is disposed to act as if he believes the receiver is disposed to
act as if he believes the probability to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of
deviation above the average height of the relevant comparison class. First, however, I want
to more carefully relate the inference patterns under discussion here to those discussed in
Chapter 2, and isolate them from other inferences failure to explain which ought not count
against the Bayesian models captured by Equation (4.5).
It might seem as if these inference patterns are distinct from the ones that the Bayes-Grice
models discussed in Chapter 2 were attempting to explain, since in that chapter we did
not explicitly require that the statistical inference patterns that we were attempting to get
the various models to generate also be ones that, roughly, the speaker expects a listener to
make on the basis of their utterance. However, I think it is clear that speakers do in fact
expect listeners to make those inference patterns that we were attempting to get the models
to generate: thus, for example, speakers (roughly) expect that upon hearing ‘Feynman is
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tall’, listeners change their probability distribution for Feynman’s height in accordance with
Figure (2.1) in Chapter 2. And, I think we should take it to be no objection to those models
if in some cases listeners actually infer on the basis of the speaker’s utterance something
additional to what the speaker expects them to infer on the basis of their utterance. For
example, if a listener were to infer that the speaker is not from around these parts on account
of their pronouncing of a local place name in a manner at odds with regional standards, it
should be considered no failure of such a model that it failed to predict such inferences; and
this because only to the degree that an inference pattern is distinctively linguistic, should we
require that the Bayes-Grice models discussed in Chapter 2 predict that pattern to occur. I
am thus assuming that there is a distinctively linguistic manner of gaining information about
the world, and it is this capacity that requires explanation; I take Equation (4.5) to govern
any Bayesian model that might give us such an explanation. Such a model may appeal to
cognitive faculties and processes that are not uniquely linguistic, but it should nonetheless
be able to characterize the differences between, for example, how we gain information about
Feynman’s height upon being told ‘Feynman is tall’, and how we gain information about
Feynman’s height upon seeing him, or learning that he played center for his high school
basketball team. And of course, part of what is distinctive about how information is trans-
mitted via language is that speakers expect listeners to make those inferences that they do
in fact make on the basis of the speaker’s utterance, and failure to predict inferences which
are not thus expected ought not count against such a model.11
11This characterization of (part of) what is distinctive about how information is transmitted via language
may seem to be at odds with the claims made in Chapter 3; however, I claim there only that under the
listed conditions, the encoding and decoding behavior characteristic of vague predicates emerges, and this
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Admittedly, it is possible to take this too far: if experimental results demonstrate that
upon hearing someone called ‘tall’, listeners systematically over-estimate that person’s height
relative to what speakers expect listeners to do, we certainly could not reject such evidence
out of hand on the grounds that that is not precisely what speakers expect listeners to infer,
and is hence unable to count as evidence against a theory that predicts that such over-
estimation does not occur. Still, it seems prima facie reasonable to start from the position
that there are patterns of statistical inference that a listener draws on the basis of a speaker’s
utterance, which the speaker expects a listener to draw on the basis of their utterance; we
then take ρn(h|u) (after marginalizing out θ from ρn(h, θ|u)) as what, for the purposes of
the discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be, given
the speaker’s utterance, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the
average height of the relevant comparison class. Likewise, we take φ(h) as what, for the
purposes of the discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to
be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average height of the
relevant comparison class.12
is consistent with the possibility that such behavior is preserved under the conditions which lead speakers
to expect listeners to make those inferences that they do make on the basis of the speaker’s utterance.
Furthermore, even under assumptions of bounded rationality in which an n level sender probabilistically
chooses a signal that tends to maximize utility—understood as the informativity to a n − 1 level receiver
whose decoding behavior is dictated by the transposition of the sender’s own n − 1 level encoding weight
matrix, minus the cost of the utterance—and an n level receiver probabilistically Bayesian-ly decodes a signal
by accounting for the encoding probabilities of an n− 1 level sender whose encoding behavior is dictated by
the transposition of the receiver’s own lower-order decoding weight matrix, simulations (not yet reported)
indicate that such vague signaling behavior persists even when n = 3.
12I phrase this notion in terms what the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be,
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Since we assume that a speaker expects a listener to engage in precisely these statistical
inference patterns, we also take φ(h) to be (roughly) what, for the purposes of the discourse,
the speaker is disposed to act as if he believes the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes
the probability to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the
average height of the relevant comparison class. How can we make this roughly more precise,
and thus define a probabilistic analogue of the iterated belief hierarchy? If a 0th-level receiver
is defined by what, for the purposes of the discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he
believes the probability x to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation
above the average height of the relevant comparison class, then we define a 1st-level sender
by what, for the purposes of the discourse, the sender is disposed to act as if he believes the
probability y to be, that the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability x
to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average height
of the relevant comparison class. Similarly, we would define a 1st-level receiver by what, for
as opposed to what the receiver is disposed to act as if the probability is, in order to highlight that this is
a psychologically loaded notion of action: in a less psychologically loaded sense of action, I am disposed to
act as my body is subject to the laws of special relativity, just because like any physical object my body is
in fact subject to the laws of special relativity. But I am not, in this sense of action, thereby disposed to
act as if I believe that my body is subject to the laws of special relativity. This notion is intended to be
a probabilistic analogue of Stalnaker’s notion of what is added to the common ground of the conversation.
(See Stalnaker, ’Assertion’.) Note also that the disposition to act seems not required to be de se attitude:
to say that John is disposed to act as if that guy over there (where John does not think that that guy over
there is him, but is in fact him) believes Feynman is 6′3′′ tall, is the same as to say that John is disposed to
act as if he himself believes Feynman is 6′3′′ tall; which is just to say that among other things if you were
to ask him how tall Feynman is, he would say that Feynman is 6′3′′ tall.
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the purposes of the discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability
y to be, that the sender is disposed to act as if he believes the probability x to be, that the
object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average height of the relevant
comparison class.
To see how this probabilistic analogue of the iterated belief hierarchy might be useful, con-
sider that one plausible manner for generating numbers for the latter notion would be to
define ρn(σn−1(h
′) = x|h): given that Feynman is h degrees of deviation above the average
height of the American adult male, what probability y would the receiver be disposed to act
for the purposes of the discourse as if he would assign to the sender assigning probability x to
height h′? On this view, the receiver thinks that no matter what height h Feynman might ac-
tually be, the sender assigns some probability to Feynman being h′. However, just how much
might depend on whether the receiver thinks of the sender as an eyewitness as to Feynman’s
height, or as just passing along how he has heard others describe Feynman. Thus, if Feynman
is 6′3′′ tall, what is the probability that the sender assigns a high probability to him being
5′9′′ tall? If the receiver thinks of the sender as an eyewitness, ρn(σ(h
′ = 5′9′′) = x|h = 6′3′′)
will be quite low when x is high; if the receiver thinks of the sender as just passing along how
he has heard others describe Feynman, ρn(σ(h
′ = 5′9′′) = x|h = 6′3′′) will be comparatively
greater for the same value of x. We can then think of the receiver as taking his posterior
height distribution given the speaker’s utterance—ρn(h|u)—and using that to calculate a
posterior probability p(x) that the sender assigns probability x to Feynman being h′ tall,
after marginalizing out h.
All of this is quite complicated, however, and I think that for the present purposes we can
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define the expected probability z as
∫∞
0
xp(x)dx, and then say that z is what the sender is
disposed to act as if he believes the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the expected
probability to be, that the object under discussion is h′ degrees of deviation above the average
height of the comparison class. Then, when we say that we take φ(h) to be (roughly) what,
for the purposes of the discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the speaker
is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be, that the object under discussion is h
degrees of deviation above the average height of the relevant comparison class, we are really
saying that φ(h) ≈ z. Similarly for when we say that we take φ(h) to be (roughly) what, for
the purposes of the discourse, the sender is disposed to act as if he believes the receiver is
disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be, that the object under discussion is h
degrees of deviation above the average height of the relevant comparison class.
4.2.4.2 Why this requirement
As for why conformity with Equation (4.5) is a necessary condition on any Bayesian model
of how, given utterances containing vague predicates, listeners draw the pre-theoretically
expected statistical inference patterns from beliefs concerning the truth-conditions of such
utterances, consider first the contrast between the truth-conditions of utterances containing
vague predicates and the statistical inference patterns listeners draw from them: the truth-
conditions of such utterances must be defined relative to a point on the degree scale such that
if the subject of the utterance has a degree of the property encoded by the predicate greater
than (or greater than or equal to) that threshold, the utterance is true; else, false. Take ‘John
is tall’: for any threshold relative to which the utterance is defined to be true, the utterance
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is equally true for all heights greater than (or greater than or equal to) that threshold; in
contrast, given an utterance of ‘John is tall’, listeners seem to smoothly and monotonically
increase the probability they assign to John’s height from 0 feet up to approximately 6′0′′,
and then smoothly and monotonically decrease the probability they assign to John’s height
above approximately 6′0′′. Even if ‘John is tall’ is equally true if John is 6′6′′ or 7′6′′, listeners
still assign a lower probability to John being 7′6′′ than to him being 6′6′′, given an utterance of
‘John is tall’. The obvious reason is that the prior probability they assign to John being 7′6′′
is lower than the prior probability they assign to John being 6′6′′. Thus, given an utterance
containing a vague predicate, listeners’ statistical inference patterns seem to account for a
prior probability distribution for the property encoded by that predicate.
Note that this prior probability distribution does not have to be receiver’s own prior prob-
ability distribution for John’s height, since h represents only what, for the purposes of the
discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be, that the
object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average height of the relevant
comparison class, and what, for the purposes of the discourse, the sender is disposed to
act as if he believes the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be,
that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average height of the
relevant comparison class. Thus, the receiver might be disposed for the purposes of the
discourse to act as if he believes the probability distribution for Feynman’s height to be
in accordance with the background distribution for American adult males, and the sender
might be disposed for the purposes of the discourse to act as if he believes that the receiver
is disposed to act as if he believes the probability distribution for Feynman’s height to be in
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accordance with the background distribution for American adult males, even if it is neither
the case that the receiver actually believes the probability distribution for Feynman’s height
to be in accordance with the background distribution for American adult males, nor that the
sender actually believes that the receiver believes the probability distribution for Feynman’s
height to be in accordance with the background distribution for American adult males, if
for example the receiver is interviewing the sender in front of a studio audience: ‘So, tell me
about Richard Feynman—like, what did he look like?’the receiver might say to the sender,
the sender then responding, ‘Well, he was tall...’
Second, consider ‘John is tall’ again: given a speaker’s utterance of this sentence, listen-
ers typically will have a probability distribution for John’s height—the result of the pre-
theoretically expected statistical inference patterns—that is distinct from some prior prob-
ability distribution for John’s height. That is, listeners have a posterior probability distri-
bution for John’s height given a speaker’s utterance of ‘John is tall’; this is the statistical
inference pattern we are trying to generate. Assuming that interpretation happens via a
Bayesian reasoning process, the only way to generate a posterior probability distribution for
John’s height given a speaker’s utterance of ‘John is tall’, from a prior probability distribu-
tion for John’s height, is via a conditional probability function for the speaker’s utterance





where u = ‘John is tall’. Of course, this equation fails to account for the thresholds relative
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to which the truth-conditions for utterances containing vague predicates must be defined;
nonetheless, it seems that the clear way to do so within the Bayesian framework we have
adopted so far is exactly parallel to how we accounted for listeners’ prior distributions for
heights: we define a conditional probability function for the speakers utterance given both
a height and a threshold, and multiply by both a prior probability distribution for the
threshold and a prior probability distribution for the subject’s height. Indeed, within a
Bayesian framework for inference, it seems that accounting for a variable just is multiplying
a conditional probability by a prior probability distribution. We thus arrive at Equation
(4.5), as long as we assume the statistical independence of φ(h) and θ.
4.3 Against Truth-Conditional Statistical Inference
4.3.1 A General Argument For Non-Truth Conditional Inference
In this section I want to offer three arguments against any Bayesian model of how, given
utterances containing vague predicates, listeners draw the pre-theoretically expected statis-
tical inference patterns from beliefs concerning the truth-conditions of such utterances; these
patterns also being those that a speaker expects a listener to engage in. The first argument
concerns purely descriptive uses of vague predicates like ‘tall’, where no information is added
to the probabilistic common ground about the degree of height required in the context of
utterance to warrant usage of that predicate.13 For example, suppose you ask me, ‘Describe
Richard Feynman to me. What did he look like? Was he at all like how he is commonly
13Barker himself defines purely descriptive uses in terms of the (non-probabilistic) common ground.
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portrayed in the media?’ Suppose further that it is common knowledge (or rather, roughly,
our probabilistic analogue of common knowledge) that you know no more about Richard
Feynman than that he was an American adult male. If I say, ‘Well, he was tall, and cer-
tainly he could be charming at times’, intuitively, you seem to gain no information about
how I use ‘tall’, or about the standards for tallness around these parts, and I believe that




ρn(h, θ|u) dh = p(θ). (4.7)
Note that here and in what follows the integral limits in this case are set to 0 and∞ because
we are talking about ‘tall’, and at least intuitively, for any comparison class there is a finite
number of standard deviations from the measure of central tendency down to the lower
bound on heights—nothing that is the kind of thing that can have heights, can have a height
that is less than or equal to 0—but no upper bound on the number of standard deviations
above that measure of central tendency. Next, it seems that in purely descriptive uses of
vague predicates, the probability distributions for heights and thresholds are statistically
independent in the posterior: this means that upon my saying that Feynman is tall, the
ratio of the probability that you would assign to Feynman being 5′6′′ and the threshold for
tallness being 5′0′′ to the probability that you would assign to Feynman being 5′6′′ and the
threshold for tallness being 6′0′′, is the same as the ratio of the probability that you would
assign to Feynman being 6′6′′ and the threshold for tallness being 5′0′′ to the probability
that you would assign to Feynman being 6′6′′ and the threshold for tallness being 6′0′′. That
is, the ratio of probability of the threshold being 5′0′′ vs 6′0′′, is the same for all heights, in
189
the posterior distribution. Then
ρn(h, θ|u) = ρn(h|u) ∗ ρn(θ|u). (4.8)
It follows that






It then follows that in purely descriptive uses of ‘Feynman is tall’, for any given height, the
sender’s behavior is independent of the threshold, and can be determined by the prior and
posterior probability assigned to that height. In other words, in purely descriptive uses,
the probability that the sender will say ‘Feynman is tall’ is determined solely by Feynman’s
height, and for any given height is the same for any threshold value, whether the threshold
is greater or less than that height. If listeners use Bayesian reasoning to derive the pre-
theoretically expected changes in probability assigned to any given height, it them seems
they do so by considering the probability that the speaker would say ‘Feynman is tall’ given
that Feynman is that height, independent of any threshold for usage, and multiplying that
190
by the prior probability that Feynman is that height, as in Equation (4.6). Of course, the
truth-conditions for vague predicates like ‘tall’ are only defined relative to thresholds, and
thus it seems that the truth-conditions play no role in the how receivers derive the pre-
theoretically expected statistical inference patterns in cases of purely descriptive uses of
utterances containing vague predicates. We thus have the following argument:
Argument for Non-Truth Conditional Inference
1. In purely descriptive uses of ‘tall’, the posterior threshold distribution ρn(θ|u) is iden-
tical to the prior threshold distribution p(θ).
2. In purely descriptive uses of ‘tall’, the posterior threshold distribution ρn(θ|u) is sta-
tistically independent with respect to the posterior height distribution ρn(h|u).
3. Hence, in purely descriptive uses of ‘tall’, the probability of the utterance σn−1(u|h, θ)
is independent of the threshold variable.
4. If in purely descriptive uses of ‘tall’, the probability of the utterance σn−1(u|h, θ) is in-
dependent of the threshold variable, then any listener using Bayesian reasoning to draw
the pre-theoretically expected statistical inference patterns based on the probability of
the utterance, does not do so by accounting for a threshold for ‘tall’.
5. If any listener using Bayesian reasoning to draw the pre-theoretically expected statis-
tical inference patterns based on the probability of the utterance, does not do so by
accounting for a threshold for ‘tall’, and if truth-conditions for ‘tall’ are defined only
relative to a threshold for ‘tall’, then the truth-conditions for ‘tall’ do not feature in
any Baysian explanation of how listeners draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical
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inference patterns.
6. Truth-conditions for ‘tall’ are defined only relative to thresholds.
7. Therefore, the truth-conditions for ‘tall’ do not feature in any Bayesian explanation of
how listeners draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical inference patterns.
Here, premise 3 follows from premise 1 and 2 as a matter of mathematical fact. Premise
4 is a matter of Bayesian reasoning: if the probability of the utterance is independent of
the threshold, then for any two threshold values, the sending probabilities are the same for
a fixed height, and hence the posterior probability assigned to that height after condition-
alizing on the utterance will be unchanged between the two threshold values. Since the
posterior probabilities are unchanged between the two threshold values, any two prior prob-
ability distribution over thresholds will result in the same posterior distribution over heights,
and hence we cannot explain the appropriate statistical inferences even partly in terms of
a Bayesian reasoner accounting for the threshold for ‘tall’, since the distribution for that
threshold makes no difference for the statistical inferences, (at least, in purely descriptive
uses.)
The argument for premise 5 is simply that since the truth-conditions are defined relative to
thresholds, without an assignment of probabilities to threshold values, and thus by extension
without a threshold value at all, any listener using Bayesian reasoning to draw the pre-
theoretically expected statistical inference patterns cannot use the truth-conditions in a
model of speaker behavior to derive the appropriate statistical inferences. For example,
consider the model of Lassiter and Goodman (2017) discussed in Chapter 2: The probability
that the speaker will say ‘Feynman is tall’ is proportional to the utility of the utterance, which
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is defined partly in terms of the informativity of the utterance to a literal listener, which
is itself defined partly in terms of the truth-conditions of the utterance. This then requires
a value to be assigned to the threshold, without which the truth-value of the expression is
undefined. Similarly, for the modified version of Lassiter and Goodman (2017) presented
in §8 of Chapter 2: the distance-weighted definition of informativity to a literal listener
again requires a value to be assigned to the threshold, in order for the probability-weighted
distance of the literal posterior to be defined. Premise 6 is a widely-held semantic claim.
This leaves premises 1 and 2 as the most substantive, and it is to them that I want to turn
next.
Given how we have described what a purely descriptive use of a vague predicate is, premise
1 seems true by definition. What seems more important to point out, then, is that the vast
majority of uses of ‘tall’ are purely descriptive uses: among competent users of English, it is
part the probabilistic common ground that all parties to a discourse have acquired the word
‘tall’; and thus from any given usage of ‘tall’ among such users, no information about the
distribution for the standard for tallness is added to the probabilistic common ground, when
the probabilistic common ground contains no more information about the height of the object
other than that it is a member of relevant comparison class. Thus, knowing no more about
Feynman’s height than that he is an American adult male, and then hearing me call him
‘tall’ you learn something about his height, but nothing about what counts as tall. Note that
if we consider the weaker notion of just what you believe about the probability distributions
for Feynman’s height and the thresholds for tallness and what I (the speaker) believe that
you believe about the probability distributions for Feynman’s height and the thresholds for
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tallness, the point remains: if I believe that you believe no more about Feynman’s height
than that he is an American adult male, and I believe that you believe no more or less about
the probability distribution for the thresholds for tallness than what any competent user of
English believes, then after I call Feynman tall, I still believe that you believe no more or less
about the probability distribution for the thresholds for tallness than what any competent
user of English believes. But I do believe that you know more about Feynman’s height
than you did before. And typically, you do believe no more or less about the probability
distribution for the thresholds for tallness than what any competent user of English believes,
which is what you believed before; and, you do know more about Feynman’s height than
you did before.14
Regarding premise 2, since we are discussing the probabilistic common ground, it is surely
relevant that after hearing the utterance the listener does not think the speaker thinks that
even though the probability of John being 5′6′′ is low, the probability of the threshold being
5′0′′ and John being 5′6′′ versus the probability of the threshold being 6′0′′ and John being
5′6′′, is any different than the the probability of the threshold being 5′0′′ and John being
6′6′′ versus the probability of the threshold being 6′0′′ and John being 6′6′′. The easier way
to phrase this is to ask if the speaker thinks that the probability that John is 5′6′′ and the
threshold is 5′0′′ is any different than the probability that John is 6′6′′ and the threshold is
5′0′′: the correct answer is yes, but the intuitive answer is no. The intuitive answer is not
the correct answer because we read the conjunction as a conditional probability. At any
14Note that we simplify away from what for the purposes of the discourse you and I are disposed to act
as if these probabilities might be, and assuming that there are no objections from you, the listener, to my
assertion that Feynman is tall, but the point remains, I think.
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rate, I think that for the speaker, John’s height makes no difference to the probability of the
threshold, and the listener believes correctly it makes no difference for the speaker. Will it be
the case that Feynman’s height makes a difference for the threshold probability distribution
for the listener, but the listener thinks that Feynman’s height makes no difference for the
threshold probability for the speaker? That would seem to predict that upon finding out
that Feynman is 5′6′′, the listener will think that the sending probabilities are different
than what the listener thinks the speaker will think the sending probabilities are like, upon
similarly finding out the Feynman is 5′6′′. And that seems wrong: if Feynman’s height
makes a difference for the listener’s threshold probability distribution it would seem to do
so by being lower for lower heights, so as to make the speaker’s utterance come out true;
but this would entail that upon finding out that Feynman is 5′6′′, the listener will think
that the sending probabilities are skewed lower, but will think that the sender thinks the
threshold probabilities are unchanged. So if the listener thinks that Feynman’s height makes
no difference for the threshold probabilities for the speaker, Feynman’s height should make
no difference for the threshold probabilities for the listener too.
One objection is that perhaps the listener thinks the speaker would assign no probability
to Feynman being 5′6′′ and the threshold for tallness being 6′6′′, because in that case the
speaker would not call Feynman tall. But this is false: the speaker might assign some small
probability to Feynman being 5′6′′, and some probability to the threshold being 6′6′′, and
still call Feynman tall. Of course, the listener thinks that there’s no probability that both
the speaker is certain that Feynman is 5′6′′, and the speaker does not call ‘tall’ anyone he is
certain is less than 6′6′′ tall. But that is different from the listener thinking that the speaker
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might assign some low but still non-zero probability to Feynman being 5′6′′, and some low but
non-zero probability to someone shorter than 6′6′′ being called ‘tall’ by competent speakers of
English. Even assuming the listener only attributes consistent mental states to the speaker,
there is nothing inconsistent about such a probability assignment.
On the other side of the hierarchy, I think that a speaker does not think that after hearing
the utterance, a listener thinks that even though the probability of John being 5′6′′ is low,
the probability of the threshold being 5′0′′ and John being 5′6′′ versus the probability of the
threshold being 6′0′′ and John being 5′6′′, is any different than the the probability of the
threshold being 5′0′′ and John being 6′0′′ versus the probability of the threshold being 6′0′′
and John being 6′0′′. Surely in such cases I the speaker think that you the listener think
that whether John is 5′6′′ or 6′6′′, the probability that someone 6′0′′ would be called tall
is the same, even after hearing my utterance. Consider that prior to my utterance I the
speaker think that you the listener think that given that Feynman is 5′6′′, the probability
that someone 5′1′′, 5′2′′,... and so on will be called ‘tall’ takes on values x, y,... and so on.
I think prior to my utterance, I the speaker think that you the listener think that given
that Feynman is 6′6′′, these probabilities are the same. In the kind of prototypical uses of
‘tall’ that we have been talking about, do speakers think that uttering ‘Feynman is tall’
has the effect of making listeners shift the probabilities that various heights will count as
‘tall’, differently at different heights, even while keeping the overall sending probabilities over
heights the same? I think clearly not: Suppose I have it on good authority that Feynman
is tall. If I said to you ‘Feynman is tall’, given that this is a prototypical use of ‘tall’
would I expect you to think it more likely that someone 5′6′′ counts as tall, if my source
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was wrong and you were to find out later that Feynman is 5′9′′ tall, than if my source was
right and you were to find out later that Feynman is 6′3′′ tall? Clearly not. If you were to
report back to me that you had discovered that Feynman was only 5′6′′ tall, I would not
expect you to think that what I had meant all along, by ‘tall’, involved some much lower
standards than we normally associate with ‘tall’. You would think I had spoken wrongly,
not that I had been misunderstood, and I would expect you to think I had spoken wrongly.
And of course, if you would think I had spoken wrongly, then it seems like your posterior
probability distribution for the threshold for ‘tall’ given that Feynman is 5′6′′ remains the
same as your prior probability distribution for the threshold, and thus also for any height
besides 5′6′′, so that your posterior threshold distribution is independent of your posterior
height distribution.
Now, one might object to this argument on the grounds that we cannot assume that we
can probe these joint posterior probabilities by asking, ‘What would someone think of the
threshold probabilities after hearing ‘John is tall’ and then actually observing John’s height?’,
or ‘What would someone think of the threshold probabilities after hearing ‘John is tall’ and
then finding out John’s actual height?’, because we do not always monotonically narrow
down a space of probabilities. What someone would think of the threshold probabilities,
might be affected by what they learn from finding out his actual height from more trusted
sources, or from their first-hand observations; perhaps in the posterior from hearing ‘John is
tall’ the threshold distribution really is not independent from the height distribution, (and
at any given height, the threshold distribution is in fact effectively ‘redistributed’to be below
that height) but this is masked by the fact that upon finding out John’s actual height, the
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receiver in this scenario rejects the assertion ‘John is tall’, including any information about
the threshold contained in that assertion. Having rejected the assertion, the receiver returns
to the prior threshold distribution. When we think about what someone would think of the
threshold probabilities after finding out John is only 5′6′′ tall, we come upon these prior
probabilities to which the listener has reverted.
In response to this objection one might note that in some cases we do seem to monotonically
narrow down the space of probabilities: for instance, when some some readers of Genesis
reinterpret ‘day’ to mean a vastly longer time period than a literal day. Here, we have a
case where something—the old age of the universe—that seems improbable, perhaps even
completely ruled out, given the truth of the sentence, is later judged to be highly probable,
and so we change what is allowed to count as a day in order to maintain the truth of the
sentence, or perhaps, to maintain the presumption that however much time it took to create
the universe, that is how long the Author said it took. Ignore for now that ‘day’ is a nominal
and that it seems in principle absolutely precise, 24 hours and no more nor less—the latter
stipulation perhaps more in keeping with the original Ancient Near Eastern context. If we
do seem to monotonically narrow down the space of probabilities in this case, so the response
might go, then why do we not do so with ‘tall’?
However, I do not think this is a good response to the objection, insofar as we in this case
seem to shift the threshold down, at least the threshold for the author’s use of the word,
contra the parallel claim that I made about ‘tall’. Having not rejected the assertion and
thus not reverted to the prior threshold distribution, we seem to be seeing that the posterior
threshold distribution really is shifted down. For someone who wants to reject premise 2, the
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difference between the two cases might then be claimed to be the amount of trust given to the
utterer; where the utterer is human and thus not so wholly trusted, the assertion is rejected
along with the lower threshold distribution; where the utterer is divine and thus wholly
trusted, the assertion remains accepted along with the lower threshold distribution. The
statistical interpretation in both cases, however, might be taken to include a non-uniform
threshold posterior.
Now, I think it is clear that speakers do sometimes use ‘tall’ to convey information about
how ‘tall’ is used, and that listeners do sometimes gain information about how ‘tall’ is used
from usages of ‘tall’, and that speakers expect them to gain such information on the basis
of the speaker’s usage of ‘tall’. Thus, any complete model of how listeners make inferences
from speaker’s utterances will have to have a component with a threshold variable in the
posterior distribution, if that inferential process is Bayesian; since what we infer about the
thresholds for ‘tall’ in such cases is sensitive to what we think the height of the object is, there
must be a height variable in the prior, and thus in the posterior. Within this component,
we can permit that the resulting joint posterior the for heights and thresholds may not be
statistically independent.
Having thus granted that in non-prototypical uses of ‘tall’ there may be a posterior threshold
distribution that is not statistically independent from the posterior distribution over heights,
I think a better response to the objection is to point out what I think is an instructively
contrasting case where we do conditionalize on something that, given what we have been
told, we consider to be unlikely. Suppose I say to you, ‘Feynman is fat.’ I think you would
think it quite unlikely that an American adult male called ‘fat’ weighed 150 lbs, but if you
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were to find out that Feynman did indeed weigh 150 lbs, you would infer that he must be
rather short. Note that like ‘tall’, ‘fat’ is a relative gradable adjective that appeals to at
least two dimensions: weight and height. Thus, we do sometimes change our probability
distribution over a property—height—relevant to the degree to which some object ‘counts
as’ some predicate, given information about some other property —weight—which is also
relevant to the degree to which that object ‘counts as’ that predicate. This is in contrast to
flat out rejecting the assertion that the person is ‘fat’, and along with it the lower distribution
for heights upon finding out that their weight is only 150 lbs. (Assume even that I am
considered just as trustworthy in both cases, so that we get the exact parallel.) This then
seems to imply that thresholds are, in a sense, different than other degrees over which relative
gradable adjectives are distributed: unlike height and weight, the degree is more resistant
to redistribution. The upshot is that we get to keep a distinction between semantics and
pragmatics, in a sense: the thresholds are distinct from the other properties encoded in
the word. But, at any rate, if we do sometimes monotonically narrow down the space of
probabilities as in the case of ‘fat’, why do we not do so in the case of ‘tall’? Absent a
motivation independent of the need to preserve thresholds (and thus truth-conditions) in
the interpretation of vague predicates, it seems the best explanation is that the threshold
distribution is not really part of the posterior, and hence not part of the prior, (that is,
the threshold distribution is independent of the height distribution in the posterior, and is
identical to the prior threshold distribution.)
Finally, even if we grant that asking ‘What would someone think of the threshold probabilities
after hearing ‘John is tall’ and then actually observing John’s height?’, or ‘What would
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someone think of the threshold probabilities after hearing ‘John is tall’ and then finding out
John’s actual height?’ are not good ways of probing the posterior probability distribution
for h and θ from hearing ‘John is tall’, I think there are other ways of probing the posterior
distribution, and which open the door for experimental confirmation of premise 2 (and 1).
For example, if a speaker were to call someone ‘tall’ we might ask what odds we would have
to set in order for the listener to bet $1 that the person is shorter than 6′0′′, 5′11′′, ..., 5′6′′,
and so on. The difference in odds is the distribution for heights. If the odds are x : y then
the probability is y/(x + y). Here x is what the house puts up and y = $1; the question is
then what the minimum $x that the house must put up for the receiver to take the bet. It
might seem confusing when x < y, (and thus the receiver thinks there’s even money that
John is over or under that given height), but we can just rescale and set x = $1 and ask, how
much would the receiver bet that John is less than, say, 6′6′′ tall, to win $1? Then we could
also ask the same question about John’s height and various threshold values: how much
would the receiver bet that John is 5′6′′ and the threshold is 5′0′′, versus how much would
the receiver bet that John is 5′6′′ and the threshold is 6′0′′? We might then compare that
ratio to the ratio of how much would the receiver bet that John is 6′6′′ and the threshold
is 5′0′′, versus how much would the receiver bet that John is 6′6′′ and the threshold is 6′0′′.
The prediction from premise 2 is that these ratios should be the same. We might similar
confirmation of premise 1; if the results accord with my intuitions, it would provide strong
evidence that in prototypical, purely descriptive uses of vague words like ‘tall’, if listeners
use Bayesian reasoning to draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical inference patterns
based on the probability of the utterance, they do not do so by accounting for a threshold
for ‘tall’; by extension, it would follow that the truth-conditions for ‘tall’ do not feature
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in any Bayesian explanation of how listeners draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical
inference patterns.
4.3.2 A Disjunctive Argument against Truth-Conditional Infer-
ence
Given that conformity with Equation (4.5) is a requirement for any plausible model of gener-
ating the pre-theoretically expected probabilistic listener inference patterns from utterances
of sentences containing vague predicates, from beliefs concerning the truth-conditions of such
utterances, we might next categorize the manners in which a model might put ‘numerical
meat’ on the abstract bones of Equation (4.5).
4.3.2.1 A Realistic Threshold Distributions
First, we might ask what a plausible prior threshold distribution might be. I think it is clear
that if listeners have a prior threshold distribution in any Bayesian calculation leading to
the pre-theoretically expected statistical inferences, it must be genuinely informative, and
thus not a uniform distribution as in Lassiter and Goodman (2017).15 As Qing and Franke
(2014) points out, the model in Lassiter and Goodman (2017) has the counter-intuitive
result that prior to hearing Feynman called ‘tall’, the listener does not know what ‘tall’
means when applied to an adult male, but afterwards the listener has gained knowledge
about both Feynman’s height, and what ‘tall’ means; it seems more intuitive that prior to
15Note that the sense of ‘informative’ here is merely that the prior contains some information, not that
that information is accurate.
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hearing Feynman called ‘tall’, the listener has prior information about what ‘tall’ means
when applied to an adult male, and the listener uses that information to infer Feynman’s
height upon hearing him called ‘tall’. As noted earlier, Lassiter and Goodman (2017) justify
uniform prior distributions for thresholds so as to not make ‘tall skyscraper’ mean something
too short, as it would if ‘tall man’ is to come out as meaning what it should, but this problem
can be avoided if we think of the distribution as a distribution not over measures of physical
dimensions, but over measures over degrees of deviation from a measure of central tendency.
Next, I want to claim that if listeners make use of a genuinely informative prior threshold
distribution in any Bayesian calculation leading to the pre-theoretically expected statistical
inferences, then that distribution must also be accurate. To see what this means, consider
‘tall’: for ‘tall’ and heights we have an in principle lower bound, since nothing can be of
negative height, but no obvious in principle upper bound on the degrees of deviation an
object might be above some measure of central tendency for the comparison class, since
there seems in principle no upper bound on the height of an object.16 For concreteness,
suppose the comparison class is adult males: since the heights of adult males are roughly
normally distributed with a mean of 5′9′′ and a standard deviation of roughly 3′′, we may
take the prior on heights to be a standard normal distribution N (0, 1) and take the lower
bound on thresholds and heights to be −23, since it is roughly 23 standard deviations from
the average height of 5′9′′ down to 0′′. When we shift the prior distribution on heights to
a standard normal distribution N (0, 1), a plausible prior distribution for thresholds would
16Is a 1000 foot tall man still a man? My intuition is that as the height reaches absurd proportions, we
are less inclined to call it a man, but I think this perspective can only be adopted by those willing to accept
degreed nominals.
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be approximately N (1, .5), corresponding to the intuition that one would almost certainly
be called ‘tall’ if one were 6′3′′, and almost certainly not be called tall if one were 5′9′′,
with perhaps equal chances if one were 6′0′′. We have thus taken the threshold distribution
average to be 6′0′′, with a standard deviation of half the standard deviation of the height,
so that by the time one’s height was two threshold standard deviations greater than the
threshold average—that is, 6′3′′—one would almost certainly be called ‘tall’.
Why assume that if the listener makes use of prior information about the threshold, he
makes use of accurate information about the threshold? Suppose he thinks of the threshold
distribution as much lower than it is, (either due to a genuine mistake, or as some kind
of presupposition or pretense of conversation); then ‘John is tall, he is 5′10′′,’should be
acceptable. Or suppose he thinks of the threshold distribution as being much higher than
it is; then ‘John is not tall, he is 6′1′′,’ should also be acceptable. But neither is. Maybe
we can say that the former is unacceptable because the posterior in heights given ‘tall’ is
incompatible with him being 5′10′′, and the latter because the posterior is incompatible with
being 6′1′′. However, cases like
(20) a. Bill: John is tall.
b. Jill: How tall is John?
c. Bill: He’s 5′10′′.
d. Jill: Huh?
e. Bill: Anyone 5′10′′ is tall.
seem to show us that an artificially low threshold prior cannot be adopted as a presupposition
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or pretense for interpretation, for then Bill’s last utterance would not be surprising, but it is.
Of course the fact that it is surprising also seems to tell against the claim that the oddness
of the last utterance is due to its asserting something that is already presupposed. Similarly
for an artificially high threshold prior:
(21) a. Bill: John is not tall.
b. Jill: How tall is John?
c. Bill: He’s 6′1′′.
d. Jill: Huh?
e. Bill: No one 6′1′′ is tall.
Now, perhaps we might object to these examples on the grounds that the pretense or presup-
position of artificially low or high threshold distributions does not project out to the latter
statements from the earlier statements. On the other hand, discourses about fiction seem
to provide examples where the pretense or presupposition does project across sentences and
speakers; for example:
(22) a. Bill: Sherlock Holmes lived at 221b Baker Street.
b. Jill: In what city?
c. Bill: He lived in London.
Here the pretense that Sherlock Holmes existed remains in the last sentence.
Finally, thinking of the receiver as presupposing, or adopting as a pretense, some artifi-
cially high or artificially low prior threshold distribution seems to not fit the usual Gricean
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paradigms: in the case of sarcasm or metaphor or other non-literal interpretation, the literal
meaning of the words results in some obvious violation of the maxims that (perhaps) the
listener thinks the speaker thinks the listener can see, so the listener reinterprets the usage
in some new non-literal way in order for the speaker not to be in violation of the conver-
sational maxims. But here, we are trying to explain what the literal interpretation is in
the first place, not attempting to explain non-literal interpretation. Instead of explaining
non-literal interpretation by literal interpretation flouting the maxims, we are explaining
literal interpretation, and furthermore, doing this by assumption of something all parties
to the conversation believe to be false. Or consider the case of presupposition or pretense:
here we already have a literal interpretation and we have to assume additional information
to prevent some maxim from being violated. In contrast, the model here is attempting to
explain how the literal interpretation comes to be, and does not start with a fixed literal
interpretation and then generate additional inferences.
4.3.2.2 A Realistic Prior Height Distribution
Next, we might ask what a plausible prior height distribution φ(h) might be. Remember, we
are attempting to model with ρn(h|u) what, for the purposes of the discourse, the receiver is
disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be, given the speaker’s utterance, that the
object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average height of the comparison
class, and what, roughly, for the purposes of the discourses, the speaker is disposed to
act as if he believes the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the probability to be,
given the speaker’s utterance, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation
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above the average height of the relevant comparison class. Similarly, for φ(h) we remove the
stipulation ‘given the speaker’s utterance’ and specify that we are attempting to model with
φ(h) what, for the purposes of the discourse, the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes
the probability to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the
average height of the comparison class, and what, roughly, for the purposes of the discourse,
the speaker is disposed to act as if he believes the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes
the probability to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the
average height of the relevant comparison class.
Now, what for the purposes of the discourse the receiver is disposed to act as if he believes the
probability to be, that the object under discussion is h degrees of deviation above the average
height of the comparison class, will vary from situation to situation: if we are both looking
straight at Feynman, measuring 6′9′′ next to the height strip at the local 7-Eleven, I would
normally be disposed for the purposes of the conversation to narrowly distribute Feynman’s
height around 6′9′′ tall, and (if you were the speaker) you would normally (roughly) be
disposed for the purposes of the conversation to act as if you believed that I narrowly
distribute Feynman’s height around 6′9′′ tall. On the other hand, suppose as before in our
prototypical uses of ‘tall’ that it is common knowledge (or rather, roughly, our probabilistic
analogue of common knowledge) that I know no more about Richard Feynman than that he
was an American adult male, when I ask you ‘Describe Richard Feynman to me. What did
he look like? Was he at all like how he is commonly portrayed in the media?’ Then I would
normally be disposed for the purposes of the conversation to distribute Feynman’s height
around 5′9′′ tall, with a standard deviation of 3′′, and (if you were the speaker) you would
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normally (roughly) be disposed for the purposes of the conversation to act is if you believed
that I distribute Feynman’s height around 5′9′′ tall, with a standard deviation of 3′′.17
Finally, for similar reasons as with for θ, I think it is clear that we cannot think of the
listener as, due to some presupposition or pretense, being disposed for the purposes of
the conversation to act as if he believes that Feynman’s height is anything other than in
accordance with the background distribution for American adult males: an utterance of
‘Feynman is tall’ is not clearly false in this case, and thus cannot trigger some unrealistic
height distribution. Furthermore, if it did trigger such a presupposition or pretense, we
would be able to say things such as
(23) a. Bill: John is tall.
b. Jill: How tall is John?
c. Bill: He’s 5′10′′.
d. Jill: Huh?
e. Bill: 5′10′′ is tall. The vast majority of people aren’t even 5′8′′.
when clearly we cannot.
17This situation was claimed earlier to be one in which the posterior on thresholds is identical to the prior
on thresholds, but I do not want to claim that here; I only want to identify this as the kind of prototypical
use of ‘tall’ that was discussed earlier.
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4.3.2.3 Substantive Sending Probabilities
If in prototypical uses of ‘tall’ we thus must think of the receiver as having a realistic prior
height distribution, and a realistic prior threshold distribution, we might next ask what
a plausible conditional sending probability σn−1(u|h, θ) could be. I see two options for a
plausible sending function:
First, for a given θ, the sending probability function could increase gradually as h increases.
The center of the increase (or the inflection point in the case of a sigmoid function) might
be some fixed distance from θ, for all θ values; or, the center of the increase or the inflection
point could become increasingly close to θ as θ decreases towards some lower bound, thus
the sending curve steepens as the threshold decreases. Either way, we take the conditional
sending probabilities to be generated by some more substantive process, such that for any
given threshold, the probability that the speaker makes utterance u increases monotonically
as the height increases, but does not instantaneously transition from 0 to 1 at the threshold.
Of course, what seems implausible is that the sending probability at some given threshold is
such that σn−1(u|h1, θ) > σn−1(u|h2, θ) where h1 < h2, or that σn−1(u|h, θ) is uniform for all
h at any given θ.18
18This may not hold in case of words like ‘big’, where there is always ‘huge’ which might put downward
pressure on the sending probabilities of ‘big’ as the size of an object reaches the extremes of the distribution
of the relevant comparison class. Thus, a shrimp 1 foot long might be more likely to be called ‘huge’ than
‘big’. One question is whether the sending probabilities for ‘big’ are static when the QUD is just the null
signal and ‘big’, which might lend some explanation for the intuition that ‘big’ is just as true for a 1 foot
shrimp as for a 4 inch shrimp.
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Second, the sending probability function could be 0 when h < θ and 1 when h ≥ θ. Two
views could lead to this kind of function: we could take the conditional sending probabilities
to be either the probability that the speaker’s utterance is true given that the threshold is θ
and the height is h, or the probability that the speaker would make utterance u, given that
the speaker believed the height was h, believed the threshold was θ, and the speaker was
attempting to speak truthfully.19 Either way, the sender model is such that for any given
height and threshold, the function takes the value 0 if that height is less than that threshold,
and 1 if that height is greater than or equal to that threshold.
However, I think there are serious problems for both kinds of sending function. Consider the
first kind of sending function: suppose that one is 6′3′′ tall. Intuitively, the probability that
one will be called ‘tall’ should be the probability that the threshold to be called ‘tall’ among
American adult males, is less than or equal to 6′3′′. Thus, it should be that σn−1(u|h), which
in Bayesian terms is defined as:
∫ ∞
0
σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ p(θ) dθ (4.11)




Now, it is true that for certain p(θ), σn−1(u|h, θ) can fail to be the truth-conditions for
19This formulation results in a posterior not on heights, but on the speaker’s believing any given height.
We would then need some further theory as to how that changes the receivers posterior on heights.
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‘tall’, and this equality will still hold. For example, suppose p(θ) is distributed over the
non-negative real line, and is some constant c for θ < k and
∫ k
0
p(θ) dθ = .5, (so c = .5
k
), and
p(θ) asymptotically approaches 0 for θ ≥ k. Then if we let
σn−1(u|h, θ) =

if h ≥ k :
1 if h ≥ θ
0 else
else :





then the equality will hold. In effect, we can gerrymander a σn−1(u|h, θ) to make it the case.
However, the only way to define σn−1(u|h, θ) so as to guarantee that, for any distribution
p(θ), the sending probability σn−1(u|h) as a function of h is
∫ h
0




σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ p(θ) dθ is to define σn−1(u|h, θ) as the truth-conditions.
Similarly, suppose the threshold to be called ‘tall’ among American adult males is 6′3′′. Then,
the probability that a randomly selected American adult male will be called ‘tall’ should be
the proportion of the population that is taller than 6′3′′ tall. Thus, for a given θ, it should be
that σn−1(u|θ) = 1−Φ(θ), where Φ(h) is the cumulative height distribution. Again, we can
for a given φ(h) gerrymander a σn−1(u|h, θ) that is not the truth-conditions but which will
guarantee that σn−1(u|θ) will be equal to the probability that a randomly selected member
of the relevant comparison class will be taller than θ: that is, 1−Φ(θ). But, the only way to
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define σn−1(u|h, θ) so as to guarantee that, for any distribution φ(h), the sending probability




is to define σn−1(u|h, θ) as the truth-conditions.
To see that this is so: w.l.o.g., assume there is some θ0 s.t. there is an h0 > θ0 s.t.




σn−1(u|h, θ0) ∗ φ(h) dh = 1 − Φ(θ0) there must be some h1 < θ0 s.t.
σn−1(u|h1, θ0) ∗ φ(h1) = φ(h0)− σn−1(u|h0, θ0) ∗ φ(h0). (We need to make up for the amount
of φ(h0) that σn−1(u|h0, θ0) loses.) Now either σn−1(u|h1, θ0) = 1 or 0 < σn−1(u|h1, θ0) < 1.
If the latter then let φ∗(h) be just like φ(h) except φ∗(h1) = 0 and for some h2 > θ0, 6= h0,
φ∗(h2) = φ(h2) + φ(h1). Then
∫∞
0
σn−1(u|h, θ0) ∗ φ∗(h) dh >
∫∞
0




σn−1(u|h, θ0)∗φ∗(h) dh > 1−Φ(θ). If the former then let φ∗(h) be just like φ(h) ex-
cept φ∗(h0) = φ(h0) +φ(h1). Then
∫∞
0
σn−1(u|h, θ0) ∗φ∗(h) dh <
∫∞
0




σn−1(u|h, θ0) ∗ φ∗(h) dh < 1− Φ(θ). Basically, if to make up what is missing
you have all of something else—the former case—then the new distribution will only give you
part of that thing. Else if to make up what is missing you have part of something else—the
latter case—then the new distribution will only give you all of that thing. The proof that
the only way to define σn−1(u|h, θ) so that
∫∞
0
σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ p(θ) dθ =
∫ h
0
p(θ) dθ, is similar.
4.3.2.4 Sending Probabilities as Truth-(ful utterance) Conditions
To see the problem with the second kind of sending function, according to which σn−1(u|h, θ)
is 0 if h < θ, and 1 if h ≥ θ, consider that in the case of heights of American adult males
the average is approximately 5′9′′, and the standard deviation is approximately 3′′, and we
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φ(h) =N(0. 0, 1. 0)







Figure 4.8: background height prior plausible threshold prior
assume that one would almost certainly be called ‘tall’ if one were 6′3′′, and almost certainly
not be called tall if one were 5′9′′, with perhaps equal chances if one were 6′0′′, so we are
taking the threshold distribution average to be 6′0′′, with a standard deviation of half the
standard deviation of the height (so that by the time one’s height was two threshold standard
deviations greater than the threshold average—that is, 6′3′′—one would almost certainly be
called ‘tall’.) We thus take the distribution of heights of American adult males to beN (0., 1.),
and the distribution of thresholds for ‘tall’ will be N (1., .5). In this case we see the results in
Figure (4.8). Although the height posterior is plausible, we immediately see a problem: the
threshold posterior is implausible; a lower threshold distribution is not added to the common
ground in prototypical uses of ‘tall’.
Now, it must be admitted that we do see that when it is part of the common ground that
Feynman’s height is quite specifically known, the metalinguistic effect highlighted by Barker
(2002) is present, as in Figure (4.9). Even better, the metalinguistic effect is weaker as the
prior estimate of Feynman’s height increases: as we see in Figures (4.10) and (4.11), by the
time it is part of the common ground that Feynman is two standard deviations above the
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φ(h) =N(− 1. 0, 0. 1)







Figure 4.9: low specific height prior uncertain threshold prior
background height for American adult males—about 6′3′′—virtually no new information is
added to the common ground about the sending probabilities. The model also has some
other nice features: suppose the common ground includes that Feynman is either 5′6′′ or
6′3′′; with hearer thinking he is short and the speaker thinking he is tall. If we think of the
common ground as being an average of the two, then we could see how Feynman’s height
comes to be agreed upon, as in Figure (4.12). Also, as we see in Figure (4.13), when it is part
of the common ground that the threshold is some very specific value, then from an utterance
of ‘Feynman is tall’ we learn almost nothing about the threshold value distribution, and very
much about Feynman’s height.
However, all this leaves unresolved the fact that in normal, prototypical uses of ‘tall’, the
model predicts that listeners infer that the distribution of thresholds is shifted distinctly
downwards, when in fact listeners seem to do no such thing. And in fact, the striking
success of the model in metalinguistic cases seems to indicate that this model is operative
in metalinguistic cases, but some other regime is at work in prototypical uses.
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φ(h) =N(0. 0, 0. 1)







Figure 4.10: middle specific height prior uncertain threshold prior










φ(h) =N(2. 0, 0. 1)







Figure 4.11: high specific height prior uncertain threshold prior










φ(h) = (N(− 1. 0, 0. 1) +N(2. 0, 0. 1))/2







Figure 4.12: bimodal height prior plausible threshold prior
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φ(h) =N(0. 0, 1. 0)







Figure 4.13: background height prior specific threshold prior
4.3.3 Negation Again
The final objection against the kind of Bayes-Grice models captured in Equation (4.5) con-
cerns negation again, and how the listener arrives at knowledge of the threshold distribution.
This problem applies to both kinds of models detailed in §4.3.2, and will remain even if we
can manage to solve either of the problems associated with those kinds of models.
Recall that in the kind of models explored in Chapter 2, there is a substantive sender model
generating the probability of the speaker making the utterance, and the threshold prior is an
implausible uniform bounded distribution. This resulted in problems with negation, since
the same processes that give rise to plausible threshold posteriors will apply in the case of
negation. More precisely: the sending probability has to be (relative to pragmatic factors)
a function of the truth-conditions of the utterance: given two h and θ combinations that
are equally true, the sending probability should, modulo other pragmatic considerations like
comparative informativity (which is controlled in the Lassiter & Goodman model by the
QUD), cost, and speaker rational choice parameter, be the same. Then the sending proba-
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bilities for ‘tall’ and ‘not tall’ will be the same for (h, θ) and (−h, θ), respectively, assuming
other pragmatic factors like the cost, comparative informativity, and speaker rational choice
parameter (λ) are the same, since ‘tall’ for (h, θ) is equally true as ‘not tall’ for (−h, θ).
(We are assuming that the only thing that matters for the truth-conditions are the distance
between h and θ. We are also assuming a suitably symmetric QUD that includes ‘tall’, ‘not
tall’, and the null phrase, or perhaps ‘tall’, ‘short’, ‘not tall’, ‘not short’, and the null phrase;
not a gerry-mandered QUD such as ‘tall’, ‘not tall’, and ‘of miniscule stature’, where the
higher cost of the last phrase might push the sending probabilities for ‘not tall’ to include
not just heights we would consider short, but more middling heights too.)
We then got incorrect symmetrical interpretations for ‘tall’ and ‘not tall’, since the prior
θ distribution is uniform over µ ± k × σ, and the ‘not tall’ and ‘tall’ sending probabilities
are mirror-images of each other with respect to the prior h distribution, which is, in the
case of ‘tall’ when applied to adult American males, approximately a lower bounded normal
distribution where when converted to a standard normal distribution the lower bound is
−23σ below 0—which seems too low for the boundedness to plausibly introduce the required
asymmetry of interpretation. The additional cost of ‘not tall’ relative to ‘tall’ only pushes
the sending probabilities for ‘not tall’ farther away from the central tendency of the h prior,
and thus we end up with ‘not tall’ meaning something in fact stronger than even ‘short’, not
to mention ‘tall’. Of course, intuitively we know that ‘not tall’ is not as informative as ‘tall’;
the trouble is finding room within this category of model for this intuition. If the speaker’s
receiver model relative to which comparative informativity is defined, is the literal receiver
who simply conditionalizes on the truth-conditions of the utterance, then there is no room
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to introduce such an asymmetry at the level of the literal receiver, and thus we must look
for some other pragmatic factor that will generate the required asymmetry of interpretation
between ‘tall’ and ‘not tall’ out of an asymmetry of sending probability between ‘tall’ and
‘not tall’. Note that this argument against this category of model seems even to apply to
degree-of-truth theories; we could take the degree of truth to be a function of the threshold
and the height, and then the sender model is either the degree of truth itself, or incorporates
the degree of truth into some substantive sender model with various pragmatic variables.
Now, we might suppose we can avoid the problem of unwanted metalinguistic inferences
with the second kind of sending function by simply marginalizing out θ from the sending
probabilities, before conditionalizing on φ(h); if we have a model for generating the requisite
threshold distributions, we might suppose our work to be done, since there will then be
no posterior θ distribution: this would in essence derive our model in Equation (4.6) from
knowledge of the thresholds. Thus, Qing and Franke (2014) present a Bayesian model of
statistical inference from vague predicates like ‘tall’ that has a sending probability conditional
on only the height of the object and a particular distribution for the threshold (but not
the threshold itself), and a prior distribution for the height of the object, but not for the
threshold.
ρn(h|u1) = σp(θ)n−1(u1|h) ∗ φ(h) (4.14)
The sending probabilities σ
p(θ)
n−1(u1|h) are defined in terms of a threshold distribution p(θ);
the message is sent if and only if the height is greater than or equal to the threshold, so that
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the probability that a certain height will be encoded as ‘tall’ is equal to the probability that







In turn, the distribution p(θ) is defined by the level 2 receiver’s conception of a level 1 sender
of finite rationality who approximates a threshold of maximal utility:
p(θ) = eλ∗U(θ) (4.16)
The utility of a threshold is defined in terms of its expected success ES(θ) for a level 0 literal
receiver, minus the expected cost of the utterance, (note that when h < θ the message is not




φ(h) ∗ c dθ (4.17)
Finally, the expected success of a threshold ES(θ) for a level 0 literal receiver is defined as
the sum of the expected true negative decoding rate (the probability that the level 0 receiver
decodes the null signal as height h, times the probability that it was in fact height h that was
encoded by the null signal), and the expected true positive decoding rate (the probability
that the level 0 receiver decodes ‘tall’as height h, times the probability that it was height h





φ(h) ∗ ρ0(h|u0, θ) dh+
∫ ∞
θ
φ(h) ∗ ρ0(h|u1, θ) dh (4.18)
Here, as with Lassiter and Goodman (2017), the level 0 literal listener decodes the null signal
as the background distribution, and ‘tall’ by renormalizing above the threshold:
ρ0(h|u0, θ) = φ(h) (4.19)




if h ≥ θ
0 otherwise
(4.20)
Qing and Franke (2014) demonstrate plausible posterior height distributions ρ2(h|u1) for
λ = 4 and C(u1) = 2.
However, just as with Lassiter and Goodman (2017)—and I think this is illustrative of a
larger phenomenon—this model again runs into problems with negation: ‘Feynman is not
tall’ will be evaluated either relative to a threshold θtall or, if we prefer partially defined
predicates in the style of Soames et al. (1999), a threshold θnot tall. In either case, the same
cognitive processes outlined in Equations (4.14)-(4.19) will apply, when we define the level
0 literal receiver’s interpretation of ‘not tall’ as:








The resulting threshold distribution will be the opposite of that resulting from ‘Feynman
is tall’, but more extreme for the same cost function and rationality constant λ because
of the extra cost of ‘not’, and then the sending curve and posterior height distribution
ρn−1(h|‘not tall′) will also be opposite of ‘tall’, but only more extreme, and thus ‘not tall’
will be interpreted as akin to ‘very short’. (Furthermore, in the former case, we will have
two threshold distributions for ‘tall’, one resulting from ‘Feynman is tall’, and another from
‘Feynman is not tall’.)
Finally, I think it is important to note that the foregoing problem with negation still applies
even if we find a way to solve the problem of unexpected threshold posteriors with the
second kind of model, and even if we can find a way to solve the problem of ‘non-threshold’
behavior with the first kind of model. It occured with both the original version of Lassiter
and Goodman (2017) and with our modified version in Chapter 2. We might even define a

























where σw is a weighting constant that tells us ‘how close’ we care about being to h. Note
that the lower limit on the inner integral of the right summand is θ since ρ0(h|u1, θ) = 0
for h < θ. Again, we can expect the same problem with negation to occur, since if this
generates plausible threshold distributions for ‘Feynman is tall’ it will generate opposite but
equal threshold distributions for ‘Feynman is not tall’.
This kind of problem with negation thus seems generalizable: deriving plausible posteriors
on heights from ‘Feynman is tall’ in a Bayesian framework requires that σn−1(u|h) be roughly
sigmoid, with the inflection point about 1 standard deviation to the right of the average of
the prior height distribution. Lassiter and Goodman (2017) accomplish this via a substantive
sender model σn−1(u|h, θ) such that when we conditionalize on a bounded uniform prior p(θ)
and then marginalize θ out, we get the desired sender behavior. Here the key notion is
the informativity of ‘tall’, compared to other words, about a height h, relative to a given
threshold θ. Qing and Franke (2014) accomplish this by thinking of the sender as calling the
object ‘tall’ when and only when the threshold is less than the height, and then generating
a distribution for the threshold by assuming the sender approximates an optimal threshold.
Either way, we see that if we start with the threshold as a free variable relative to which
the sender’s behavior must be defined and then marginalize out that threshold, we run into
the problem that the same cognitive processes invoked to define that behavior—whether
that process acts on the sending probabilities σn−1(u|h, θ) or p(θ)—will result in equal but
opposite behavior in the case of the negated form. We could even combine a substantive
sender model with a non-uniform prior for θ, and this would still apply, since the cognitive
processes would be equal and opposite for both σn−1(u|h, θ) and p(θ). The problem, it
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seems, is that we start with θ as a free variable. Why can’t we think of p(θ) as being
fixed for all contexts, so that in any context even ‘not tall’ gets interpreted relative to the
proper threshold distribution for ‘tall’? Once a threshold distribution is fixed relative to
any context, it becomes part of the meaning of the term, just as when we specify that the
denotation of ‘Feynman’ is invariant relative to context.
4.4 A Bayes-Grice Model Without Truth-Conditions
4.4.1 Squaring the Circle: Descriptive Usages
Let’s review the evidence: We have seen that unless we allow the threshold distribution
to remain fixed invariant of context, we end up with implausible statistical inferences from
negations of vague predicates once we invoke some cognitive process to generate the requisite
threshold distribution. This suggests that we should indeed let p(θ) be fixed from context to
context, if we think of the degree scale as a scale of degrees of deviation from a measure of
central tendency for the relevant comparison class. One way for the threshold distribution to
be fixed invariant of context is for it to be part of the character of ‘tall’, since the character
is fixed invariant of context. Now, character is a function from worlds to propositions (or
intensions more generally); so analogously if the threshold distribution is straightforwardly
identified with the character we would expect the character to be a function from thresholds
to probabilities of thresholds. But of course that gets the subject matter of vague predicates
wrong: they are supposed to tell us about heights, not thresholds. Perhaps thinking of the
character as a rule for determining the proposition expressed in any given context will shed
223
light on the matter, and that rule should again be a function; we will then want to think of
the threshold distribution as part of the definition of that function (that is, the character)
expressed by ‘tall’. Intuitively, we want that function to tell us how tall something is; the
clear way a threshold distribution can do that, is to fix the probability that something will
be called ‘tall’as its height varies. This suggests that the other component is what we have
identified thus far as the truth-conditions of ‘Feynman is tall’: σn−1(u|h, θ).
However, as we have seen, in purely descriptive uses of vague predicates, the thresholds ap-
pear to be unnecessary to any Bayesian model of how information about the height of the
object under discussion is added to the probabilistic common ground, and, if we assume real-
istic prior distributions for the threshold and height in prototypical uses of vague predicates
like ‘tall’, we end up with unrealistic posterior threshold distributions in any Bayesian model
in which the sender component σ(u|h, θ) reflects the truth-conditions. This suggests that
neither the threshold distribution, nor the truth-conditions, are part of any Bayesian model
of how listeners make the expected statistical inferences. How can we square this circle? I
want to suggest that we can do so by inverting the order of explanation of the relationship
between our knowledge of the threshold distribution and our knowledge of how the sending
probabilities depend on the height of the object. Along with this inversion, I want suggest
that the meaning of ‘tall’ is fundamentally probabilistic. Thus, I suggest that we take the






to capture how we infer how tall something is, when we hear it called ‘tall’. Since we want
that inferential process to depend on the meaning of ‘tall’, I propose that we take the meaning
of ‘Feynman is tall’ to be a function from heights to encoding probabilities. This suggests
that the denotation is something like:
JFeynman is tall K = σn−1(Feynman is tall |h(Feynman)) (4.24)
where h(x) is a function from entities to degrees of deviation from some measure of central
tendency for the height scale, (and not simply heights.) Note that in light of the divorce
of the degree scales from actual physical quantities, necessitated in order to account for
why ‘completely fast’ and ‘perfectly cold’ are unacceptable even though velocity is upper
bounded by the speed of light and temperature is lower bounded at 0 Kelvin, we ought to
maintain some theoretical distance between the degree scale for ‘tall’, and actual physical
distances. Nonetheless, even if we should not think of the height scale as actual physical
distance, it seems we ought to think of it as being quite close to the physical distance, as
in this case the relation between the degree scale and the physical quantity seems close
enough to afford the statistical inferences regarding physical height that we have thus far
been discussing. In general, it seems that the interloper between our words and the actual
physical quantities themselves, would be concepts: thus our concept of speed or temperature
when our words evolved lacked an upper, or lower, bound, and thus we see the patterns of
adverbial modification that we do.







Thus, instead of coming to know how the encoding probabilities vary with (the degree of
deviation from some measure of central tendency of) height as a result of our knowledge of
the threshold distribution, I suggest that we know what the threshold distribution is like,
based on our knowledge of how the encoding probabilities vary with (the degree of deviation
from some measure of central tendency of) height.
Now, Equation (4.24) defines the output of J·K in terms of the input to that function, and this
is unacceptable in a definition of the static part of the model: the denotation is to be applied
to an existing probability distribution to yield an updated probability distribution; the effect
is to be dynamic, but the denotation is to be static. Note that this is not a problem facing
Barker (2002), since he gives a single denotation for purely descriptive, purely metalinguistic,
and mixed descriptive and metalinguistic usages; but it is a problem here, where we are
attempting to give a static denotation to ‘tall’, to reflect the fact that no metalinguistic
inferences are made in purely descriptive uses of the word.
Thus, instead of Equation (4.24), we might take the meaning of ‘tall’to be, roughly:
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JFeynman is tall K = a monotonically increasing probability func-
tion on heights with a derivative that is a
roughly normal distribution N (µ∗, σ∗), where
µ∗ = µ + σ and σ∗ = .5σ, where N (µ, σ)
are the average and standard deviation on the
height scale of the members of the relevant
comparison class.
(4.26)
One possible objection to this proposed denotation for ‘Feynman is tall’ is that it may not
result in the intuitively correct posterior distribution, given a prior distribution that is not
roughly normally shaped. For example, if the prior distribution over the height scale is a
bounded uniform distribution, or a bounded distribution with significant probability mass
towards the lower bound such as in a Beta(9, 1) distribution, or a bounded distribution
with both lower and upper bounds as in a Beta(.5, .5) distribution, the resulting posterior
distribution may fail to match any intuitively plausible posterior distribution over the degree
scale for height, which (intuitively, at least) should be roughly normally distributed.
More generally, if we can find a relative gradable adjective such that for some relevant
comparison class the posterior distribution over the degree scale is not remotely close to
the result of applying the probability function specified in the foregoing denotation to the
prior distribution over that degree scale, that might be a counter-example to the proposed
semantics. Thus, for example, if the prior distribution is a uniform distribution over (0, 5),
and the intuitively plausible posterior distribution is a uniform distribution over (1, 6), then
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since the latter distribution cannot result from the application of the denotation specified in
Equation (4.26) to the former distribution, as required in Equation (4.6), it would constitute
a possible counter-example to the view we are considering. In response, I want to note
first that it seems a virtue of the approach that it generates falsifying predictions. Second,
although this does not demonstrate that no such cases exist, I have trouble finding them
myself: words like small, big, short, cheap, and expensive all seem to have the requisite
relation between prior and posterior.
4.4.2 Squaring the Circle: Metalinguistic Usages
Of course, this cannot be the whole story, because this model allows for no metalinguistic
inferences to be drawn from an utterance of ‘Feynman is tall.’, since there are no threshold
variables in the prior or posterior, and clearly we do sometimes gain information about the
threshold distribution (and thus the sending probabilities) from such an utterance. Nonethe-
less, I think the solution is clear: We assume the independence of h and θ, and then ask
ourselves how we can define a function σn−1(u|h, θ) that will allow us to learn about the
threshold distribution from an utterance of ‘tall’; our function must conditionalize on h,
since clearly it is knowledge of Feynman’s height that allows us to gain knowledge of the
threshold, and it must conditionalize on θ, in order for θ to appear in the posterior. If we




1 if h ≥ θ
0 else
(4.27)
and further assume, as before, Equation (4.5), reprinted here:
ρn(h, θ|u) =
σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ p(θ) ∗ φ(h)
σn−1(u)
(4.5)

















= φ(h) ∗ σn−1(u|h)
(4.28)
thus getting back our original equation. We thus have derived from our simpler equation
(4.6) without thresholds an equation (4.5) with thresholds, which is equivalent to our original
model in its statistical inferences regarding height, but which allows us to gain new informa-










σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ p(θ) ∗ φ(h) dh
(4.29)
To be clear: the view I am advocating here is that there are at bottom no thresholds; even
though it seems we have given back what we had earlier taken away, our threshold dis-
tribution is derived from the receiver’s view of the sending probabilities, and the receiver
requires no additional information that she did not have before in order to define her proba-
bility distribution for thresholds: she simply takes the derivative of her view of the sending
probabilities.
A second model, similar to this first model, is that we marginalize out the heights in met-
alinguistic usages prior to conditionalization on our existing threshold distribution:




σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ φ(h) dh
(4.30)
This helps address a concern with the first model that we see in Figure (4.9): typically,
when we use someone’s utterance of ‘Feynman is tall’ to infer how tall one must be to count
as tall, we do not change our distribution for Feynman’s height at all; instead, we hold it
fixed and change our threshold distribution. The slight shift in posterior height distribution
we see in Figure (4.9) can thus be eliminated, and not merely written off as so small as to
be undetectable, in this second model, since there is no height prior, and hence no height
posterior, at all. (And thus, any objection to the argument in §4.3.2.4 that the unexpected
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threshold posterior in purely descriptive usages that we see in Figure (4.8) might also be
simply written off, can be rejected without falling prey to a tu quoque response.)
One apparent advantage of this model is that what we consider as the truth-conditions of
the utterance ‘Feynman is tall’ naturally fall out of the model, as a device for learning about
just how tall someone has to be, to count as ‘tall’. Note also that a similar definition of
‘short’ will also be available for σn−1(short|h, θ) just as for σn−1(tall|h, θ):
σn−1(short|h, θ) =

1 if h ≤ θ
0 else
(4.31)
(Note however that in the corresponding proof of equivalence of the simple Bayesian model
and the complex Bayesian model with regards to statistical inferences regarding heights, we
will have to integrate from h up to ∞, instead of from the lower bound (or −∞) up to h.)
Although it might look rather abstruse for the receiver to define these conditional sending
probabilities in these different manners, we might not think it so: the receiver already has
a notion of how the sending probabilities change with height, so in a sense defining the
conditional sending probabilities in this manner is what one knows is required.
Finally, we can see that thinking of the denotation of ‘tall’ as a function from degrees of
deviation from some measure of central tendency of height, to a probability of encoding as
‘tall’ is that we get a plausible solution to our problem with negation, without changing our
intuitive notion of negation. If we define:
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JFeynman is not tallK = 1− JFeynman is tallK (4.32)
then we can see that our sending function will be the mirror image, flipped vertically, of the
purple line in Figure (4.8), and the resulting posterior on h from our simple Bayesian model
will have the upper reaches of φ(h) reduced, while smoothly redistributed over the middle
and lower portions of the distribution. Thus, ‘not tall’ will not mean ‘short’, but just ‘not
tall’.
4.4.3 A More Formal Semantics
Now, the fact that what we traditionally consider as the truth-conditions of ‘Feynman is
tall’ falls out of the model of metalinguistic interpretation above might make us suspect that
we can integrate the underlying probabilistic picture here, with the existing truth-theoretic
framework. I think this can be done, and I would like to sketch in this section how to do
so. Consider that we suggested earlier taking the meaning of ‘x is tall’ to be a function from
degrees for x on the scale for tallness, to the probability that a speaker would utter, ‘x is
tall’ given that x is that tall:
Jx is tallK = σn(‘x is tall’|tall(x)) (4.33)
We also noticed that what we might think of as the truth-conditions for ‘Feynman is tall’,




1 if h ≥ θ
0 else
(4.27)
However, we might also notice this seems very close to a degree-theoretic denotation for the
adjective ‘tall’, which can combine with degree morphemes such as ‘-er’ and ‘-est’ to generate
the appropriate meanings for ‘taller’ and ‘tallest’:
J [AP tall ] K = λθdλxe.tall(x) ≥ θ (4.34)
where tall(x) is a function of type D〈e,d〉 that maps any object x to its maximal degree of
height h. This is slightly different from the denotation defined in Chapter 1, as we have
replaced a measure function with a relation between individuals and degrees of tallness;
nonetheless, as we can see below, it will still generate the required meanings.
Now, the parallel between Equations (4.27) and (4.34) suggests that in place of truth-values,
we will have probabilities of utterance. Thus, instead of a domain of truth-values Dt = {0, 1},
we will have a domain of probability densities Dp = [0, 1]. And this suggests that we can
define
J [AP tall ] K = λxeλhd.TALL(x)(h) (4.35)
where TALL is a function that specifies the probability that an object x of degree h on the
height scale will be called ‘tall’. Then, we might use a type-shifter as in Jacobson (1999) to
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reverse the order of the arguments:
JrevK = λg〈e,dp〉 λhd λxe . g(h)(x) (4.36a)
Jrev tallK = λhdλxe.TALL(x)(h) (4.36b)
Then, if we think of the height h′ that x might be as itself a feature of context, and taking




Note that since the effect of ∨ is to evaluate Jrev tallK at h′, this has the effect of creating
an h′-specific function that outputs the probability that an object x that is h′ tall, will be
called ‘tall’.
Now, in §4.2 I claimed that in metalinguistic interpretations, listeners introduce a threshold
variable to learn about how senders use ‘tall’. In semantic terms, I propose that similar to
J∨ rev tallKh′ , there is for every adjective like ‘tall’ a word ‘tall*’ such that:
Jtall∗Kθ = λxe.TALL∗θ(x) (4.38)
where λxe.TALL
∗
θ ∈ D〈e,p〉. Intuitively, we can think of λxe.TALL∗θ(x) as telling us the
probability that an object x will be called ‘tall’ if it is taller than the threshold θ to be called
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Finally, we can define





1 if height of x ≥ θ
0 else
(4.41)
Note that λθJtall∗Kθ stands to Jtall∗Kθ as Jrev tallK stands to J∨ rev tallKh′ . Finally, we can
use λθJtall∗Kθ to generate the appropriate meanings for ‘taller’. If we say:
J [Deg -er ] K = λg〈d,ep〉λyeλxe.∃θ[g(θ)(x) & ¬g(θ)(y)] (4.42)
then
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Thus, we have derived in intuitively correct semantics for ‘x is taller than y’ from our
probabilistic picture. Similar treatments ought to be available for degree constructions such
as ‘Feynman is six feet tall’, ‘Feynman is the tallest man in the room’, and ‘Feynman is as
tall as Einstein.’
While a full treatment of the syntactic issues involved lies beyond the scope of this disser-
tation, we might note that the foregoing approach does not fall prey to a common objec-
tion to the degree-theoretic treatment of vagueness: that the semantic complexity of the
degree-theoretic treatment of the unmarked, positive form in both predicative (‘is tall’) and
attributive (‘is a tall door’) positions belies its apparent morphological simplicity. Since we
do not have to posit an unpronounced positive null morpheme ‘pos-’, and we likewise derive
the adjectival form required for composition with degree morphemes from an underlying
probabilistic form, we can have morphological simplicity track with semantic simplicity.
4.4.4 Defining the Transition
Finally, this view needs to specify under what conditions listeners change their mode of inter-
pretation from the simple Bayesian model in Equation (4.6) to the complex Bayesian model
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in Equation(4.5). It does not seem to be a sufficient condition for metalinguistic interpreta-
tion merely that the listener have some fairly narrow distribution for Feynman’s height, or
even that the listener be disposed for the purposes of the discourse to act as if he has some
such distribution for Feynman’s height. Suppose that for the purposes of the discourse I am
disposed to act as if I believe that Feynman’s height is narrowly distributed around 5′9′′ tall.
Even so, if for the purposes of the discourse I am disposed to act as if I believe that you
believe that I believe that Feynman’s height is in accordance with the background distribu-
tion for American adult males, I might not engage in the metalinguistic interpretation—for
example, if I believe that you believe that I don’t know how tall Feynman is, and have only
background information about his height, I will only engage in the descriptive interpretation
and reason according to the simpler Bayesian model. This case seems to indicate that at the
least, in order for the listener to engage in the metalinguistic interpretation, it must roughly
be the case that the listener is disposed for the purposes of the discourse to act as if he
believes that the sender believes that the listener believes that Feynman’s height is narrowly
distributed around some specific height. And it seems it must be at least a fairly narrow
height distribution, since otherwise the listener will think the sender is trying to tell him
about Feynman’s height, not the threshold distribution. And it might be required not just
that the listener believes that the sender believes that the listener believes that Feynman’s
height is narrowly distributed around some specific height; it might be required that the
listener believes that the sender believes that some fairly narrow distribution for Feynman’s
height is part of the common ground.
In order for me to interpret you in a metalinguistic manner, is it necessary that for the
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purposes of the discourse I am disposed to act as if I believe that Feynman’s height is
narrowly distributed around some fairly specific height? I don’t think so—suppose you and
I are at the local 7-Eleven and we see our friend Feynman walking around. Suppose I am
disposed to act for the purposes of the discourse as if I believe that you believe it is part
of the common ground that Feynman is 6′6′′: I see you see him standing next to the height
strip by the door, and I see you see me see him standing there, and I see you see me see
you see him standing there. Unbeknownst to you, I think I see him wearing stilts, but of a
height that is unknown to me, and I don’t think you caught those stilts; given the chance, I’d
have told you about them to let you know that we really can’t tell how tall Feynman is just
from where his head lines up with the height strip. Thus, I am disposed for the purposes
of the discourse to act as if I have only background knowledge of the Feynman’s height.
Nonetheless, it seems in this case at least that so long I am disposed for the purposes of the
discourse to act as if I believe that you believe it to be part of the common ground that I do
not know what counts as ‘tall’ around here—suppose I have just asked you, ‘What counts
as tall around here?’—I will interpret your utterance metalinguistically.
This suggests that the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for me to
(be disposed for the purposes of the discourse to act as if I) engage in the metalinguistic
interpretation of your utterance are that:
1. I am disposed for the purposes of the conversation to act as if I believe that you
believe that some fairly narrow distribution for Feynman’s height is part of the common
ground.
2. I am disposed for the purposes of the conversation to act as if I believe that you believe
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that it is part of the common ground that I do not know what counts as ‘tall’ around
here.
Admittedly, we have not proved that these constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for




5.1 How we got here
I argued in Chapter 2 that one prominent model from Lassiter and Goodman (2017) of how
we get from our knowledge of the meaning of ‘Feynman is tall’ to the kind of statistical
inferences that we typically engage in upon hearing that sentence, when coupled with the
kind of truth-conditional semantics for vague predicates discussed in Chapter 1, leads to the
wrong predictions about the kinds of statistical inferences we typically engage in upon hearing
the negations of that sentence. After searching for solutions within the model, in various
extensions of the model, or in various modifications of the model, I argued that the intuitively
correct statistical inferences from ‘Feynman is not tall’ can be predicted by the model if
we assume that listeners have realistic, informative prior distributions for the thresholds
relative to which ‘Feynman is tall’ is true or false. I in turn argued that this suggests a
simpler model according to which listeners use their knowledge of how the probability of the
speaker uttering that sentence varies with Feynman’s height, in combination with a prior
probability distribution for Feynman’s height, to derive a posterior probability distribution
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for Feynman’s height. Absent a variable for thresholds in the model, relative to which
truth-conditions for sentences containing vague predicates must be defined, and assuming
the requisite statistical inferences are driven by knowledge of the meaning of the utterance,
it appears that this is evidence for a non-truth conditional view of meaning.
Now, one might respond that our knowledge of the truth-conditions, including their depen-
dence on the threshold for tallness, allows us to know how the encoding probabilities vary as
the height varies: once we conditionalize on the threshold distribution and marginalize out
the thresholds, before conditionalizing on the height distribution, we arrive at a function from
heights to encoding probabilities. After conditionalizing on our prior height distribution, we
arrive at a posterior height distribution. However, this still requires a prior threshold distri-
bution that is fixed from context to context as part of the meaning of ‘tall’, unless we posit
a pragmatic process as in Qing and Franke (2014) that generates a threshold distribution
based on what the receiver takes to be common knowledge of the truth-conditions of our
words, along with a characterization of the speaker’s relevant psychological features, such as
their degree of rationality, and their subjective cost of talking. However, that option again
makes the wrong predictions about the statistical inferences we make upon hearing ‘Feyn-
man is not tall’: with the threshold for tallness again determined by a cognitive process that
accounts for the truth conditions of the utterance and the relevant features of the speaker’s
psychology, the receiver will think that ‘not tall’ means something akin to ‘very short’.
Of course, it would seem to be a small circle if we infer a threshold distribution for ‘tall’
from our observations of how the encoding behavior of our co-linguals varies with the heights
of the things they are describing, and the explanation of how the encoding behavior of
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our co-linguals varies with the heights of the things they are describing must be generated
from their knowledge of the truth-conditions of utterance encoding those heights. Thus,
I argued in Chapter 3 that there is a plausible account, originating in a game-theoretic
framework, for why natural languages have the kind of probabilistic encoding behavior that
seems characteristic of vagueness. Even though such encoding behavior is not part of a strict
Nash equilibrium, nor is it an evolutionarily stable strategy on either the replicator dynamics
interpretation of evolutionary game theory, or the best response dynamics interpretation of
evolutionary game theory, it can be predicted to arise as a result of a learning strategy known
as stimulus generalization: here, after a given iteration of the game, senders in a signaling
game reinforce not just on the state that the signal encoded but also on states nearby that
state; similarly, receivers reinforce not just on the state that the signal was decoded as, but
also on states nearby that state.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I attempted to define a larger class of models, one member of which was
discussed in Chapter 2, for how receivers move from their knowledge of the truth-conditions of
utterances containing vague predicates, to the kinds of statistical inferences that we typically
make when we hear a speaker say, for example, ‘Feynman is tall.’ In order to define this class
of models, I demonstrated that the dynamic semantics for vague predicates from Barker
(2002) is equivalent to context updating via diagonalization from R. C. Stalnaker (1978),
which is again equivalent to the ∧∨-operator from Montague (1973), all of which are special




σn−1(u|h, θ) ∗ Pr(θ) ∗ φ(h)
σn−1(u)
(4.5)
I take this equation to characterizes the general class of models that I am concerned to
reject, and I argued that conformation to this equation is in fact a requirement for any
plausible Bayesian model of how, given utterances containing vague predicates, listeners
draw the pre-theoretically expected statistical inference patterns from beliefs concerning the
truth-conditions of such utterances. After presenting three arguments against any model
conforming to this equation, I proposed an alternative model of the manner in which ut-
terances of sentences with vague predicates give rise to the expected statistical inference
patterns, of both metalinguistic and non-metalinguistic kinds: In non-metalinguistic usages
of vague predicates, receivers generate a posterior probability distribution for heights by
conditionalizing on a prior height distribution, and considering how the probability of the





On the other hand, in metalinguistic usages, receivers define an encoding probability condi-
tional on both the height and the threshold, which is thus recognizable as the truth-conditions
for ‘Feynman is tall’, and then define a distribution for the threshold as the derivative of how
the encoding probabilities vary with Feynman’s height. By then conditionalizing on a prior
height distribution, perhaps marginalizing over heights, and then conditionalizing on this
threshold distribution, listeners can calculate a posterior threshold distribution, and thus
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learn how tall someone must be, to count as ‘tall’. Finally, I argued that on the assumption
that knowledge of the meaning of ‘Feynman is tall’ is required for generating the expected
statistical inference patterns in non-metalinguistic usages, we might think of the fundamen-
tal meaning of ‘Feynman is tall’, as probabilistic in nature: its meaning, on this view, is
an encoding probability function over various heights for Feynman. Analogous to the dis-
tinction between content and character in a traditional truth-theoretic semantics, we might
then also define another, derivative meaning: this being an encoding probability function
over various heights for Feynman and thresholds for tallness. Finally, given the similarity
of this derivative meaning to an existing degree-theoretic, truth-conditional semantics, we
saw how we can generate the insights of such a semantics from a fundamentally probabilistic
semantics.
5.2 Areas for Further Exploration
If the foregoing conception of the semantics for vague predicates is correct, it suggests a
number of areas for further exploration. I would like to first briefly discuss a few such areas,
and then end by discussing two areas at greater length: the distinction between absolute
and relative gradable adjectives, and of course, the Sorites.
5.2.1 Various Extensions
First, we might attempt to determine if the view escapes the problem of higher-order vague-
ness: in addition to the vagueness of ‘tall’, there is also the vagueness of ‘definitely tall’: even
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though someone 5′11′′ might be tall, it seems clear they are not definitely tall. Someone 7′0′′
seems definitely tall. Between these again lie borderline cases, and a probabilistic semantics
for ‘definitely’ and ‘tall’ should , one would hope, resolve this as well as it resolves first-order
vagueness.
Second, vagueness is not restricted to adjectives: there are vague nominals, such as ‘heap’,
and perhaps even cases of vague identity, such as the ship of Theseus. We might hope that
the probabilistic view advocated here could be extended to these cases too.
Third, in contrast to the truth-conditional semantics introduced in Chapter 1, we have left
unaddressed so far the effect of comparison classes on our probabilistic semantics: to be told
‘Feynman is tall‘, ‘Feynman is a tall man’, and ‘Feynman is tall for an American’ all drive
different patterns of statistical inference about Feynman’s height, and a good theory of the
semantics of vague predicates should explain how that happens. This is especially pressing
insofar as I have defined the degrees of deviation, as degrees of deviation from some measure
of central tendency, for the relevant comparison class.
Fourth, and related to the third area for further exploration, is providing a syntax for vague
predicates: whether comparison classes are arguments to the function denoted by ‘tall’, or
if they are domain restrictors, may affect what kind of syntactic structures relative gradable
adjectives can stand in.
Fifth, our semantics seems in some respects a probabilistic generalization of two-dimensional
semantics. However, the precise relation between the two frameworks is not entirely clear.
For example, certain operations which can be easily defined in the probabilistic framework,
such as marginalization before conditionalization, are not as clearly definable in the tra-
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ditional two-dimensional framework. While we might view this as a point in favor of the
probabilistic view proposed here, insofar as the availability of the operation allows us to
respect the intuition that one can learn about the language if one knows the features of the
world, or one can learn about the features of the world if one knows the language, it remains
to be seen what other operations definable in one framework, will or will not find an analogue
in the other framework. Furthermore, constraints on what kinds of operators are available
in the two-dimensional framework—specifically, what Kaplan (1989) called ‘monsters’—may
or may not be definable, or even well-motivated, in a probabilistic generalization.
Sixth, and related to the fifth, is finding a probabilistic analogue of Stalnaker’s constraints on
assertion. This is clearly related to the project of defining the transition between descriptive
and metalinguistic interpretations: since the projection of the diagonal proposition into
the horizontal is motivated by those constraints, we should also be able find analogous
probabilistic constraints on interpretation that motivate the shift from our probabilistic
descriptive interpretation to probabilistic metalinguistic interpretation.
Seventh, it should be noted that we have passed over an option for a non-Bayesian, non-truth
conditional view of the meaning of vague predicates: We could take the meaning of ‘Feynman
is tall’ to simply be the function from a prior height distribution for the relevant comparison
class, to the height distribution for the relevant comparison class that is generated by our
signaling game. Since the receiver in these games is simply probabilistically decoding the
utterance as various heights for Feynman in proportion to the rewards garnered over pre-
vious iterations of the game, they are clearly not engaged in a Bayesian reasoning process.
Now, one problem with such as view is that it is unclear how we can think of the negation
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of such a meaning; in contrast, thinking of the negation of a conditional encoding proba-
bility as one minus that probability, is simply a generalization of the traditional notion of
negation. We could claim perhaps that the positive form is interpreted by the non-Bayesian
process resulting from the signaling game, and the negation is interpreted by the Bayesian
process involving the speaker’s encoding probabilities. However, this seems ad hoc. On the
other hand, we might notice that the same underlying structure that generates the decoding
probabilities, also generates the encoding probabilities: decoding of the un-negated form is
just normalization across states for a fixed signal, and decoding the negated form as 1 - the
encoding probabilities is at least not an ascension of the sender-receiver hierarchy: it is just
normalization across utterances, followed by normalization across states for the given utter-
ance, followed by 1 - the encoding probabilities for that utterance. Both methods of decoding
make use of the same underlying matrix, and we thus might try to develop a probabilistic
semantics in terms of these underlying matrices of weights that determine the encoding and
decoding behavior.
5.2.2 Scale structure
Recall that in Chapter 1 we introduced the distinction between absolute and relative gradable
adjectives, with only the latter giving rise to the phenomena characteristic of vagueness.
The difference between absolute and relative gradable adjectives can also be observed in the
patterns of entailments they allow. Consider:
(24) Sample A is more impure than sample B
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(25) Sample A is purer than sample B
Then (24) entails that sample A has more than the absolute minimum amount of impurity,
and is hence impure, and (25) entails that B cannot have the absolute minimum amount of
impurity and is hence not pure. Thus we see that (26) and (27) follow from (24) and (25),
respectively:
(26) Sample A is impure
(27) Sample B is not pure
In contrast, we see that (28) nor (29) entail (30) nor (31), respectively.
(28) Aaron is taller than Baron
(29) Aaron is shorter than Baron
(30) Aaron is tall
(31) Baron is not short.
This distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives is initially unexpected,
however, on a truth-conditional, degree-theoretic framework for gradable adjectives: on all
views within such a framework, just as ‘tall’ means, roughly, having a degree greater on the
height scale than a degree standard for the relevant comparison class, so also ‘pure’ will mean
having a degree greater on the purity scale than a degree standard for the relevant comparison
class. What then requires that the degree standard for ‘tall’ for the relevant comparison class
be contextually sensitive, whereas that for ‘pure’ for the relevant comparison class always be
the maximum value on the degree scale, invariant of context, so that the former, but not the
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latter, admits of no natural precisifications, invariant of context, and thus always gives rise
to borderline cases? Likewise, what requires that the degree standard for ‘pure’ be always
the maximum value on the degree scale such that (25), which entails that sample B is not
maximally pure, thus entails (27)? And what requires that the degree standard for ‘impure’
be always, in effect, having non-zero degree of impurity, so that (24) always entails (26), no
matter how small the difference in purity between sample A and sample B?
On Kennedy’s view, the degree standard of a positive form gradable adjective is chosen so
as to ensure the object ‘stands out’ in the context of utterance. (The requirement that
the standard be chosen so as to ensure the object stand out seems to make sense; if the
standard were not chosen to do so, gradable adjectives would not allow language users to
communicate distinctions among objects in a given comparison class.) Borrowing a term from
Williamson (2002), Kennedy claims that degree scales with neither maximum nor minimum
values, however, have no ‘natural transitions’ relative to which an object might stand out
and so where the degree standard might be placed, so adjectives that encode such scales can
only be relative gradable adjectives with contextually variant degree standards. However,
this cannot be the complete explanation for the distinction between relative and absolute
gradable adjectives, since even though degree scales with minimum or maximum values
do have natural transitions (from minimum to non-minimum values or maximum to non-
maximum values), so far nothing requires that the degree standard be placed at the minimum
or maximum values. Kennedy thus appeals to a principle of interpretive economy, according
to which participants in a discourse are required to compute the truth conditions of a sentence
in a way that maximizes the contributions of the conventional meanings—including the
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topological properties of any encoded degree scales—of its constituents.
There are problems with this explanation, however: First, there are questions as to how it fits
into a broader theory of economization. Speakers generally seem to face pressure to balance
informativeness, brevity, and ease of listener processing. What guarantees that maximiza-
tion of the contribution of the conventional meanings of the constituents of a sentence to
the computation of its truth conditions will not be in tension with these broader pressures?
Furthermore, how does the principle of interpretive economy serve these broader commu-
nicative aims, and is it derivable from them? Potts (2008) attempts to derive the principle
as a result of the cognitive prominence of endpoints, which allows them to ease coordina-
tion in signaling games; however, it is unclear how to extend his analysis to applications of
interpretive economy beyond gradable adjectives.
Second, it seems there are exceptions to these generalizations: Consider
(32) Snowboarding isn’t dangerous, but it carries some degree of risk.
This does not seem contradictory; however, the degree scale for the safe/ dangerous antonym
pair is lower open and upper closed, as evidenced by the distribution of adverbial modifiers
in example (10) in Chapter 1.
Interpretive economy would then require that ‘dangerous’ require only non-maximal degree
of safety, and so predicts it should be contradictory. (Potts’ analysis makes the same pre-
diction, and so faces the same problem.) We might claim that pragmatic slack giveth where
interpretive economy taketh away, so that even though dangerousness strictly requires only
non-maximal safety and so that many more things are dangerous than are actually called
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‘dangerous’, an assumption of speaker informativity allows us to speak as if less than merely
non-maximal safety is required. However, this explanation should generalize to other abso-
lute gradable adjectives that take maximal degree modifiers, but it does not, as we see if we
consider some examples from §1.2.2 of Chapter 1:
(33) * The assay is not impure, but there are some undesired surfactants in it.
(34) * The outcome is not uncertain, but there is some doubt about it.
(35) * That’s not inaccurate, but it is wrong in some respects.
However, it does not. Now, perhaps there are competing pressures that override pragmatic
slack for most cases of absolute gradable adjectives, thus allowing the truth conditions gen-
erated by interpretive economy to surface; however, in the absence of such, we might hope
that the probabilistic picture advanced here might shed light on the relative versus absolute
gradable adjective. Recent work by Lassiter and Goodman (2013) and Qing and Franke
(2014) has attempted characterize the distinction in terms of the distribution of thresholds
that their respective probabilistic models of interpretation generate, and then to explain
the distinction in terms of listener’s prior beliefs about what he takes to be the commonly
known truth-conditions of the utterances, and a model of the speaker’s cognitive processes,
along with assumptions about the prior distribution of the objects in the relevant compar-
ison class on the relevant degree scale. In contrast, the view proposed here would attempt
to characterize the distinction between absolute and relative gradable adjectives in terms of
the fundamentally probabilistic encoding and decoding behavior generated by the appropri-
ately constrained signaling game; ideally, we might hope to discover under what conditions
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senders and receivers in signaling games engage in signaling behavior such that words like
‘perfectly’ combine with words that also can combine with comparative, equative, and mea-
sure phrase morphology, and also under what conditions senders and receivers in signaling
games engage in signaling behavior such that ‘perfectly’ and ‘slightly’ do not combine with
words that also combine with such degree morphology. This would seem to also require that
we can also evolve signaling games in which senders and receivers engage in compositional
signaling behavior, so that the probabilities of encoding and decoding a complex signal can
be determined by the probabilities of encoding and decoding its constituent parts.
5.2.3 The Sorites
Perhaps most obviously, from a philosophical standpoint, is an application of the current
framework to the various Sorites arguments. For example, consider:
(36) a. Feynman is tall.
b. If Feynman is tall, then Einstein is tall.
c. If Einstein is tall, then Dirac is tall.
d. ...
e. Therefore, Avogadro is tall.
First, given our distinction between the primary, descriptive meaning and the secondary,
metalinguistic meaning of ‘x is tall’ we might notice that this Sorites argument appear to
be in some sense metalinguistic: we gain no information about the height of the objects
mentioned from either the initial premise or from the conditionals. If we did not know the
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height of Dirac, then when we hear ‘If Einstein is tall, then Dirac is tall’, we would infer that
Dirac is at least as tall as Einstein. The effect of the Sorites requires that we already know
the heights of all of the objects. This seems to indicate that each occurrence of ‘x is tall’
in the Sorites sequence is metalinguistic, since its height is already in the common ground:
that is, we conditionalize on the height to gain information about the thresholds. This then
allows a measure of the probability of the conditional premises: we can define this as the
proportion of the area under the posterior threshold distribution for the antecedent that is
also under the posterior threshold distribution for the consequent. Since the initial premise
is chosen such that Feynman is clearly tall, we measure its probability as 1, or else as the
proportion of the area under the threshold distribution prior to the initial premise, that is
also under the threshold distribution posterior to the first premise. We can then take the
probability of the conclusion to be the product of the probabilities of the premises; then, if
the differences in heights are small, each premise has high probability, but the conclusion
has low probability.
An alternative is to define the probability of the initial premise as the area under the sending
curve below the height of the person who is called tall in the initial premise. The probability
of each conditional premise is then defined as the area below sending curve between the
height of the person in the antecedent and the height of the person in the consequent. The
probability of the conclusion is again product of the probabilities of the premises. Here
again, if the differences in height are small, each premise may have high probability, but the
conclusion will have a low probability. We might also note that the area under the sending
curve below the height of the person called ‘tall’ in the conclusion is a measure of the prior
253
probability of the conclusion; and we might consider various desirable constraints on the
relationship between the prior probability of the conclusion, and the probability assigned to
the conclusion by the product of the probabilities of the premises. We might so something
similar under the approach in the previous paragraph, but with the prior probability of the
conclusion understand as the proportion of the area under the threshold distribution prior
to any of the premises, that is also under the the threshold distribution posterior to the
conclusion: how much, that is, is the claim ‘Avogadro is tall’ asking you to change the
threshold distribution?
Understanding each occurrence of ‘tall’ in this argument as metalinguistic also makes it
possible to understand each conditional premise as non-assertoric: just as we say, ‘If you are
going to the store then please remember the milk,’ we might also think of each conditional
premise as a request, or a proposal, as to where to put the threshold, conditional on its
already being somewhere else: ‘If Coulomb counts as tall, then please let’s count Bernoulli
as tall too.’ After all, even accounting for the fact that we seem compelled to interpret each
occurrence of ‘tall’ in the argument metalinguistically, it seems we are not gaining information
about the thresholds from argument: it is not as if . Then, again we can define a measure
of the resistance we will encounter to each of the conditional premises as the proportion of
the area under the posterior threshold distribution for the antecedent that is also under the
posterior threshold distribution for the consequent. Again, we might also define the measure
of the resistance we are likely to encounter to the conclusion, as the product of the resistance
to each of the premises.
Finally, similar to the assertoric option, we might also define the measure of the resistance
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we will encounter to the initial premise as the area under the sending curve above the height
of the person who is called ‘tall’ in the initial premise. The resistance to each conditional
premises is then defined as the area under the sending curve between the height of the
person in the antecedent and the height of the person in the consequent. The resistance
to the conclusion is again the area under the sending curve below the height of the person
called ‘tall’ in the conclusion. Here again, if the differences in height are small, each premise
may have low resistance, but the conclusion will have a high resistance.
There are, of course, other versions of the Sorites, and a full treatment on the current
proposal of all of the various forms, along with a comparison of its costs and benefits relative
to other approaches, lies beyond the scope of the present work. Nonetheless, I think it is




Barker, C. (2002). The dynamics of vagueness. Linguistics and Philosophy, 25 (1), 1–36.
Barker, C. (2013). Negotiating taste. Inquiry, 56 (2-3), 240–257.
Bogus lawski, A. (1975). Measures are measures: in defence of the diversity of comparatives
and positives. Linguistiche Berichte, 36, 1–9.
Cumming, S. (2007). Proper nouns (Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University-Graduate
School-New Brunswick).
Dowty, D. R., Wall, R., & Peters, S. (1981). Introduction to Montague semantics. Dordrecht:
Reidel.
Fox, D. & Katzir, R. (2011). On the characterization of alternatives. Natural language se-
mantics, 19 (1), 87–107.
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